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Focused contextually on the labour movement in Singapore, this thesis examines the key 
roles and functions played by labour unions here, claiming that they function primarily as 
agents for social integration. This assertion is made both in relation to the observed 
longstanding alignment and support given by the dominant coalition of labour unions 
under the aegis of the NTUC to the government and its principle practice of adopting a 
‘non-confrontational’ approach to industrial relations, which has led to labour unions 
functioning as conduits for the mitigation of conflict. However, structural processes alone 
are inadequate for the maintenance of such a system, another crucial contributing element 
is the support of labour union leaders whose views and perceptions are shaped not only 
by the existing objective set of social-structural conditions but also by their own 
subjective experiences, rooted in the routine day-to-day practices.  
 vii 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 The Beginning  
 
The original conception of this thesis was to examine the response of labour unions to the 
forces of globalisation, specifically, the effect of the latter on various unionised sectors 
and how labour unions were reacting to such forces; focusing namely on the strategies 
that unions employ to cope with this phenomenon. This plan proved too ambitious as I 
came to discover in the course of my fieldwork. This led to the attempt to answer a more 
fundamental but nevertheless important and relevant question, what is the role of labour 
unions here? 
 
The central focus to examine the role of labour unions, in particular, those within the 
dominant ‘mainstream’ coalition of labour unions aligned under the aegis of the National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), is motivated both by the dearth of information within 
the contemporary labour field and the need to elucidate their function given the changed 
contextual circumstances (since its founding) and the plethora of criticisms that have 
been levelled against them.  
 
To this end, some of the questions that this thesis will seek to answer include the 
following: Is there a rationale for the continued existence of unions? What is the 
underlying nature of the relationship between the government and unions? Are the latter 
marionettes in the service of the former? 
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Theoretically, the study of Singapore’s labour movement tend to take either one or a mix 
of these approaches: 1) Modernisation theory; this details how the role and influence of 
unions and their relationship with political parties is tied to the stage and period of 
economic development (Frenkel 1993: 5-8). Later industrialising countries like the 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), which are likely marked by a strong state 
presence and ‘pressure to contain union activity’ would see less empowered labour 
movements with a more limited role and scope of action (Frenkel 1993: 8).  
 
Anantaraman 1990, Chew et al 1989 and Deyo 1981b examined the development of 
Singapore’s labour movement and traced the emergence of its ‘bureaucratic authoritarian-
corporatism’ brand of industrial relations system in relation to its economic and 
industrialising process, which aside from the period of political upheaval leading to 
Singapore’s independence, showed the close cooperation between government and labour 
movement across the different economic development phases – through unemployment, 
EOI (Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) – up to 1990.  
 
The central idea behind the second approach, 2) International Labour-Market theory is 
that the mobility of ‘global capitalism’ gives more power and influence to multinational 
corporations (MNCs) over government in developing countries, leading to the weakening 
and increasing marginalisation of labour unions and workers due to ‘repressive public 
policies’ – ‘aimed at maintaining stability, profitability’, and the attraction of direct 
foreign investment – taken against them (Frenkel 1993: 8-9).  
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To varying degrees, Lim et al 2000, Rodan 2001 and Yeung 2001 have affirmed this 
view, citing the inevitable need to make changes in light of this ’New Economy’. For the 
state, ‘opening up the domestic economy to international competition’ makes it more 
emasculated, while for workers and labour unions, the onset of this ‘New Economy’ 
upholds efforts for ‘labour market deregulation’, notably, the legal prohibition of 
industrial action and the denial of minimum wage legislature (Lim et al 2000: 160-163, 
167-170; Rodan 2001: 164).  
 
Another approach to labour union research is the use of comparative politics and political 
Sociology (Frenkel 1993: 9). This research category theorises and examines the 
relationship between political parties or government types with labour movements, often 
doing so by incorporating the aspects highlighted in both the first and second category.  
 
Works that utilise socio-economic or political factors to draw conclusions on the nature 
of state-labour relations have been carried out by Barr (2000), Leggett (1993), Deyo 
(1981a, 1981b), Rodan (1993) and Rosa (1990). The consensus being that a ‘corporatist’ 
form of state-labour relations exists wherein labour has been ‘incorporated’ (Rosa 1990) 
by a dominant state1. 
 
The commonality that course through all these works is the ‘structural-institutional’ 
approach taken to examine labour, which implicitly suggests that it exists as a 
                                                 
1
 While Deyo claims this corporatism to be ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ in nature, Barr (p.481) – borrowing 
David Brown’s term – claims that it leans closer towards ‘inclusionary corporatism’ – in Brown, D. (1994) 
The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London, New York: Routledge) p.89. 
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homogeneous monolith. This oversimplification as a result of generalising state-labour 
relations offers no understanding of the dynamic and complex relations that belie it. In 
particular, it fails to address the motivations for the quiescence and support given by the 
‘agents’ of labour, namely, union members and its practitioners.  
 
1.2 Thesis Aims and Arguments 
 
While the broad aim of this thesis is to identify the primary role and function of the 
dominant ‘mainstream’ coalition of labour unions aligned under the aegis of the NTUC, it 
seeks to do this from the perspective of the agents within it. The argument being that 
support from agents stemming from their beliefs and perceptions is a crucial factor in 
maintaining the roles and functions of unions. 
 
Even though tracing the trajectory of historical-structural linkages is fundamentally 
important to understanding institutions and their workings in the present, they are not the 
sole determinants. Often, there is a tendency to gloss over how institutional structures are 
inhabited and governed by agents whose actions affect how they function. Thus, an 
understanding of the relationship between institutional structures is not complete without 
an examination of the agents who operate within them.  
 
In this sense, the established ‘cooperative’ labour-government relationship cannot be 
assumed to be a de jure, given that labour unions are not passive partners. Instead, the 
condition of this relationship needs to be understood as the resultant effect of an active 
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and conscious decision making process made by individual agents, specifically, labour 
union leaders, whose decisions are shaped by a complex set of mutually reinforcing 
social-structural conditions.   
 
The result of this is the proposition that labour unions in Singapore function primarily as 
an integrative force in society. This first proposition view labour unions to be socially 
integrative to the extent that they help manage and diffuse conflict, preventing their 
escalation often by asserting common interests that are nationalistically oriented.  
 
The second question that this thesis addresses is this: what enables this system of 
industrial relations – which emphasises non-confrontational approaches – to be 
maintained? The key to this rests on the support from practitioners, who through the 
course of their experience within the labour unions’ system, come to identify with, 
support, and reinforce this particular system, thereby enabling its continuation.  
 
The focus here is the examination of ‘processes’; how structure interacts with agency in a 
dialectically mutually reinforcing relationship that characterises the relationship between 
the labour movement and the government here. This requires the examination of the 
following components: Structurally, the legislative framework governing labour relations, 




In terms of agency, and a contributing aspect of this thesis, how the views of individual 
practitioners influence their actions and participation that contribute to the maintenance 
of the labour relations system. What views and opinions do they hold with regards to the 
purposes of labour unions?  
 
The significance of this stems from their being an incidence of agency and structure: 
How do structural factors influence the decision-making, and thereby the actions of an 
individual? How then do individual actions affect existing structural relations? The 
convergence of these considerations on the individual, means that the participant actor is 
not only subject to structural influences but is also in a position to influence (i.e. change 
or perpetuate) structural processes, provides the justification for giving emphasis to the 
individual actor, the labour union leader. 
 
The thesis’s focus on the concerns outlined above is neither an apology nor an 
endorsement of the manner in which the labour movement in Singapore is structured or 
operates. More modestly, it hopes to provide a better understanding as to the opinions and 
perspectives held by the agents – namely the leaders and practitioners – within the 
movement, and to show the subtle yet complex dialectical manner in how these 
subjective views are both shaped by and go towards reinforcing the established structural 
institutional norms.  
  
1.3 Structure and Organisation of Thesis 
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This thesis will be organised as such: The first chapter covers Singapore’s labour 
relations system, detailing the legislative framework governing it, as well as the legal-
structural procedures for the resolution of labour disputes. This will help contextualise 
the examination of the labour movement – specifically the NTUC – and how it is 
organised. The second chapter will be devoted to the discussion of research methodology, 
and a review of some the key difficulties encountered in the course of the research.  
 
Tracing the historical rise of Singapore’s labour movement, Chapter 3 seeks to identify 
the key factors that have influenced the movement’s development. Aside from showing 
the inextricable influence of the past on the present, the intention is to show how 
individuals’ understanding of the present is shaped by the interpretive understanding of 
the social-historical trajectory.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews not only the theoretical frameworks used to examine, locate and 
analyse Singapore’s labour movement but also discusses the interrelationship between 
labour practitioners and their environment as well as their mutual influence within the 
scope of agency-structure analysis. Lastly, Chapter 5 will offer a more substantive 
analysis of the labour movement (with an emphasis on the NTUC), highlighting some of 
the contemporary concerns and issues.  
 
1.4 Leaders run a Movement  
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Although it is accurate to say that a labour movement does not consist solely of its 
leaders, one cannot ignore the influence they wield. Occupying positions of authority 
within unions, they act simultaneously as representatives of their membership, 
articulating the concerns of their constituents; while being agents subject to the higher 
authority of the labour confederation, where they work to disseminate and implement 
initiatives passed by the latter. 
 
As intermediaries between confederation and members, their importance – and this 
thesis’s decision to focus on them – arise from their role as gatekeepers who are 
responsible for determining on the one hand, which ‘concerns’ or ‘issues’ to highlight 
and the intensity to lobby them; and on the other, the degree of attention and effort that 
are invested into federation initiated programmes.  
 
1.5 Overview – Industrial Relations System  
 
The aim of the following sections are as follows: one, to explore the role of unions from 
the perspectives of its practitioners; two, to detail the operation of the industrial relations 
system, in particular, the established system for resolving industrial disputes; and three, 
to examine how the NTUC is structured and organised.  
 
1.5.1 Overview and Role of Unions 
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Overall, union membership has seen a steady increase since the late 1980s, rising from 
205,717 members in 1987 to 443,983 in 2004 (see Table 1A). Union density, which looks 
at union membership as a percentage of the number of employed persons has also risen. 
In 1993, only 14.8% of the working population was unionised, this rose to 15.4% in 
1999, and leapt later to 19.3% in 2002 and 21.5% in 2004 (see table 1B).  
 
Functionally, union leaders are of the view that the role of unions may be bundled into 
two categories: The first is ‘to protect and enhance the well being of workers’; and the 
second, is to ‘provide them with representation’ (Interview 16: 2), with the aim to attain 
‘good conditions [and] equitable pay’ (Interview 15: 3).  
 
In practice, the two are difficult to distinguish, but may still be divided into several 
notional areas: 1) One involves [the negotiation of the terms and condition of 
employment] (Interview 3a: 4), which involves remunerative conditions for employment, 
such as salary, [annual increment and bonus] (Interview 9: 6) and other additional non-
monetary ‘non-standard [enhancements]’ (Interview 9i: 10). 2).  
 
2) Another is the provision of representation to members in the event of disputes and 
unhappiness, which tend to manifest in the form of grievance handling, as well as the 
mediation of disputes and unhappiness. 3) Further, unions are also seen to serve as a 
‘channel of communication’ (Interview 8: 3) that would enable ‘work improvement’ 
(Interview 8: 2) and aid in improving worker-management relations.  
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Table 1A: Employee Union Membership and NTUC Membership  
1960 - 2003 
     
Year  Number of Unions  Membership1 NTUC Membership2 
 
         
1960 130 144,770 -  
1961 124 164,462 -  
1962 122 189,032 -  
1963 112 142,936 -  
1964 106 157,050 101824  
1965 108 154,052 112635  
1966 108 141,925 104626  
1967 106 130,053 92930  
1968 110 125,518 88401  
1969 110 120,053 88558  
1970 102 112,488 85423  
1971 100 124,350 96227  
1972* 97 166,988 142762  
1973 92 191,481 168090  
1974 90 203,561 189214  
1975 89 208,561 196622  
1976 91 221,936 211956  
1977 90 229,056 216890  
1978 89 236,907 226306  
1979 85 249,710 236628  
1980 83 243,841 232895  
1981 86 224,362 211548  
1982 89 214,337 203077  
1983 90 205,155 198268  
1984 86 192,394 186111  
1985 84 201,132 197320  
1986 83 200,613 200082  
1987 83 205,717 203569  
1988 83 210,918 209051  
1989 86 212,874 209193  
1990 83 212,204 211575  
1991 83 217,086 216291  
1992* 81 228,686 230000  
1993* 82 235,723 236110  
1994 82 232,927 234363  
1995 81 235,157 237443  
1996 83 255,020 257815  
1997 82 260,130 262484  
1998 80 272,769 277507  
1999* 76 289,707 293831  
2000 72 314,478 312794  
2001 71 338,311 337387  
2002 70 389,676 387278  
2003 68 417,166 406449  
2004 68 443,893 -  
 
1Figures from MOM; 2 Figures are as at Dec each year from NTUC National Delegates Conference Oct 
2003  







Table 1B: Union Membership as a Percentage of  
Employed Persons (1993-2004) 
     
Year  Employed Persons (at mid-year) Union Membership Union Density  
 
     
1993 1,592,000 235,723 14.8%  
1994 1,649,000 232,927 14.1%  
1995 - 235,157 -  
1996 1,748,000 255,020 14.6%  
1997 1,830,000 260,130 14.2%  
1998 1,870,000 272,769 14.6%  
1999 1,886,000 289,707 15.4%  
2000 - 314,478 -  
2001 2,047,000 338,311 16.5%  
2002 2,017,000 389,676 19.3%  
2003 2,034,000 417,166 20.5%  
2004 2,067,000 443,893 21.5%  
     
Source: Employed Persons - MOM, Union Membership - MOM 
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1.5.2 Collective Agreement and the Bargaining Process 
 
One importance of unions, often deemed to be the capstone of trade unionism, is that they 
confer protection in the employment of workers through the conduct of CA (Collective 
Agreements). Without this, [the terms and conditions of employment would not be as 
good, and workers are vulnerable to exploitation since it is really up to the ‘whims and 
fancies of the company’] (Interview 2a: 1) 
 
The terms and conditions of employment stipulated by a CA generally encompass (but is 
not limited to) the following aspects: wages; number of work hours; benefits such as 
annual, medical, maternity or marriage leave, medical coverage; extra-monetary 
recompense, such as AWS (Annual Wage Supplement), AVC (Annual Variable 
component) or vocational-related allowances; overtime terms; welfare or ‘[non-standard] 
benefits’ (Interview 9h: 5); and compensation derived due to workforce retrenchment2. 
 
However, ‘there are [also] agreements that are not stated in the CA’ (Interview 9a: 54). 
These unrecorded clauses arise when companies ‘don’t want [the benefits] to be 
published’ (Interview 9a: 54) and revealed to their competitors. 
 
                                                 
2
 AWS – Known colloquially as the ‘13th Month Bonus’, this payment , which is equivalent to a full 
month’s pay, is commonly viewed (where it is paid out) as an inviolable fixed year end payment – paid out 
to all employees of a firm irregardless of their performance. The AVC on the other hand is a non-
cumulative incentive bonus paid according to the individual’s work performance.  
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Usually, a CA is in force for a period of ‘not less than 2 years or not more than 3 years’, 
and are negotiated by unions on a company-to-company basis3. Industry wide bargaining 
is not practiced in Singapore; while ‘companies … do not want to do industry bargaining’ 
(Interview 10: 12) because of the immense difficulty in setting a common standard given 
their varying financial means, workers object to it because it threatens those who 
currently have better benefits.  
 
According to the Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 136), collective bargaining can only 
be undertaken by a trade union recognised by the employer for ‘bargainable’ workers. 
The latter group, ‘as defined by the law, [refers to] non-executive, non-managerial and 
non-confidential’ (Interview 9: 2) employees, basically, individuals who has ‘no 
supervisory responsibility’ (Interview 9: 2) (Singapore Statutes Cap.136)4. 
 
To be recognised, the union first needs to ensure than more than 50% of the bargainable 
workers are its members, only then can the union serve a notice (under Section 18 of the 
Industrial Relations Act) to the employer stating that ‘[they] represent [a] majority of 
[the workers]’ and that the employers ‘have to give [them] legal recognition’ (Interview 
9a: 5). When this is acknowledged, the union can then ‘serve a notice [an invitation to 
negotiate] to the employer’ (Interview 9a: 5).  
 
However, the union’s demand for recognition may be challenged by employers:  
                                                 
3
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 25 (5) (a). In the negotiation of the CA with the management, 
the union is usually represented by members of the branch committee and the Industrial Relations Officer 
(IRO) assigned to the branch. 
4
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 17 and Section 30 (1) 
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‘we don’t believe you have 51%, we want to challenge you through a secret 
ballot, [thereupon] the Ministry of Manpower as provided by law will step in and 
conduct a secret ballot’ (Interview 9: 5). 
 
If successful, the management would be legally bound to recognise the legitimacy of the 
union and upon receipt of the union’s invitation to negotiate would have to serve a reply 
within the next 7 days stating its acceptance or non-acceptance of the union’s invitation 
to negotiate (Singapore Statutes Cap.136)5. 
 
If the invitation to negotiate is not accepted, the party serving the invitation may then 
notify the Commissioner of Labour6. The latter would then meet with (either) the 
employer (or the union) in order to persuade them to accept the invitation (Singapore 
Statutes Cap.136)7. If this fails, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and the Registrar of 
the Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC) will be notified, and a trade dispute would be 
deemed to have occurred.  
 
If unresolved within 14 days, the Commissioner of Labour may consult with both parties 
and offer to help them reach a conciliation (Singapore Statutes Cap.136)8. If the situation 
persists 7 days after consultation, it would be referred to the Ministry of Manpower. The 
                                                 
5
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 19. The invitation to enter into collective bargaining may be 
served by either union or the employer. In either case, the recipient of the invitation has 7 days to give an 
acceptance reply.  
6
 Once recognition has been established, either the union or the employer may serve notice for negotiation.  
7
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 20 (1) and (2) 
8
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 21 – 14 days after serving Section 18. 
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Minister may then direct that compulsory conferences be held (Singapore Statutes 
Cap.136)9. 
 
1.5.3 Labour Disputes and their Resolution  
 
Even if collective bargaining does proceed, negotiations can collapse either as a result of 
acrimony or because no agreement could be attained. When this happens, the union and 
management may apply for arbitration either jointly or unilaterally. Previously, I 
discussed the resolution process when the employer refuses to negotiate. I will now 
discuss the process of dispute resolution (applicable to collective bargaining or situations 
of conflict) when attempts at resolution between union and management fail or become 
deadlocked.  
 
In the above scenario, union or management may request for the MOM to act as an 
arbiter. Should the matter fail to be resolved at this level, either party can file an 
application for the dispute to be heard at the Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC), or they 
could be referred there by the manpower ministry.   
 
But even before the matter ‘goes to [the] arbitration court …, the practise nowadays is to 
settle out of court … the judiciary … will try to mediate in chambers and get both parties 
to try and settle’ (Interview 9f: 3). This ‘chamber mediation’ is the last opportunity for 
settlement before an open court hearing.  
 
                                                 
9
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 23 – Compulsory Conferences 
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During such a meeting the ‘Registrar will tell you your legal points and whether you can 
win or lose; and they tell you “compromise and don’t embarrass in the open court”’ 
(Interview 4a: 10). Sometimes, they may,  
‘[see the union separately] and say: “you go, sure lose, reason so and so”, which 
they cannot tell. Sometimes it can be because of Singapore’s economy [and the 
union] tried asking [for] too much’ (Interview 4a: 10). 
To the employer:  
‘“you go, your company’s name gets spoilt, [actually your company’s name is] 
very good, [so] why go and do all these?” Open court wait [appear in] papers. 
That’s why [in] Singapore, very few go to open court’ (Interview 4a: 10).  
Should this fail, the IAC will decide ‘how the dispute is to be settled’ (Interview 9f: 3). 
The outcome of which is final and ‘binding on both parties’ (Interview 9f: 3).  
 
The strong emphasis on settlement stems not just from the view that:  
[The need for arbitration is in itself a kind of failing, since it showed that both 
parties were unable to compromise with each other and that it is very likely that 
one party would eventually lose out] (Interview 15: 10), 
but also because victory is uncertain.  
 
Unions may lose their case if it was not presented properly. This is due not just to having 
the burden of providing evidential documentation that is verifiable, a task that gains 
added difficulty given the need to negotiate legalist interpretations which employers may 
exploit to their advantage (see Annex 1.1).  
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1.5.4 The Arbitration Process and its Implications  
 
Lamenting the present, one union leader remarked that in the past, ‘the ministry is quite 
helpful’ (Interview 5: 7) and ‘the registrar of the arbitration [is] very effective’ 
(Interview 5: 6); ‘they are supportive of the workers’ (Interview 5: 6),  
‘if [a] case [is referred] to [the] arbitration court, the arbitration court [would 
be] very strict with them … ultimately, the management learn … to live with the 
union and … they also learn [that] when they make profit, they also have to share 
with the workers’ (Interview 5: 7).   
 
However it is perceived that this is no longer the case; legislation and regulations are 
perceived to have become increasingly opaque and bureaucratic (technical and difficult to 
understand) to the extent that that it is felt that the ‘ministry and [the] arbitration court 
[are] not doing their job’ (Interview 5a: 31) (See Annex 1.2).  
 
This is seen to be one of the three elements contributing to the deteriorating situation of 
unions, which ‘over the past 10 or 20 years [have] definitely become [weaker and 
weaker]’ (Interview 5: 6). The other two being the absence of effective union leadership 
because ‘there is no union leader’ (Interview 5: 6) and unions themselves being ‘unable 
to maintain the members’ (Interview 5: 6). 
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Additionally, one consequence of having a gradational and systemic dispute resolution 
system is the notable absence of any industrial actions or strikes, which may only take 
place should conciliation fails (Singapore Statutes Cap.333); a remote possibility to say 
the least, given the compulsory and legislatively enforceable nature of arbitration10.  
 
1.5.5 Employment Practices, Union Organisation and Wage Policies 
 
In Singapore, employment practices are governed primarily by the Employment Act 
(Chapter 91). There is no stipulation of minimum wage and Part IV of the act, which 
covers rest days, work hours and other conditions of service, are only applicable to 
‘workmen’ and employees whose [salary does not exceed $2,000 a month]11. Setting a 
minimum wage is regarded as a pointless endeavour: ‘you can have minimum wage, then 
you have a black market … There will be people [the foreign workers] willing … to take 
a lower [pay] than your minimum wage’ (Interview 10: 62). 
 
Employers on the other hand, have full prerogative over promotions, transfers, 
employment and termination, retrenchment, and the allocation of duties which may not 
be included into the collectively agreement12. This is rationalised as not to place undue 
constraints on employers and enable the development of a free labour market. However, 
                                                 
10
 Trade Union Act (Cap. 333) Section 27 (15) – Definition of ‘Industrial Action’ 
11
 Employment Act (Cap. 91) Section 35. (Interview 10: 62) – The stipulation of minimum wage is seen to 
be a pointless endeavor as it merely encourages the development of a ‘black market’: ‘you can have 
minimum wage, then you have a black market … There will be people [the foreign workers] willing … to 
take a lower [pay] than your minimum wage’. 
12
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 18 (2) (a) – (f)  
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management have been known to exploit these prerogatives to resist the entry of labour 
unions into their companies. 
 
Despite having legal provisions to protect union members from discrimination unions 
still [have difficulty trying to organise workers] (Interview 9b: 2) 13. While part of this is 
due to ‘apathy, ignorance [and] workers’ attitudes’ (Interview 9a: 26), employers have 
also been known to adopt ‘union-busting’ (Interview 9a: 24) tactics. 
 
For instance, it is ‘very common [for the management to sack the ringleader] trying to get 
people to join the union’ (Interview 9a: 23). In these cases, even though ‘there is 
protection against victimisation in the law’ very little can be done because ‘victimisation 
is very hard to prove’ (Interview 9: 15). As such, unions have to be ‘discreet [in 
organising unions’ (Interview 11: 11). 
 
The negotiation of wages between employees and employers usually take place without 
government intervention. But tripartite cooperative efforts between government, 
employers and labour have seen the establishment of national bodies like the National 
Wages Council (NWC), whose role is to offer recommendations on wage matters such as 
bonuses and increments (Rosa 1990: 492-3)14. These recommendations are made in 
relation to both productivity gains and the performance of the Singapore economy as a 
whole (Rosa 1990: 493).  
 
                                                 
13
 Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 79 and 80. 
14
 The NWC was established in 1972. 
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The creation of such centralised guidelines serves four main purposes. First, it legitimises 
organised labour’s claim to an equitable share of the economic rewards, and serves as a 
measure to diffuse and prevent the rise of any potential conflict during collective 
negotiation thereby preserving industrial peace. Third, having centralised guidelines 
allow for the preservation of Singapore’s economic competitiveness by restricting the 
share that goes to labour (Rosa 1990: 493). 
 
Lastly, the representation of labour through the NTUC in this tripartite arrangement 
ensures the organisational involvement – if not subordination – of the labour movement, 
which can be seen from the higher incidence of NTUC affiliated unions adopting 
recommendations put forth by the national tripartite body (MOM 2006b: 22)15. 
 
1.6 Background – NTUC Structure and Organisation 
 
As the sole labour confederacy in Singapore, the NTUC occupies a position of unrivalled 
dominance, claiming a membership in excess of 460,000 and having 93% of all labour 
unions – 63 of the 68 labour unions – in the country affiliated with it (NTUC 2007). 
Given this dominance, it would be an understatement to claim that it heavily influences 
the character of the labour movement here, making its discussion a necessary one. 
                                                 
15
 In a survey carried out by the Manpower Ministry, it was found that unionized firms have a higher 
incidence of adopting the key recommendations put forth by the NWC. Of three key recommendations 
suggested by the NWC: 1) linking variable bonus to Key Performance Indicators (KPI), 2) implementing a 
Monthly Variable Component (MVC), and 3) narrowing maximum minimum salary ratio (Max-Min 
Ratio), the implementation rate by unionized establishments was reported to be 75.6%, 75%, 67.4% for 
each of the respective recommendation. Contrasted with this, the proportion of non-unionized 
establishments that implemented the same recommendations was 40.8%, 17.4% and 56.5% respectively 
(Table 12).  
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1.6.1. Branch Committee  
 
How are the NTUC and its affiliated unions structured and governed? Beginning at the 
level of individual labour unions, each union consists of the membership from various 
branches, with each branch representing workers of a unionised company. Except when 
there are too few members where it is ‘not practical to have a committee’ (Interview 9d: 
10), the unionised workers in each branch will elect from amongst themselves a branch 
committee, who will then function as their representative in liaising with the union or 
during negotiations with the management16. 
 
These elections which are seen as ‘quite a democratic process’ and ‘quite informal, 
[done] by show of hands or ballot paper’ (Interview 9c: 11), can be done in two ways: 
 
‘one is to convene a general meeting and then elect there and then; … people are 
nominated and then the names are put up, and the members at the meeting will 
vote for each position and the person with the highest vote, say two names may be 
nominated for chairman so the person with the highest vote becomes the 
chairman, and then next position is secretary and so on’ (Interview 9c: 11)17. 
 
                                                 
16
 (Interview 9c: 28) – ‘less than ten we don’t have a committee, we say just appoint one… to be the liaison 
person’.  
17
 (Interview 9c: 11) – Depending on the arrangement (within the branch), there can be a variation in the 
sense that the nominee who fails to secure the post contested for may be allowed to fill the next available 
post. The three most common positions are: Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer. 
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‘… another method will be we say ok we will just nominate a committee of x 
[number of people] because we need x to cover all the departments … the 
members just nominate and then this x after they have been duly nominated and 
elected … they will amongst themselves decide who to be chairman and secretary’ 
(Interview 9c: 11). 
 
The first method where members vote directly for those who wish to stand or have been 
nominated for a particular position is termed by one interviewee as the ‘open system’ 
(Interview 4b: 2); while the second which is currently used during the selection of the 
NTUC’s Central Committee is called the ‘direct system’ (Interview 4b: 2). Although the 
term-of-office for the Branch Committee (BC) has ‘recently [been] amended’ (Interview 
9c: 12) to four years, changes and reshuffling may take place when required by 
circumstances or if deemed necessary by the committee. 
 
More commonly, changes and reshuffling may be the result of members having 
‘[resigned from the] company’ or in some cases promoted, leading to some positions 
being ‘[left] vacant’ (Interview 9c: 12). In such cases, the committee has the option of 
conducting a reshuffle of the committee without looking for a replacement member, or 
they may at their discretion, look for an additional member to replace the member who 
left or otherwise simply carry on with the status quo till the next election.   
 
However, in some instances it is due to ‘the person elected … not performing’ or ‘human 
factor issue [such as] personality cash or people don’t work well together’, in which case 
 23 
‘the IRO (Industrial Relations Officer) have to solve the problem’ by consulting with the 
committee to either get them ‘to talk to the person to make a change or a switch’ 
(Interview 9c: 12). 
 
1.6.2 Union Executive Committee 
 
One level up from the BC is the Union Executive Committee (EXCO). This body serves 
principally as the governing body of the union and oversees ‘the day-to-day 
administration of the union’ (Interview 9c: 23). It comprises union delegates who are 
elected into the committee during the union’s triennial delegates’ conference – during 
which ‘the EXCO will report back to the delegates who are the branch rep on the 
finances of the union, the policies, what’s been happening over the last 3 years’ 
(Interview 9c: 22)18. 
 
In order to stand as a nominee for election into the EXCO, a union member must first be 
a union delegate, chosen from amongst the members within the BC. Although it is 
‘normally the rule of thumb … that the branch secretary will be the delegate’ (Interview 
9c: 22), this also depends on other factors, key amongst which is the size of the branch 
the delegate comes from. 
 
While the delegate to members ratio differs from union to union (according to the 
individual union’s constitution), the ratio is usually 1 delegate for every 50 branch 
                                                 
18
 Like the Branch Committee the term-of-office for the Union EXCO is in the midst of being revised into a 
4-year term. 
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members (Interview 8: 1)19. Branches that are too small (‘less than ten’) where there is 
not even a branch committee will not be represented by a delegate, only a ‘liaison officer’ 
who may then ‘come as [an] observer’ (Interview 9c: 28)20. 
 
In order to prevent larger branches, which are predisposed by virtue of their having more 
delegates, from dominating the EXCO, some unions impose certain restrictions such as 
stipulating that ‘a branch cannot have more than [an x number of individuals] sitting in 
the EXCO’ (Interview 4b: 4)21. It is from this pool of union delegates from the various 
branches of the union that the EXCO of the union is formed. The process being akin to 
that which takes place in the BC, where elections may be conducted either in the open or 
direct system style. 
 
It should however be pointed out that not all EXCO members need to be elected. The 
constitution of some unions contains provisions that allow some members to be 
appointed. The ‘appointed ones will be the full-time staff, [they are] not from the branch, 
[they] are full-time employees’ (Interview 9c: 23) – IROs (Industrial Relations Officer). 
 
1.6.3 NTUC Central Committee 
 
At the highest level, the NTUC is governed by the NTUC Central Committee 
(NTUCCC), ‘the decision making body for NTUC’ (Interview 4a: 25); ‘a executive 
                                                 
19
 We place an emphasis on branch members in order to distinguish this from the general membership of 
the union, a topic we will discuss later.  
20
 An observer has no voting rights.  
21
 (Interview 4b: 4) – In the case of this interviewee, only ‘maximum 3 can sit in the EXCO’. 
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committee of NTUC’ (Interview 4a: 22) headed by the NTUC Secretary-General, which 
decides on a wide range of matters such as the increase in membership dues or the 
decision to invest union money overseas (ST 2005, 23 Sep)22. Comprising 21 members, 
the NTUCCC is elected once every 4 years; this was a change that was first implemented 
in 2003. Previously, the NTUCCC election was held once every 3 years (ST 2003, 7 
Oct)23. 
 
The process by which this committee is formed closely resembles that of the union’s 
EXCO: ‘each union EXCO will … appoint delegates to the NTUC delegates conference 
to elect the NTUC EXCO, which is called the Central Committee’ (Interview 9: 21). 
Similar to the union EXCO, the number of NTUC delegates that may represent each 
union is dependent on its membership size – both ordinary and general24.  
 
The system functions on the principle of proportional representation works in such a way: 
‘for the first 400 paid up member 1 delegate for every 25 members or part thereof 
…. Then 401 to 1,000, 1 delegate for every 50 member ….Above 1,000 paid up 
members 1 delegate for every 100 member. ’ (Interview 4b: 7) 
 
This illustration was provided by an interviewee to show how the number of delegates an 
individual union branch was entitled to send to the union EXCO was determined. Our 
                                                 
22
 (Straits Times 2005: ‘Union Membership Fees to Increase Next Year’, 23 Sep) 
23
 (Straits Times 2003: ‘Unionists to Chart Movement’s Direction’, 7 October) – The last three year term 
NTUC Central Committee was elected in October 2003. 
24
 (Interview 4b: 6) – In addition, the union is allowed to bring in 1 observer for every 1 delegate, though 
the ‘observer got no voting right’.  
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reference to it is merely to illustrate that the calculation of delegates a labour union could 
send to the NTUC delegate conference works on the same principle (ST 2000, 28 Mar)25. 
 
Although the institution of proportional representation is ‘so you will not have dominance 
of one union’ (Interview 4b: 4), ‘there was a lot of argument that it’s not fair’ (Interview 
4b: 3) to include general branch membership because this way, if ‘the industrial unions 
all vote they will sure win’ since they have ‘got a lot of general branch’ members 
(Interview 4b: 4). What this illustrates is the large representation size of the largest 
(usually industrial ot general) unions; ‘if all the big [unions] can form a coalition and say 
ok let’s all help each other … they can influence something’ (Interview 4b: 5). 
 
It is notable too that the election of the NTUCCC follows the direct system, wherein the 
NTUC delegates are only responsible for electing the 21 members of the NTUCCC, 
whereupon these 21 would then amongst themselves decide who would fill what position 
within the central committee (Interview 4a: 30). 
 
1.7 Turf Management  
 
The NTUC categorises labour unions into four types. 1) General unions; non-industry 
specific, these unions have a diversity of branches in various industries. 2) Industrial 
unions; cover specific industries, and are responsible for all branches in that particular 
industry. 3) Craft/Job unions; represent workers engaged in a particular line of vocation 
                                                 
25
 (Straits Times 2000: ‘Boon Heng Among 23 in NTUC Polls’, 28 Mar) – In the 2000 Triennial NTUC 
Delegates’ Conference, there were 359 voting delegates.  
 27 
or trade; and 4) House unions, which are enterprise based unions that provide 
representation for bargainable employees within that particular enterprise only. 
 
The categorisation of unions functions as a strategy for ‘turf management’ (Interview 3: 
1); by establishing specific boundaries so as to prevent unions from ‘[entering] into each 
[other’s] turf area. … this guideline was created … for those affiliated unions of [the] 
NTUC’ (Interview 3: 1). The system works like this:  
‘before the union move into a company to unionise, [they] have to … inform 
NTUC membership department that [they] intend to move, [if there are] any other 
union interested in the same company [they] will sit down and discuss which is 
the proper union to go [in], this is the [rule]’ (Interview 3: 2). 
 
The aim of ‘this turf rule is [to create] an understanding’ (Interview 3: 2), which helps to 
prevent and manage disputes amongst unions when they arise, relying on the NTUC as 
the central authority figure. However, turf demarcation also has the unintended result of 
favouring the growth of some unions over others as boundaries limits the unionisation 
extent of unions, since they cannot unionise beyond their established scope26. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary  
 
                                                 
26
 A point we shall elaborate on in Chapter 5.  
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This chapter began with the examination of some approaches used to examine labour 
unions, in particular, the labour movement in Singapore, and how these approaches 
possess an overly structural bias, having too much of an institutional emphasis.  
 
Within this context, this study stipulates that examination of institutional-structural 
conditions must not come at the expense of neglecting the views and role played by 
agents who participate within the structure, given that it is through their participation that 
structural conditions and organisations come to be realised, maintained and acquire their 
distinct characteristics.  
 
In this way, an understanding of Singapore’s labour movement, its function and long 
standing relationship with the government cannot be complete without taking into 
account the beliefs, perceptions and motivations held by individuals working within it 
and the structural institutional processes that influence them.  
 
Having established this, the main body of this chapter sought to contextualise this study 
by providing a cursory examination of the industrial relations system, focusing on the 
role of labour unions, employment practices, and the manner in which collective 
bargaining and dispute resolution is carried out. The structure and organisation of the 
NTUC was then briefly examined, with attention given to the design of its electoral, 
delegate representation and union management system.  
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The following chapter will deal with the issue of research methodology. There, I will not 
only discuss the key methods employed for gathering the data used for this research, but 
also, some of the research difficulties encountered, ethical concerns, and the referencing 
method used for citation purposes. 
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Chapter 2 – Methodology 
 
2.1 Establishing Contact  
 
An early difficulty in this research was to gain entry and establish contacts with potential 
interviewees. It did not help that I had no personal contacts that might have been able to 
help in a less officious way, a factor which would have aided the research process given 
the requisite need for trust and rapport.  
 
This lack of informal contacts led me to embark on the only other viable alternative of 
making ‘prospecting’, essentially, making ‘cold’ calls to various unions and soliciting 
their help. While prospecting, emphasis was given to target particular unions based on 
their size and the industry that they covered; a consciousness based on the initial proposal 
to study the effects of globalisation on particular industries and the response of unions to 
these changes.  
 
Using this method, I managed to secure interviews with 12 union representatives of 
unions of varying sizes, representing workers in different industrial sectors27. There were 
inevitably rejections as well, which realistically was unavoidable. While scheduling a 
first meeting with those who have consented to meet was not difficult, follow-up 
interviews were much harder to secure; this tend usually to take the form of non-response 
                                                 
27
 Labour unions had clearly demarcated representational boundaries; they were responsible for 
representing workers who fell into their sphere of influence which was carved up either along industry 
category or place of work (in the case of house unions). This allowed for a certain degree of spread in 
representation. See chapter 1 ‘Turf Management’. 
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from email communiqués or politely sidestepping the issue of scheduling another 
meeting.  
 
While further attempts could have been made to gain access, I felt that it would not be 
meaningful given the expressed unwillingness of the contact to meet again. In such cases, 
‘dogged determination’ may come across as pushy, pressurising and coercive, 
compromising researcher-respondent rapport while making it difficult for future research 
to be conducted in the same field. Thus, follow up meetings and interviews were only 
made with willing contacts. 
 
2.2 The Problem with Listening to the ‘Ayes’: Internal or Broad-based 
Consistency? 
 
The implication of this is that there is a greater reliance on particular sources, opening 
this thesis to the criticism of having a narrow focus or of being insufficiently 
representative and therefore partial and inconclusive. In addition, it also raises suspicion 
on the intentions of the contacts, who may possibly be being motivated by more personal 
or parochial interests, which again exposes the thesis to accusations of biasness and 
inaccuracy.  
 
But this risk is both necessary and unavoidable given the degree of subjectivity entailed 
by the research topic. However, the admittance and acceptance of this risk does not 
preclude any effort made to address it, and effort has been given to minimise such risk by 
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cross checking interview data received with known facts, or with interview information 
that has been gathered through different contacts. Nonetheless the concern is not so much 
to achieve broad based consistency, which the cross comparison would have (to a degree) 
provided but to ensure the individual consistency of a contact’s narrative.  
 
I have attempted to ascertain this through repetitive questioning, asking similar questions 
in subsequent interviews. Unexpectedly, this reiterative technique of revisiting previously 
discussed themes and questions has served at times to elicit new information and issues 
that were not previously mentioned by the respondent.  
 
2.3 Information Saturation: Trust and the One Voice 
 
Although the consistency, and therefore the reliability, of the views proffered by contacts 
is of some concern, this was less worrying than the homogeneity of perspectives that I 
found myself confronting. Contacts (particularly those from NTUC) almost always 
appear supportive, giving praise and applauding the merits of the labour movement. It 
was this gulf between what I experienced and the literature critique on this system that 
influenced my decision on the direction of my research. 
 
This is not to say that no critique can be made of the current industrial relations system, 
but that respondents are reluctant to of their own volition offer up any such criticisms, 
and understandably so. The worry expressed by respondents is that I might use the 
information that they provided in a manner that would result in some negative 
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repercussions for them. One respondent declined any in-depth discussion with me prior to 
my producing documentary proof of my student status, speculating that ‘for all [he] 
knows [I] might be from Amnesty International’ (Interview 1). 
 
A far fetched thought, but it highlights the vital importance of trust when conducting 
research in this field and the disadvantage that a lack of personal contact can place one in 
such a situation. Even if contacts spoke, they may do so while withholding personal or 
negative perceptions, given their uncertainty as to how I might handle the information 
they provide. This may lead them to exercise political correctness by repeating key 
catchphrases that are vaunted by the institutions they serve in 
 
Barring short-lived contacts, trust may be fostered through long-term constant contact 
albeit subjected to the willingness of the contacts themselves to do so. In which case, I 
have found that gaining the confidence of the contact can be greatly aided by supplying a 
copy of the transcript following each interview. In addition, reiterating the condition of 
confidentiality and anonymity also helps. 
 
However the effectiveness of these measures is still very much dependent on the 
willingness of the contacts to accept them on the basis of ‘faith’, which may be mitigated 
by the use of interviews as the primary research method. Even then, the use of interviews 
is not without its problems: the interview’s duration constraints the extent and intensity of 
the interaction with the interviewee and may be inadequate for cultivating rapport; 
potential momentum may be disrupted by the frequency and time interval between 
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subsequent interviews; and the role expectation (of ‘researcher’ and ‘interviewee’) 
generated by the formal “set-piece” interview setting might hinder the establishment of a 
deeper rapport. 
 
Despite the possible setbacks that may arise due to the use of interviews, it would appear 
that some measure of trust can be secured from the use of interviews. Of the 12 labour 
representatives approached, I managed to secure a follow-up (second) interview with at 
least half of them, with the remaining having expressed the openness to meet again. This 
outcome was rather unexpected and suggests that the use of formal interview may not 
deter the cultivation of trust and rapport with one’s contacts as initially feared28. 
 
2.4 Research Methodology – Interview 
 
2.4.1 Source and Approach  
 
The interviews were arranged and conducted over a period of two years between 2004 
and 2006. A total of 36 interviews were conducted with individuals from 17 different 
sources. These sources include labour unions and organisations that are part of the 
industrial relations framework29. The duration of the interviews ranged from thirty to 
forty-five minutes to under three hours, most averaged a period of one to one and a half 
hours. 
                                                 
28
 Though admittedly, such an outcome might be regarded as highly subjective and contextualised. Given 
that union representatives are generally quite wary, their willingness to speak may either be a reflection of 
trust, or that the information which they are disclosing is something is not something that they would have 
to worry about saying.  
29
 Thirteen sources were from trade unions.  
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A semi-structured approach was adopted for the interviews; a prepared questionnaire set 
that covered specific themes and topics served as a guide, but was not adhered to too 
rigorously, giving flexibility to the manner in which questions were asked and put across 
to the respondents (Fontana et al 2003: 68). 
 
Respondents were also given latitude to elaborate and speak freely and interjections were 
kept to a minimum. Follow-up questions were then made on particular points or 
statements mentioned by the respondent. The aim was to avoid creating an atmosphere 
that would be too formal and oppressive, trying instead to foster a conversational 
atmosphere that would hopefully help strengthen rapport with the respondents and make 
them feel more at ease with speaking up. 
 
2.4.2 Picking Respondents  
 
The majority of the respondents were from the labour unions and effort was taken to 
target those occupying ‘leadership’ positions within the unions. These union ‘leaders’ fall 
into two distinct categories. The first encompasses individuals employed directly by the 
labour unions or the NTUC, they can generally be categorised as IROs (Industrial 
Relations Officers).  
 
Varying in seniority, they are career professionals responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the unions and constitute the immediate liaising body between the 
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union headquarters and its members. The second category of union ‘leaders’ refers to 
elected labour union representatives from amongst the ‘rank and file’ employees of a 
company or firm30. It is individuals from these two (distinct) categories of ‘leaders’ that 
constitute our respondents.  
 
This thesis’s intention to focus on the individual and how the latter interacts with current 
social-structural conditions to maintain and realise a mutually reinforcing dialectical 
dialogue, makes the selection of labour union ‘leaders’ as the key respondents an 
appropriate one. To maximise “representativeness” I made attempts to secure interviews 
from both groups of leaders31. 
 
Labour union leaders like the IROs and representatives, occupy ‘gatekeeper’ positions 
with a role to implement organisational policy and directives, or to represent and further 
the interests of their members. Our interest then is to see how structural conditions act on 
and are reinforced in turn by the actions of these labour union leaders.  
 
2.4.3 A Qualitative Approach 
 
The focus on individual leaders and the selection of interviews as the main research 
method for gathering data reflects the realist ontological approach taken by this thesis, 
which aims to capture the descriptions and explanations offered by the respondent 
(Thomas 1993: 34). The rationale for this qualitative approach lies in its focus on the 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 1 section 1.5, for the election and appointment process.  
31
 I also interviewed non-NTUC union leaders as a way to give more balance to the views and perspectives 
of NTUC leaders.  
 37 
individual as the main unit of analysis, which hopefully would yield ‘a view from the 
inside’; capturing the subjective meanings and beliefs that arise from their [active 
experiences] and shed light on the social processes at work (Allan et al 1991: 178-180; 
Burgess 1984: 3; Denzin et al 2003:12). 
 
This approach necessarily addresses the issue of how social reality is construed, which in 
this case stresses the social constructed nature of reality, wherein the latter is not seen as 
a singular, unchanging, homogeneous monolith, but rather, comprised of a myriad of 
facets; a montage of the varying interpretations and meanings expressed by individuals 
(Denzin et al 2003: 5, 8, 12-13). 
 
A common criticism raised in relation to the use of the qualitative approach is the 
question of the validity of such a research (Denzin et al 2003: 28). But the issue of 
reliability in this research does not come about from the lack of variety in the research 
methodology, which would be more of a concern (given the need for triangulation 
purposes) had the concern of the research been centred on identifying causal relations 
rather than social processes (Allan et al 1991: 178-179). 
 
Of greater concern is the distortion that could be created as a result of the unwillingness 
of respondents to share their thoughts, beliefs and interpretations in an honest fashion, 
which is contingent on the level of rapport and trust established between researcher and 
respondent – issues which have been addressed previously in the chapter (Wirth 1946: 
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xx)32. But broadly speaking, there appears to be a low level of variation in the responses 
gathered, which would appear to fulfil the condition of generalizability, though the 
conclusion on the degree of rapport and trust built remains elusive given its subjective 
nature and the impossibility of ascertaining it. 
 
In capitalising heavily on the use of interviews, the data collection methodology that this 
paper utilises offers little difficulty in the way of replication. But the same cannot be said 
of the results gathered, which is highly contextualised both in terms of the time reference 
and the data collated, which is subjective and dependent on the personal biography of the 
respondent involved. 
 
These factors and the varying interpretations that are likely to result from the interview 
process suggest that uniform accounts are not likely to result (Allan et al 1991: 182). 
Nevertheless replicability of the study can come in the form of pursuing a similar themed 
study and the use of the methodology employed (Allan et al 1991: 183). 
 
2.5 Referencing System 
 
Crucially, there is the question as to how data gathered is going to be represented in this 
thesis. Since this thesis utilises a qualitative approach hinging heavily on the use of 
                                                 
32
 The key concern here was with the issue of objectivity and the ability to discern ‘truth’, which Wirth felt 
is not simply about the simple ‘correspondence between thought and existence’. Distortions can still result 
from ‘inadequate perception or incorrect knowledge about oneself’ and also ‘by the inability or the 
unwillingness to report ideas and perceptions honestly’.   
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interviews, there is the matter of referencing them through the use of quotations, an issue 
which raises the matter of confidentiality. 
 
To uphold the latter and to avoid the possibility of punitive reprisals befalling 
respondents as a result of what they have said or shared, I would not cite the name of the 
source for the quotes I would be using, nor would I use any pseudonyms that might 
suggest the age and gender of the individual. 
 
As I was told, ‘[the labour scene in Singapore] is very small’ (Interview 2: 1). It would 
take only a quick examination to see how true this is, making it difficult to even volunteer 
‘general’ information like ‘union size’, ‘respondent’s title’ or the industry it represents 
without revealing which union and whom the respondents were. An endeavour not helped 
by the classificatory system used to organise the (NTUC) unions33. 
 
Thus, I would simply use a two set numeral system; the first number denotes which 
interviewee it is from, the second numeral following the colon denoting the page in 
which the quote or statement was recorded34. In the case of a follow-up interview, an 




                                                 
33
 See Chapter 1 ‘Turf Management’. 
34
 All interviews – whether recorded or not – have been transcribed.  
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Undertaken as an overt research, this study offers little in the way of discussion on issues 
such like the concealment of the researcher’s identity given that respondents in this case 
are aware of their participation in a research process. In this respect, the issues faced are 
fairly different, but significantly, three issues deserve mention. 
 
The first is on the matter of openness. How much should be divulged to the respondents 
with regards to the aims of the study? This is of concern given the restriction of time and 
the desire on the part of the respondents to ‘cut to the chase’; providing too detailed a 
revelation of the study’s aims runs the risk of alienating respondents that do not agree 
with the themes and the approach of the study, who may either discontinue their 
participation or try to influence it through withholding particular information and views. 
 
The latter concern is extremely important and as is also correlated with the perceived 
threat they feel their participation and response might have on the office they that occupy. 
And this brings us to the second issue of promises; should the researcher honour promises 
made to respondents? This researcher feels a need to. In seeking the help of respondents, 
it is sometimes necessary to offer something in return, for example, the provision of the 
transcript from the interview. The drawback of which arises when respondents asks for 
the omission of certain parts of the interview from the transcript. 
 
The negotiation of which ties with the third issue of this section that is the protection of 
the respondents. In the case of this research, any information and quotations extracted 
from interviews made with respondents will be made with anonymity and as far as 
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possible not bear any distinguishing characteristics that could result in it being traced 




Chapter 3 – Development of the Modern Labour Movement: Key 




The aim in this chapter is to examine the historical rise of the labour movement in 
Singapore, an event intertwined with the advent of the NTUC (National Trades Union 
Congress), which is itself linked to the country’s political history and the ascendancy of 
the PAP (People’s Action Party). The intent is to highlight key events and developments 
that have influenced the character of the current labour movement, and through this, an 
understanding of the concerns it is preoccupied with.  
 
3.1.1 Theoretical Significance  
 
Just as the thoughts of individuals are rooted in specific social-historical situations, bound 
so to speak, with particular ‘inherited’ situations of the group, the same may be said for 
institutions (Mannheim 1991: 3). Institutions, which function as a form of social control 
by making conduct ‘more predictable’, are created through the ‘typification of 
habitualised actions by types of actors’, are historically rooted and need to be understood 
in relation to the historical circumstances that led to their founding (Berger et al 1966: 
71-72, 74, 80)35. 
 
                                                 
35
 ‘Habitualisation carries with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed’ (p.71). When 
speaking of the ‘typification of habitualised actions’, not only must the institution typify the type of 
habitualised actions, but they also have to typify the actors, combining the two process to attribute 
particular type of actions to particular type of actors (p.72).  
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But because an institution’s existence tend to precede the present – representing a 
divergence from the socio-historical context of its founding – its reality appears as a 
‘historical one’; this needs to be ‘explained’ and ‘justified’ to those in the present (for 
whom it is not part of their ‘biographical memory’ and thus have no access to its original 
meaning) in order for it to maintain its legitimacy (Berger et al 1966: 79). 
 
For institutions to have legitimacy, ‘legitimating formulas’ need to be incorporated within 
the ‘cognitive and normative interpretations’ of subsequent generations (Berger et al 
1966: 79). The subsequent legitimacy it yields can then be channelled to supporting its 
current relevance and to extract compliance (Berger et al 1966: 80). 
 
In this way, this chapter’s examination of the labour movement’s historical background 
serves principally as an examination of the ‘legitimating interpretations’ used to explain 
the role played by unions presently. It explains not only how the industrial relations order 
came into being but also forms the basis for its continued legitimation and the 
‘convincing’ socialisation of new union entrants (Berger et al 1966: 79-80)36. 
 
3.1.2 Organisation of Chapter 
 
Taking 1954, the year in which the PAP was formed as our starting point, there are three 
identifiable phases that labour underwent. The first phase was marked by the struggle for 
political control ending with the political triumph of the PAP and the depoliticisation of 
the labour movement. 
                                                 
36
 This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
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The second phase of national economic modernisation coincided with a similar 
modernisation process of the labour movement where ‘cooperation’ became the new 
guiding philosophy. The third phase witnessed the tightening grip of corporatisation 
together with an increasing centralisation of the NTUC, an emphasis on enterprise 
unionism and efforts to stem the decline of union membership.  
 
3.2 Phase I (1954 – 1968) – Period of Struggle: Political Contestation 
and Depoliticisation   
 
The period between 1954 and 1968 was characterised first by the tumultuous political 
struggle for independence amidst an internal tussle with communism, and the subsequent 
post-independence expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation. It was during 
the period within the federation where fuelled by the intense political competition and 
lobbying between political parties for power that organised labour began to mobilise and 
expand its influence (Deyo 1981b: 37).  
 
Unlike the post-war period where unions operated autonomously, unions, driven by the 
increasing politicisation, were becoming increasingly tied to political parties, who were 
dependent on them as bases of populist support and political strategy; as evident during 
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the 1955 bus and student union demonstrations against the Labour Front government 
(Anantaraman 1990: 68-69)37.  
 
3.2.1 ‘Co-leadership’ – Party-Union Synthesis 
 
The politicisation of organised labour peaked in the 1960s with the political contest 
between PAP and the Barisan Socialis (BS). The latter formed on 17 September 1961 
following ideological rifts within the PAP (Deyo 1981b: 37)38. This split created a similar 
division within the union arena as well; the BS was backed by Singapore Amalgamation 
of Trade Unions (SATU), while the PAP was supported by the NTUC.  
 
The significance of this factionalised alignment is the erosion of the boundary between 
organised labour and political parties. The close relationship is not limited to a shared 
outlook between union client and political patron but also includes a ‘co-leadership’ 
condition wherein key political figures of the PAP and BS also occupied concurrent 
leadership positions within their affiliated union organisations, a condition which raises 
the eventual question as to the fundamental compatibility between the interests of the 
party and that of labour39. 
                                                 
37
 The Singapore Bus Union called for a strike on 13 May 1955 three weeks following David Marshall’s 
government took office, they were joined later by Middle School students who formed a union, conducted 
campus sit-ins and demanded the exemption of Middle School students from conscription. This led 
eventually to a bloody confrontation with the police. The Labour Front government later on alleged that 
members of ‘the PAP Central Executive Committee (CEC) members (Fong Swee Suan particularly)’ were 
involved ‘in the agitation and riots’.  
38
 The PAP formed ‘Singapore’s first locally autonomous government’ in 1959 following the successful 
mobilization of support from the leftist labour groups.  
39
 Individuals like Fong Swee Suan and Devan Nair, who held leadership positions within the BS and PAP 
respectively, were also at the same time leading union leaders for the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers 
Union and the Singapore Teachers Union, which were correspondingly affiliated with the BS and PAP. 
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3.2.2 Political Triumph and the Consolidation of Organised Labour 
 
In November of 1963 following the PAP’s political ascendancy, SATU was denied 
registration thereby leaving the pro-PAP NTUC as the undisputed (‘legitimate’) labour 
confederacy within Singapore (Anantaraman 1990: 73-74; Chua 1995: 17; Chew et al 
1989: 53; Heyzer et al 1972: 16)40.  
 
The demise of SATU spelled the beginning of the depoliticisation of organised labour. 
An effort aided by the ‘Registration and Deregistration’ clause of the Trade Unions Act, 
which enabled the government to deregister any trade union found being ‘used for 
unlawful purposes or against the interests of the workmen’ (Anantaraman 1990: 106-
107). 
 
Judiciously complemented with the powers of political detention, it placed a stranglehold 
on the leftist unions, eliminated ‘open political opposition’ from labour and effectively 
prevented the use of organised labour as a ‘possible [base]’ to spearhead ‘organised 
sectional interests’ (Chua 1995: 18; Deyo 1981b: 37-38). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the close links between political parties and affiliated trade 
unions was not new and had already been observed to be in existence during the time of the Labour Front 
government prior to the internal split within the PAP. See (Anantaraman 1990: 68-69) – The Singapore Bus 
Union called for a strike on 13 May 1955 three weeks following David Marshall’s government took office, 
they were joined later by Middle School students who formed a union, conducted campus sit-ins and 
demanded the exemption of Middle School students from conscription. This led eventually to a bloody 
confrontation with the police. The Labour Front government later on alleged that that ‘the PAP Central 
Executive Committee (CEC) members (Fong Swee Suan particularly)’ was involved ‘in the agitation and 
riots’. 
40
 The PAP came to power following a snap election on 21 September 1963. 
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3.2.3 Depoliticisation and the Extension of Restriction  
 
While organised labour was initially depoliticised to deny the political rivals of the PAP a 
support base, more restrictions were later added. This came in the form of the Trade 
Union (Amendment) Act and the Trade Union (Amendment) Bill passed in 1966. The 
most notable feature of the former, now colloquially known as the ‘management’s 
prerogative’ under the Industrial Relations Act, is to exempt companies from having to 
negotiate with unions on matters pertaining to [hiring, firing, promotions, and internal 
transfers] (Chew et al 1989: 54; Singapore Statutes Cap.136)41. This together with the 
latter, which required unions to seek the consensus of members before conducting a 
secret ballot, heralded a new stage of organised labour relations (Chua 1995: 18; 
Singapore Statutes Cap.333)42.  
 
3.3 Phase II (1969 – 1979) – National Survival and the New Role of 
Organised Labour 
 
The hint of this new role surfaced in 1968 with the introduction of the Employment Act, 
which reduced employment costs by ‘standardising’ the amount payable on pay and 
employment benefits (Chew et al 1989: 54)43. Other than reducing labour costs, it also 
restricted the bargaining scope of unions (Chew et al 1989: 54).  
 
                                                 
41
 Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 136), Part III Section 18.  
42
 The Trade Union (Amendment) Bill was passed in August 1966. Trade Union Act (Chapter 333), Section 
27. 
43
 This included ‘bonuses, annual leave, overtime, [retirement and retrenchment benefits]’. 
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The message was clear, ‘national development’ is the priority (ST 1968, 13 Feb)44. 
Unions and workers were told that ‘better working conditions and higher wages’ cannot 
be attained through militancy, only through hard ‘work’ (ST 1968, 3 Mar)45. Placed 
within the context of the impending British withdrawal in 1971 that would render 
100,000 individuals ‘unemployed or under-employed’, it provided justification to the call 
for ‘intelligent cooperation between labour, management and Government’ (ST 1968, 8 
Apr, 14 Apr)46. 
 
Despite being a collaborative effort, it was labour that was exhorted to make the 
‘sacrifice’ deemed necessary to secure ‘national security’ and a ‘better life for all’ (ST 
1968, 14 Apr)47. The involvement of the NTUC was particularly pertinent, since it 
represented more than one quarter of the labour force at the time – ‘130,000 of 
Singapore’s 400,000 workers’ (ST 1968, 14 Apr)48. 
 
3.3.1 Why Labour must go Modern 
 
Announced in 1969 at the NTUC’s watershed ‘Modernisation of the Labour Movement’ 
seminar, the key emphasis of this ‘new approach to trade unionism’ was socio-economic 
modernisation. It was made clear that the old style trade unionism of militancy and 
                                                 
44
 (Straits Times 1968: ‘Nation before Union’, 13th Feb) 
45
 (Straits Times 1968: 3rd Mar) 
46
 (Straits Times 1968: 8th Apr); (Straits Times 1968: ‘Sacrifice Yes, Suicide No’, 14th Apr) 
47
 (Straits Times 1968: ‘Sacrifice Yes, Suicide No’, 14th Apr)  
48
 (Straits Times 1968: ‘Sacrifice Yes, Suicide No’, 14th Apr)  
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‘slogan shouting’ was now ‘obsolete’ (NTUC 1970: 33; ST 1969, 5 Oct)49. With political 
independence, labour’s interest was now inseparable from national survival, which 
requires rapid industrialisation (NTUC 1970: 19, 21). The success of which is dependent 
on creating a stable political environment and a quiescent labour movement (NTUC 
1970: 9). 
 
Despite the appeal for cooperation, organised labour in reality had little alternative given 
its financial dependence on the government, who contributed $400,000 a year, covering 
90% of their running expenses, and the veiled suggestion of a clampdown otherwise (ST 
1969, 18 Oct, 15 Nov, 18 Nov)50.  
 
While not clamping down on labour was explained as being to avoid creating ‘submissive 
and docile’ workers, it also opened the opportunity for the government to extend 
stewardship over the labour movement, thereby preventing its organic development 
(NTUC 1970: 19)51 
 
The extension of the government’s influence was aided by an abject decline in union 
membership. Between 1962 and 1969, the NTUC lost approximately 12,000 members, 
                                                 
49
 (Straits Times 1969, 5th Oct) – ‘More and more trade unions in Singapore are being stifled by inertia.’ 
Devan Nair: ‘We must wake up to the indignity of being impoverished by an uncritical adhesion to obsolete 
concepts of trade unionism’.  
50
 (Straits Times 1969: ‘NTUC Poised for Plunge into Big Business’, 18th Oct) – Statistics cited from Prof 
Tom Elliot.  (Straits Times 1969: ‘Seah: Tell your Woes’, 15th Nov), (Straits Times 1969: ‘Dependence on 
Govt for money Criticised by Delegates’, 18th Nov) 
51
 It is nevertheless also worth considering if an outright dismantling if the labour movement might have 
been in the long term favour of the government. Considering the case of Korea, while outright destruction 
of the labour movement might neutralise immediate social and political challenges from organised labour, 
it nevertheless leaves open the possibility that a renewed labour movement might arise in some future 
period; one that was organically founded, unfettered and not subject to government influence.   
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while overall union membership declined by almost 60,000 (see Table 1-A) – from 
189,000 to 121,000 – creating a loss in morale that saw the membership of the labour 
movement turning to the government rather than the leaders of the movement itself for 
leadership (ST 1969, 18 Oct)52. 
 
Workers’ dignity aside, preserving the organised labour movement provided the social 
network framework for distributing ‘a variety of [social] services to the working 
population’; this contributes to ‘economic [development]’ and serves also to act as ‘an 
effective instrument in determining public opinion’ (NTUC 1970: 6, 11, 14)53. 
 
3.3.2 Cooperation and Formation of the New Labour Movement  
 
It is undeniable that organised labour’s leadership has contributed significantly to this 
process. However, the decision to modernise the labour movement was not without its 
detractors. In the period leading up to modernisation, there was widespread 
disillusionment, criticisms and dissent amongst union leaders who feel that the NTUC’s 
new approach ‘towards workers’ problems’ was ‘feeble and compromising’ (NTUC 
1970: 29). 
 
The new employment legislature, particularly the ‘employer’s prerogative’ – section 
18(2) of the Industrial Relations Act – was heavily criticised as being over reliant on the 
‘employers’ benevolence or bureaucratic sympathy’, and offering no provisions to 
                                                 
52
 (Straits Times  1969: ‘NTUC Poised for Plunge into Big Business’, 18th Oct) – Statistics.  
53
 Example of social services include education, housing, financial assistance, as well as skill planning and 
upgrading.  
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safeguard union organisers from arbitrary termination (ST 1969, 15 Nov; ST 1972, 6 
Mar)54. 
 
The government was dismissive of those who expressed such opinions, viewing them as 
holding onto ‘old habits and attitudes’ that were detached from the reality of today55. 
However, the denunciation underlined the importance of the union leadership’s support in 
enacting modernisation reforms. From here on, any distinction remaining between 
government and organised labour would be further eroded.  
 
3.3.3 Modernisation and Change 
 
Aside from ‘cooperation’ (between union and management), there was also concern with 
‘equitability’, wherein it was necessary for workers to share in the benefits of growth, as 
reflected through their wages (ST 1972, 4 Mar, 20 Aug)56. This reflected a cognizance in 
the existence of a class of economically ‘less favoured citizens’ and their potentially 
destabilising effect if ignored (ST 1972, 24 Apr)57. 
 
One of labour’s (new) role was to address this through the establishment of consumer 
cooperatives, which aim to provide affordable goods and services to workers in the 
‘middle and lower income groups’, an aspect that the [NTUC has become synonymous 
                                                 
54
 (Straits Times 1969: 15th Nov), (Straits Times 1972: ‘Amend Labour Laws, Urges Industrial Policy 
Committee’, 6th Mar) 
55
 If anything, these views are still being expressed in the present, as will be shown in Chapter 5.  
56
 (Straits Times 1972: ‘Prosperity only if “Nationalcake” is Shared Fairly’; ‘Wages must Reflect our 
Affluence’, 4th Mar), (Straits Times 1972: ‘Continuing Working Closely with Management, Ong tells 
Union’, 20th Aug)  
57
 (Straits Times 1972: ‘Help Less Favoured Citizens, Devan Urges Elite’, 24th Apr) 
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and identified with] (Interview 17: 19) (ST 1972, 20 Oct, 6 Nov)58. While doing this 
‘[addressed] social issues’ (Interview 17: 2), it also enabled the labour movement to 
attain financial independence thereby aiding its modernisation process (ST 1969, 10 
Nov)59.  
 
3.3.4 New Union Leadership 
 
The shift towards corporatisation also encompassed a determination to break away from 
‘old style’ slogan shouting, table thumping style of unionism, which involved an 
advocacy to reshape the labour movement’s leadership, both qualitatively and in terms of 
its relationship with the government (ST 1972, 14 Feb)60. 
 
The traditional practice of selecting union leaders from amongst the ranks of the union 
membership is incompatible and unable to meet the requirements of modernisation and 
corporatisation, which require individuals with higher qualifications (ST 1972, 14 Feb; 
ST 1979, 22 Apr)61. The subsequent drive to recruit ‘talent’ from outside the ranks of the 
unions came to be seen as a pretext for inducting members of the political elites into the 
                                                 
58
 (Straits Times 1972: ‘$400,000 From Public for Co-op Mart’, 6th Nov; ‘NTUC to set up Consumer Co-op 
Supermarkets’ 20th Oct) – Initial cooperatives include INCOME, which provides insurance coverage; 
COMFORT in the field of transportation; and Fairprice, a supermarket chain.  
59
 (Straits Times 1969: ‘“Machines” Role for Trade Unionists’, 10th Nov) – ‘The struggle today is not 
against employers as such nor against Governments, but against the very conditions that impede economic 
growth’. 
60
 (Straits Times 1972: ‘What a Union Leader Must Develop’, 14th Feb) 
61
 (Straits Times 1972: ‘What a Union Leader Must Develop’, 14th Feb), (Straits Times 1979: ‘Unions Told 
to be Cautious in Ventures’, 22 Apr) 
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labour movement and the reciprocal cooptation of ‘promising unionists’ into the party 
ranks (ST 1979: 1 May)62.   
 
However intimate or cooperative the labour-ruling party relationship appears as a result 
of the cooptation-induction process, it is still premised on the subordination of labour. 
This has been justified on the basis that the parochial social interests represented by 
labour cannot take precedence over ‘long-term national interests’, hence the dominance 
of the political elites (BT 1979, 1 May; ST 1980, 11 Jan)63. 
 
A somewhat incoherent assertion given that the objectives of the PAP and the NTUC are 
supposed to be similar (ST 1979, 1 May)64. This suggests that the interests of organised 
labour may not necessarily be similar to the national interests and the role of the NTUC is 
to bring about such an alignment. Similarly, even if affiliated, the views of individual 
unions may not necessarily be in agreement with the NTUC.  
 
3.3.5 Reaction to Reorganisation and Other Developments  
 
The revamp of the NTUC and the uncertain role of trade unions led to a ‘slower growth’ 
of its membership (ST 1980, 11 Jan)65. Between 1977 and 1979, NTUC membership 
                                                 
62
 (Straits Times 1979: ‘Search for Second Line Union Leaders, Test for top 2 or 3’, 1st May) 
63
 (Business Times 1979: ‘Lee on the Ideal Leaders, Changing of the Union Guard’, 1st May) – ‘This is the 
first lesson of life in Singapore unions: that the political leadership is supreme’ – The Prime Minister’s (Lee 
Kwan Yew) May Day message to the labour movement. (Straits Times 1980: ‘Uncertainty over Union’s 
Role Hits Membership’, 11th Jan) 
64
 (Straits Times 1979: ‘Search for Second Line Union Leaders, Test for top 2 or 3’, 1st May) 
65
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Uncertainty over Union’s Role Hits Membership’, 11th Jan) 
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increased by approximately 14,400 members, less than the period between 1974 and 1976 
where membership rose by around 22,700 members (see Table 3A) (BT 1979, 7 Nov)66. 
 
Despite the slower rate of union membership, the 10-year period between 1969 and 1979 
saw the NTUC expand its membership by 159%, representing 95% of the total organised 
labour’s membership (BT 1979: 7 Nov)67. On the other hand, non-NTUC unions have 
been declining; the same 10-year period, saw them lose some 61.6% of their membership, 
their proportion of the overall membership base also fell, from 26.2% in 1969 to 5% by 
1979 (see Table 3A) (BT 1979, 7 Nov)68. The unassailable dominance of the NTUC 
confederacy also concludes the rivalry that previously existed within the labour 




The intention was for unionism to extend beyond the confines of industrial relations and 
job regulation, to participate in national initiatives that comprise both corporate and 
social-policy aspects (ST 1980, 11 Jan)69. The former called for the development of 
‘profitable business ventures’ that would offer it financial sufficiency, while the latter 
envisioned the NTUC being actively involved in the training and education of its 
                                                 
66
 (Business Times 1979: ‘Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement’, 7th Nov)  
67
 (Business Times 1979: ‘Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement’, 7th Nov) – Figures.  
68
 (Business Times 1979: ‘Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement’, 7th Nov) – Figures.  
69
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Uncertainty over Union’s Role Hits Membership’, 11th Jan) 
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Table 3A: Growth of Trade Unions in Singapore (1969 - 1979) 
 















       
1969 112 120,053 88,558 73.8% 31,495 26.2% 
1970 102 112,488 85,422 75.9% 27,066 24.1% 
1971 100 124,350 96,227 77.4% 28,123 22.6% 
1972 97 166,988 142,162 85.1% 24,826 14.9% 
1973 92 191,481 168,090 87.8% 23,391 12.2% 
1974 90 203,561 189,214 93.0% 14,347 7.0% 
1975 89 208,561 197,510 94.7% 11,051 5.3% 
1976 91 221,936 211,956 95.5% 9,980 4.5% 
1977 90 229,056 215,522 94.1% 13,534 5.9% 
1978 89 236,907 226,257 95.5% 10,650 4.5% 
1979 86 242,014 229,932 95.0% 12,082 5.0% 
       
Figures: (Business Times 1979: 'Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement', 7th Nov) - Amendment has been made to the 1969 




members (ST 1979, 5 Sep; ST 1980, 8 Aug)70. It is through such national initiatives that 
the NTUC and the PAP-led government hope to win greater appeal (Wright 1996: 102). 
 
3.4 Phase III (1980 – 1997) Restructuring and Expansion 
 
3.4.1 Structural Reorganisation: Centralisation and Control 
 
If the previous phase saw the increasing corporatisation and professionalisation of the 
labour movement, the third phase saw its actualisation. A key development within the 
NTUC was the appointment of its Secretary-General (then Lim Chee Onn) as a Minister 
Without Portfolio as part of symbiotic relationship between union and party – introduced 
earlier in having MPs perform a ‘dual function’ (ST 1979, 5 Sep; ST 1980, 15 Sep)71. 
 
Other than closely linking the NTUC and political leadership, such an appointment is 
viewed favourably as: 1) it gives labour a cabinet level presence to represent their 
problems and interests, 2) which allows both labour and government to identify common 
goals and coordinate their efforts to attaining them (ST 1980, 15 Sep, 16 Sep)72. But most 
importantly, 3) this would ensure ‘support for the decisions and policies of the 
government’ (ST 1980, 15 Sep)73. 
                                                 
70
 (Business Times 1980: ‘The Challenge of the Eighties’, 8th Aug), (Straits Times 1979: ‘A Glimpse of 
Singapore in the Eighties (Part 5) – Industrial Thrust: NTUC is at Vanguard’, 5th Sep) 
71
 (Straits Times 1979: ‘A Glimpse of Singapore in the Eighties (Part 5) – Industrial Thrust: NTUC is at 
Vanguard’, 5th Sep), (Straits Times 1980: ‘To Preserve PAP-NTUC Ties, Chee Onn made Minister’, 15 
Sep) 
72
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘To Preserve PAP-NTUC Ties, Chee Onn is made Minister’, 15 Sep), (Straits Times 
1980: ‘Unions Hail Chee Onn’s Appointment: “Positive Step to Bring Labour’s Voice into Cabinet”’, 16 
Sep)   
73
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘To Preserve PAP-NTUC Ties, Chee Onn is made Minister’, 15 Sep) 
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Indeed, it was suggested that the ‘dual role’ of MPs is to an extent mooted to prevent 
situations where labour and government are in disagreement from arising, and should it 
arise, ensure that it would be what the government prescribes that would prevail (ST 
1980, 16 Sep)74. 
 
3.4.2 Indeterminate Deferment75  
 
Aside from cautioning against assuming unison of interest between state and labour 
(particularly with respect to individual labour unions), the above also indicates that a gulf 
exists between state and labour in terms of their claim-making authority. The state’s 
dominance here enables it to practice a process of indeterminate deferment. This 
essentially refers to its authority to deny, dismiss or postpone any claims, demands or 
challenges on the basis of them being deemed ‘inappropriate’ given the existence of other 
more crucial and pressing matters. 
 
The assumption is that the government is: 1) objective; 2) knowledgeable, knowing and 
able to decide what is ‘best’; 3) and possesses the moral integrity and therefore could be 
entrusted with the duty of making the ‘right’ decisions, which they are acknowledged to 
                                                 
74
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Unions Hail Chee Onn’s Appointment: “Positive Step to Bring Labour’s Voice into 
Cabinet”’, 16 Sep)  
75
 ‘Indeterminate deferment’ is intended to be a description of the manner/process by which the government 
handles claims/demands/challenges that it does not agree with; namely through denial, dismissal or 
postponement. This is different and needs to be differentiated from the stated ideology that guides 
government action, i.e. the basis and principle/s which the government uses to guide and make its 
decisions, namely pragmatism. The latter having been adequately covered by Chua in ‘The Communitarian 
Ideology’ (p. 68-9, 74-5). In it, he established that the ‘overriding goal of PAP pragmatism was to ensure 
continuous economic growth’. In fact it is even contended that pragmatism might be seen as a form of 
rational choice and therefore non-ideological (p.68).  
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have done, given their success in ‘delivering the goods’ and ‘improving the lives of the 
people’, a success which serves to strengthen, legitimise and validate, their claim and 
decision-making authority (Chua 1995: 3, 74). 
 
As such, the ministerial appointment of the NTUC’s Secretary-General and the ‘dual 
role’ of MPs serve a double mandate: to enhance the cooperative-symbiotic relationship 
between government and organised labour, and to exercise a degree of control over 
organised labour (BT 1979, 1 May; ST 1980, 16 Sep)76. 
 
3.4.3 Restructuring Unions – House Unions 
 
This period also saw the organisational restructuring of labour unions. Previously 
organised along the line of industrial unions, there was a shift from 1984 towards the 
formation of House Unions, a move that was met with a mixture of approval and 
unhappiness at the same time (ST 1984, 29 Apr)77. While it claimed to offer members 
greater participation and ‘ownership’ over their own unions, it was also motivated in part 
by unhappiness and suspicion over the years towards the larger unions and their officials, 
who it was felt, had too much power and influence. 
 
3.4.3.1 The Phey Scandal and its Aftermath 
                                                 
76
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Unions Hail Chee Onn’s Appointment: “Positive Step to Bring Labour’s Voice into 
Cabinet”’, 16 Sep) – ‘if the union leadership challenged the political leadership, political leaders must 
triumph.’, see also (Business Times 1979: ‘Lee on the Ideal Leaders, Changing of the Union Guard’, 1st 
May)  
77
 (Straits Times 1984: ‘The Big House Union Debate’, 29 Apr) – Organising along industrial lines, does 
not mean industrial bargaining. 
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This is best exemplified by the Phey Yew Kok scandal. Phey, a Chairman of the NTUC 
and once MP (1972), misappropriated union funds and later absconded to avoid criminal 
prosecution (ST 1979, 4 Dec, 11 Dec)78. In the ensuing fallout, Singapore Industrial 
Labour Organisation, Pioneer Industries and Employees Union (SILO-PIEU), two of the 
three unions where Phey was the General-Secretary, were restructured into 10 industry-
wide unions (ST 1980, 16 Mar, 6 Apr)79. 
 
The intent was for house unions to mitigate the vulnerability and predisposition of large 
unions like SILO-PIEU to abuse, since they amassed ‘too much power over too many 
workers in the hands of too few individuals’ (ST 1980, 16 Mar)80. The greater concern 
however, was that large unions with their sizeable membership bases may be exploited 
and used to undermine or depose the ‘existing economic and political system’ (ST 1980, 
17 Mar)81. 
 
Thus, whether it is for the purpose of reducing graft and ‘mismanagement’, or preventing 
political usurpation from rogue union leaders, both highlight the risk inherent with the 
                                                 
78
 (Straits Times 1979: ‘Under Investigation’ Devan, “Phey Quits 3 Posts”’, 4 Dec), (Straits Times 1979: 
‘NTUC Chairman charged’, 11 Dec) – Phey once the MP for Boon Teck (1972), was charged (1979-1980) 
for contravening the Trade Unions Act and for Criminal Breach of Trust involving $100,265. 
79
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Omnibus Unions to go in 18 Months, Smaller ones will be set up and Devan Warns 
of Bloody Noses for those who try to Block the Path’, 16 Mar), (Straits Times 1980: ‘Restructuring will 
take 12 – 18 Months, SILO and PIEU to be Split into 10 Unions’, 6 Apr) – The proposal was for unions to 
be split into these 10 broad categories: 1) electrical electronics; 2) textiles, spinning, garments and leather; 
3) metal industries and machineries; 4) shipbuilding, repairing, oil engineering and oil rigs; 5) timber, 
woodworks and paper products; 6) chemicals, gases, pharmaceutical, plastics and rubber; 7) building, 
construction and cement productions; 8) transport; 9) food and beverage; 10) and a ‘general industries 
division for industries that cannot be classified under the other headings’. 
80
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Omnibus Unions to go in 18 Months, Smaller ones will be set up and Devan Warns 
of Bloody Noses for those who try to Block the Path’, 16 Mar) 
81
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Never Again’, 17 Mar) 
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over-centralisation of leadership and control within large unions, thereby providing the 
raison d’être for their [dismantlement] (ST 1980, 17 Mar)82.  
 
3.4.3.2 Towards House Unionism  
 
The establishment of House Unionism raised the consideration as to the extent to which 
decentralisation and the devolution of authority should be carried out (ST 1979, 7 Nov; 
ST 1980, 17 Mar)83. It was agreed that so long as the preconditions of, a ‘right 
[workforce size], good climate of union-management relations,’ capable union leadership 
and ‘financial viability’, were met, affiliates of industry unions could break away and 
establish themselves independently so long as it was in the ‘workers’ interests’ (ST 1984, 
28 Apr, 29 Apr)84. 
 
Despite these requisites, objections continued to be raised (ST 1984, 21 Mar)85. There 
was fear of a loss in privileges, of being disadvantaged when negotiating with 
                                                 
82
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Never Again’, 17 Mar) 
83
 (Straits Times 1980: ‘Never Again’, 17 Mar), (Straits Times 1979: ‘seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for 
Union Movement’, 7 Nov) – The shift towards house unionism was a direct reversal of the decision made 
during the trade union seminar conducted in 1969, which called for amalgamation of ‘all small unions into 
big effective unions’.  
84
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Ong Clears the Air Over House Unions – By Lucy Ng’, 28 Apr), (Straits Times 
1984: ‘The Big House Union Debate’, 29 Apr) – The survivability of both the would-be House Union and 
the former union to which it was previously affiliated being a crucial consideration.  
85
 (Straits Times 1984: ‘House Unions: Decisions left to Members’, 21 Mar) – The formation of House 
Unions depended on the outcome of a referendum conducted through secret ballot.  Allegations were made 
by Mr Jeyaretnam that union members (of SATU – Singapore Air Transport Union) were being coerced to 
form house unions.  
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management, and in particular, about the long-term sustainability of house unions due to 
its smaller membership base (BT 1984, 28 Apr; ST 1984, 19 Jan, 18 Apr)86. 
 
While the Phey scandal was unequivocally important in influencing the formation of 
house unions, it was not the only factor involved (ST 1984, 10 Jul)87. Economic motives 
also played a great role; it is hoped that promoting greater cooperation between unions, 
workers and management would foster closer worker identification with their company, 
thereby [reducing industrial strife] and raising productivity (BT 1984, 26 Jul; ST 1984, 
26 Apr, 28 Jul)88.  
 
3.4.4 Declining Union Membership 
 
Interestingly, union membership declined during this restructuring (BT 1984, 15 Aug)89. 
NTUC membership, which represented 96.4% of all union membership in 1983, had 
                                                 
86
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Ong Clears the Air Over House Unions – By Lucy Ng’, 28 Apr), (Straits Times 
1984: ‘Teng Cheong gives Assurance: Privileges won’t be lost with House Unions’, 19 Jan), (Straits Times 
1984: ‘Teng Cheong’s Plea to Affiliates: “Help the House Unions Financially”’, 18 Apr) 
87
 (Straits Times 1984: ‘Laws to Check Powers of Union Leaders – By Ivan Lim’, 10 Jul) – There was 
emphasis on ‘collective leadership’ and proposed changes to the election process of key union officials, 
which aimed to institute greater accountability and prevent the rise of domineering ‘strongmen’. In order to 
impede the cultivation of a personal following, the proposal was made to replace the current system ‘where 
the president, general secretary and treasurer are individually elected by the rank-and-file or delegates. 
Under such a system, the general secretary for example was not beholden to the executive council and 
could thus ‘act at will and ignore the views of the other officials’. The new system on the other hand, 
proposes the need for the general secretary to have the ‘backing of most – if not all – members of his 
committee. 
88
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Teng Cheong Shares His Views on Qualities of Good Union Official’, 26 Jul), 
(Straits Times 1984: ‘It will be Suicidal to go back to Old-Style Trade Unionism: Teng Cheong – “Table 
Thumping Days are Over”’, 26 Apr), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unionists with Primitive Ideas: Dhana Rebukes 
those who are Against Union – By Ivan Lim’, 28 Jul) 
89
 Though there are still labour unions that are not affiliated with the NTUC still in existence, they 
nevertheless make up only a small portion of the overall union membership; in 1983, the total union 
membership figure stands at 205,155, out of which 198,280 are members of NTUC-affiliated labour 
unions. This essentially means that the NTUC membership is responsible for 96.4% of the total labour 
union membership figures, while the proportion represented by non-NTUC unions are 3.4% - or 6875 in 
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declined by 16% after peaking at 236,630 in 1979 (BT 1984, 15 Aug)90. Overall, 
although the percentage of organised workers rose from 17.3% in 1970 to 25.5% in 1978, 
it declined to 23.1% in 1980 and fell further to 19.1% in 1982 (ST 1979, 7 Nov; ST 1984, 
10 Jun)91.  
 
3.4.4.1 Why Decline? 
 
This decline was attributed to several factors: Firstly, workers were less reliant on unions 
as economic growth and full-employment made it easy to find jobs (BT 1984, 28 Jul, 19 
Sep; ST, 19 Sep)92. Secondly, there is no tangible impetus for workers to join unions, 
since the ‘pay and fringe benefits between unionised and non-unionised workers were 
undifferentiated (BT 1984, 28 Jul)93. 
 
Third, improved relationship between workers and management due to ‘enlightened 
management’ – and ironically ‘responsible unionists’ – contributed to workers’ apathy 
and ignorance, towards union membership (BT 1984, 19 Sep; ST 1984, 19 Sep)94. Lastly, 
                                                                                                                                                 
real figures. Figures from: MOM – See file Thesis – Data and Tables “Union Membership from 1960” and 
(Business Times 1984: ‘NTUC Looks into Ways of Stopping Membership Fall’, 15 Aug). Hence, given 
that the large proportion of union membership belongs to NTUC-affiliated unions, reference to NTUC 
unions membership will be deemed to be akin to a representation of the national figures, with necessary 
clarifications made when necessary.  
90
 (Business Times 1984: ‘NTUC Looks into Ways of Stopping Membership Fall’, 15 Aug) 
91
 (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions’ Shrinking Membership’, 10 Jun) – Published figures from Ministry of 
Labour. (Straits Times 1979: ‘Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement’, 7 Nov) – It should 
be pointed out that the percentage of NTUC membership of total organized labour membership was 76% 
(1970), 93% (1974), 95.5% (1976) and 95.5% (1978).  
92
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Unions must Show Employers where the National Interests Lies’, 28 Jul), 
(Business Times 1984: ‘Union Membership Likely to Worsen as Full Employment Continues – By Foo 
Choy Peng’, 19 Sep), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Serve All – Chok Tong’, 19 Sep) 
93
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Unions must Show Employers where the National Interests Lies’, 28 Jul) 
94
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Union Membership Likely to Worsen as Full Employment Continues – By Foo 
Choy Peng’, 19 Sep), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Serve All – Chok Tong’, 19 Sep) 
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retrenchments within the manufacturing sector, the traditional base of union membership, 
which led to a 25% fall in membership (BT 1985, 1 Apr)95.  
 
3.4.4.2 Response to Decline 
 
While both labour and government leaders voiced a need to stem the decline, no concrete 
plans were surfaced. Instead, the government continued to emphasise how labour unions 
‘existed to look after the interests of the masses and not their members’ welfare alone’ 
(BT 1984, 19 Sep; ST 1984, 19 Sep)96. This, and the ‘free-rider’ problem, where non-
union members enjoyed the benefits won by union members provided little incentive for 
workers to take up union membership (ST 1984, 19 Sep; ST 1985, 31 Mar)97. 
 
While it is understandable that union membership would decline in times of economic 
growth and full-employment, the reverse is not necessarily true; unions are not better 
placed to extend protection or make demands during economic downturns either (BT 
1984, 28 Jul, 19 Sep)98. 
 
                                                 
95
 (Business Times 1985: ‘Unions face Real Problem of Continuing Decline in Membership: Where are all 
the Members?’, 1 Apr) 
96
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Union Membership Likely to Worsen as Full Employment Continues – By Foo 
Choy Peng’, 19 Sep), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Serve All – Chok Tong’, 19 Sep) 
97
 (Straits Times 1985: ‘NTUC Chief Against Membership by Force, Teng Cheong: Up to Unions to Woo 
Members’, 31 Mar), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Serve All – Chok Tong’, 19 Sep) – It was 
expressed that benefits won by unions should not be confined only to union members.  
98
 (Business Times 1984: ‘Union Membership Likely to Worsen as Full Employment Continues – By Foo 
Choy Peng’, 19 Sep) – ‘Unions cannot expect membership to rise when there is full employment in 
Singapore… suggested that the situation would have been different if there were massive unemployment as 
in Britain’s case.’ Contrast with (Business Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Show Employers where the National 
Interest Lies’, 28 Jul) – ‘Mr Dhanabalan told workers that it is also important to be a union member 
because there is no guarantee that there will always be full employment and prosperity’. 
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Given this, why would workers join unions when there is no obvious benefit to be 
derived? Ong Teng Cheong (then Secretary-General of the NTUC) attributed this to 
union leaders, whose dedication and commitment is crucial in both motivating workers to 
join unions and in retaining current members (BT 1985, 1 Apr; ST 1985, 31 Mar)99. 
 
Despite initial claims that the union would not compel membership, the pressure to halt 
membership decline, led the NTUC to eventually discriminate against non-union 
members (BT 1985, 25 Mar; ST 1985, 25 Mar, 31 Mar, 2 Apr)100. This illustrates that 
despite being the unopposed labour confederation, the NTUC is still not invulnerable to 
populist demands, having to pay attention and (sometimes) accede to the demands of its 
membership (ST 1985, 2 Apr)101. It also raises the question as to the possibility and 
viability of deeming it necessary for unions to serve ‘everybody’ as insisted by the 
political leadership (ST 1984, 19 Sep)102.  
 
3.4.5 Continued Membership Expansion and other Developments 
 
Membership concerns never quite subsided, and in the 1990s, efforts were made to 
expand union ranks by opening union membership to executives, and later through the 
                                                 
99
 (Business Times 1985: ‘Unions face Real Problem of Continuing Decline in Membership: Where are all 
the Members?’, 1 Apr), (Straits Times 1985: ‘NTUC Chief Against Membership by Force, Teng Cheong: 
Up to Unions to Woo Members’, 31 Mar) 
100
 (Business Times 1985: ‘NTUC Getting Less Fees from Union Members’, 25 Mar) – ‘Affiliation fees 
received from member union fell by 5 per cent to $2.89 million compared with $3.03 million for 1983/84.’, 
(Straits Times 1985: ‘NTUC’s Plan to Stem Decline’, 25 Mar), (Straits Times 1985: ‘NTUC Chief Against 
Membership by Force, Teng Cheong: Up to Unions to Woo Members’, 31 Mar), (Straits Times 1985: 
‘Ong: NTUC will Discriminate against Non-Union Members’, 2 Apr) 
101
 (Straits Times 1985: ‘How to Arrest Declining Membership: Discriminate Where Possible – Says 
NTUC Chief’, 2 Apr), (Straits Times 1985: ‘Ong: NTUC will Discriminate against Non-Union Members’, 
2 Apr) – ‘Are we stressing too much on long term interests and  not enough on immediate benefits?’ – 
Address by Mr Ong Teng Cheong at the Fifth Triennial NTUC-Delegates Conerence.  
102
 (Straits Times 1984: ‘Unions Must Serve All – Chok Tong’, 19 Sep)  
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‘General Branch’ membership scheme. Interestingly, this was not framed as a 
membership issue, but recognition of the changing composition of the workforce and the 
NTUC’s need to cater to them (BT 1990, 7 Jan)103. 
 
However, unlike ‘regular’ membership, executive (‘associate’) members will not be 
allowed to hold office, participate in collective bargaining, speak at meetings or be given 
representation (BT 1990, 14 Feb; ST 1990, 20 Feb)104. The main attraction of an 
associate membership lay in the tangible gains via the NTUC Club Card scheme, which 
offers various discounts and privileges (BT 1990, 14 Feb)105. This emphasis on 
‘recreational and consumer benefits’ essentially reduced labour unions into social clubs 
(ST 1990, 20 Feb)106. 
 
3.4.5.1 General Branch Membership 
 
The attempt to address the membership problem led to the introduction of the general 
branch membership in 1992 (ST 1992, 5 Mar)107. The aim was to halt membership 
decline, by raising the overall membership base and addressing the high turnover of 
members (ST 1990, 20 May)108. 
 
                                                 
103
 (Business Times 1990: ‘NTUC Acts to Cater for Needs of more Sophisticated Members’, 7 Jan) 
104
 (Business Times 1990: ‘Executives can now Join Trade Unions’, 14 Feb), (Straits Times 1990: ‘Storm 
in a Teacup’, 20 Feb) 
105
 (Business Times 1990: ‘Executives can now Join Trade Unions’, 14 Feb) – The card offers various 
discount schemes and privileges such as free admission to public swimming pools.  
106
 (Straits Times 1990: ‘Storm in a Teacup’, 20 Feb) 
107
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘Trade Unions to set up General Branches to Recruit Members’, 5 Mar) – This was 
an extension of the associate membership programme. 
108
 (Straits Times 1990: ‘High Turnover of Union Members Eroding Gains Made’, 20 May)  
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There were still a substantial number of ‘bargainable but not organised’ workers, glossed 
over mainly because they were employed in small and medium size enterprises which 
were difficult and not seen to be worth the effort it takes to organise them (ST 1990, 20 
May)109.  
 
The situation was not helped by the 1985 recession and the subsequent wave of 
resignations, retrenchments and tight labour market thereafter, which acted as 
disincentives for joining the unions (ST 1990, 20 May)110. The general branch 
membership allowed workers in small enterprises and the non-unionised sector to join as 
members, albeit without the coverage of representation and collective agreement, (ST 
1992, 5 Mar)111. 
 
Similar to the associate membership, the key attraction of general branch membership lay 
in the tangible benefit of providing cost savings at NTUC operated supermarkets or 
cooperatives (ST 1992, 3 Apr, 19 May)112. But despite the introduction of this new form 
of membership, union membership is still being encouraged on the basis of the 
‘traditional’ (namely representation, the safeguarding of rights and compensation) 
benefits (that general branch membership does not confer), which is still necessary given 
                                                 
109
 (Straits Times 1990: ‘High Turnover of Union Members Eroding Gains Made’, 20 May) 
110
 (Straits Times 1990: ‘High Turnover of Union Members Eroding Gains Made’, 20 May) 
111
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘Trade Unions to set up General Branches to Recruit Members’, 5 Mar) – ‘…it 
would not be viable to carry out such negotiations [of collective agreements] for members of general 
branches working for companies with fewer than 20 workers.’ 
112
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘NTUC to Launch Massive Recruitment Campaign’, 3 Apr), (Straits Times 1992: 
‘More than 5,000 Apply to be NTUC Members’, 19 May) – ‘Mrs Yu-Foo, who is the MP for Yuhua, said 
that the applicants were attracted by NTUC Club facilities and rebates offered by NTUC FairPrice 
[supermarket].’ 
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that victimisation and intimidation still occurs (BT 1992, 30 Apr; BT 1992, 3 Jun; ST 
1990, 20 Oct; ST 1992, 3 Jun)113. 
 
3.4.6 End of Phase III 
 
The above illustrates the difficulty faced by the NTUC in managing their sometimes 
incompatible aims; while it tries to raise membership by emphasising ‘social benefits’, it 
also simultaneously stress the benefits of its ‘traditional’ function, but yet, have expressed 
an unwillingness to organise new members when it is ‘not viable’ to represent them.  
 
But all this is peripheral to the centrally held belief of the NTUC, which is that ‘workers 
cannot achieve freedom and peace if they do not have decent jobs’ (ST 1992, 9 Apr, 13 
Jul, 16 Oct)114. In this respect, the role of the union is viewed to ensure workers will 
continue to have ‘bread’ – in a competitive economy – by raising their skills and keeping 
them employable (ST 1992, 13 Jul, 16 Oct, 14 Nov)115. A more understated role of the 
NTUC lies in its shoring up political support for the government. While this was clear at 
                                                 
113
 (Business Times 1992: ‘Unionised Workers Enjoy More Safeguards: Teng Cheong’, 30 Apr) – ‘Only 
4.5 per cent of non-unionised workers had the benefit of an extended retirement age’. (Straits Times 1990: 
‘Bosses Unreasonable? Teach them a Lesson: Teng Cheong’, 20 Oct), (Business Times 1992: ‘OCBC 
Finance Using Scare Tactics’, 3 Jun) – ‘The Singapore Manual and Mercantile Workers’ Union (SMMWU) 
has accused OCBC-Finance of using scare tactics to prevent its officers from joining the union’, (Straits 
Times 1992: ‘Execs Allegedly Harassed over Union Membership’, 3 June) – The listed scare tactics 
included: ‘Calling up officers to dissuade them from joining the union; indicating that officers would be 
interviewed personally by the general manager of they persisted in signing on; threatening to deploy the 
officers to do personnel work, thus making them ineligible for union membership’. 
114
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘Workers “must have jobs first to achieve freedom”’, 9 Apr), (Straits Times 1992: 
‘Unions Expected to Maintain “relevant role in the 90s”’, 13 Jul), (Straits Times 1992: ‘Singapore faces 
Stiff Competition in Race for Economic Growth, Unionists told. “Work together or be left behind” – PM 
Goh’, 16 Oct)   
115
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘Unions Expected to Maintain “relevant role in the 90s”’, 13 Jul), (Straits Times 
1992: ‘Singapore faces Stiff Competition in Race for Economic Growth, Unionists told. “Work together or 
be left behind” – PM Goh’, 16 Oct), (Straits Times 1992: ‘Aussie, S’pore Unionists Provide Poignant Study 
in Contrasts’, 14 Nov) 
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the onset of the NTUC’s formation, it has grown increasingly oblique with the 
‘depoliticisation’ of labour. 
 
While reciprocal endorsement for each other’s policy initiatives hinted at the ‘mutual 
support’ between the government and the NTUC, the expectation for affiliated unions to 
offer their political support was directly stated during the 1992 by-election, where the 
NTUC warned of potential political instability and the loss of investor confidence in 
Singapore should the Goh Chok Tong led PAP team lose the election (ST 1992, 19 
Dec)116.  
 
3.5 Summary – Themes and Issues  
 
The aim in this chapter was to trace the development of the modern labour movement in 
(post-independence) Singapore, one which is synonymous and inextricably linked with 
the development of the NTUC, which represents a dominant proportion of the overall 
labour union membership. Examining the key structural and legislative developments that 
took place within the NTUC during the socio-economic and political context of the time, 
enable us to understand the NTUC and the labour movement of the present.  
 
From its heavily politicised beginning, the NTUC has continued to adapt itself according 
to changes the political landscape, unions’ roles have also been continuously redefined. 
Now depoliticised and having their industrial scope restricted by legislature, labour 
                                                 
116
 (Straits Times 1992: ‘PAP Loss will Affect all Workers in S’pore: NTUC’, 19 Dec) 
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unions have been presented with the need to embrace economic competitiveness as the 
only plausible means to safeguard the long-term interests of workers effectively. 
 
Reviewing the socio-historical circumstances that led to the present-day system of 
industrial relations and the established role of labour unions helps us understand how it is 
used to justify it to those in the present; which is important because it serves as a basis to 
‘convince’ new union entrants of the necessity and legitimacy of the current established 
arrangement (Berger et al 1966: 79-80). 
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Focused on the theoretical frameworks used to address the concerns of this thesis, this 
chapter is organised into three sections. The first section will attempt to locate 
Singapore’s form of trade unionism amongst different trade union typologies. This may 
be differentiated according to the ‘role’ and ‘function’ they play in relation to their 
representatives and the wider socioeconomic and political system in which they exist in.  
 
The second section addresses the theoretical frameworks backing this thesis’s claim that 
trade unions in Singapore play an integrationist role. This consists of two parts. The first 
is based on Georg Simmel’s view that conflict would bring about social integration 
instead of social change as Marx proposed. 
 
Key to Simmel’s view are the existence and development of structural processes that help 
channel and manage conflict, with some focus also on the nature of the conflict, and the 
emotive feeling of the individuals involved. However, this alone is too structurally 
lopsided, and fails to address the fundamentally important question of why individuals 
would accept the established structural processes.  
 
This thesis proposes to address this through Berger and Lukhmann’s ‘Social Construction 
of Everyday Life’, which focuses on individuals and locates their importance in the 
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maintenance of structures. What results is the thematic emphasis on the interrelationship 
that exists between agency and structure, and how ‘knowledge’ is a socialised process 
that takes place through both structural influences and everyday practices. 
 
4.2 Trade Unions – Ideological Range and Trajectory 
 
4.2.1 Varying Purposes 
 
There are essentially two aspects in which labour unions may be understood. Their 
purpose and whom they serve; both of which are linked to their ideological influence, 
which determines what they do, how they do it and the strategies or approaches they 
utilise to achieve their stated purposes.  
 
While the Webbs define labour unions to be ‘a continuous association of wage-earners 
for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives’, V. L. 
Allen (1966:149) saw them simply as institutions organised to ‘protect and improve the 
living standards of their members’ (see also Martin 1989: 11; Webb et al 1935: 1). While 
both offer broad definitions that encapsulate the fundamental aims of unions, they do not 
state the extent to which these interests should be satisfied or the prescriptive for attaining 
them, of which there are a variety (Martin 1989: 10-12).  
 
4.2.2 Theories of Trade Union Purposes – Typological Overview 
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Union purposes may essentially be classified into 5 categories, Pluralists, Syndicalists, 
Marxist-Leninist, Organicists and Authoritarians. Each differs in terms of conceiving the 
scope of union purposes and also how unions relate to other social institutions, 
particularly the state.  
 
4.2.2.1 The Pluralists  
 
Of the five, Pluralists proffer the narrowest definition of union purpose; seeing the 
responsibility of the union and its leaders as being to protect the material interests of its 
members not by toppling the existing socioeconomic institutional system or by engaging 
in zero-sum outcomes, but by protecting workers’ rights through legislature and 
employing collective bargaining as the main means to secure the ‘regulation [and] control 
of [the] employment relationship’ (Martin 1989: 14-16, 21; Perlman 1949: 300)117.  
 
4.2.2.2 The Syndicalists 
 
The anti-state Syndicalists who aspire for the ‘total overthrow of capitalism’ and 
thereafter designating the ‘trade unions’ to be the new administrators view the role of 
trade unions as two-fold (Martin 1989: 23-24, 34-35)118. The first involves aiding in the 
                                                 
117
 (Martin 1989: 14, 21) – Refers to ‘market economies and liberal political systems’. Perlman describes 
this to be the rift between ‘organic labour’ and ‘labour’s devoted but impractical friends’ (which 
encompasses also the revolutionary intellectual types); stating a belief that ‘organic labour’ aspires for a 
‘civilised level of existence for oneself and one’s dependents’. The relative nature of such outlooks and 
perspectives will be addressed later on in the chapter.  
118
 There are three sub-categories of Syndicalism: 1) Anarcho-Syndicalism, 2) One Big Unionism and 3) 
Guild Socialism (p.23). The use of strikes is seen to be a necessary part of the process (p.24). What is of 
contention however is to whom self-governance should be accorded to, and therefore, where the 
responsibility of the trade unions lies. While the Anarcho-Syndicalists and the One Big Unionists 
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destruction of capitalism through the use of the general strike (Martin 1989: 24, 37; 
Rocker 2004: 33, 78-88)119. And secondly, by acting as a platform for educating workers 
on ‘real essence of the social problem’ and ‘schooling’ workers in resistance to facilitate 




For Leninist-Marxists who desire to eliminate capitalism, labour unions in capitalist 
society serve an educational function. They are responsible for [emancipating the 
proletariat] by organising and stirring workers’ consciousness; ‘moulding [their] minds’, 
uplifting them to ‘revolutionary class-consciousness’ thereby rendering them ‘capable of 
concerted industrial and political action’ (Moses 1990: 30-31, 44, 64; Tucker 1975: 51).  
 
4.2.2.4 The Organicists 
 
To the Organicists who feel a moral obligation to preserve the ‘common good’ over ‘self-
seeking’ parochial interests, unions need to defend and extend the rights of workers while 
safeguarding the common interests (Martin 1989: 62). This leads them to lean towards 
‘corporatist’ based arrangements emphasising cooperation in employment relations, with 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceptualised ‘workers’ and the responsibility of trade unions to the ‘proletariats’ (defined exclusively to 
mean manual workers), the Guild Socialists’ version was more inclusive, encompassing manual, wage, 
‘salariat’ and administrative workers (p.35). 
119
 Strikes range in ‘gradations from the simple wage-struggle to the general strike; the boycott; sabotage in 
its countless forms; anti-militaristic propaganda, and in particularly critical cases, armed struggle.  
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the state being entrusted with the moral authority in determining and upholding what is 
‘in the interest of society’ (Martin 1989: 51-52, 68-69)120.  
 
4.2.2.5 The Authoritarians: Unions as an Extension of the State 
 
To the Authoritarians, the defence of workers’ rights should not result in socio-political 
division or jeopardise the wider, state-defined, economic interests or ‘common good’ 
(Martin 1989: 70-73, 74, 76, 79). As such, unions occupy a subordinate role to the state 
or party and have to exercise ‘restraint’ in exercising industrial action so as to maximise 
economic production for the common interest of economic growth and national 
prosperity whose trickling-down effect would then benefit and improve the conditions of 
workers (Martin 1989: 70-72, 74, 76, 79, 82-84)121. 
 
4.2.3 The Matter of Autonomy  
 
The discussion of labour union typologies in the above section underlines the importance 
of the socio-political environment unions operate in. This will define the nature of the 
                                                 
120
 The state’s moral authority to arbitrate what is deemed to be best for society is not without limitations. 
This is a crucial element which distinguishes Organicists from the Authoritarians, for whom no such 
limitation on state power exists.  
121
 “‘Restraint’, instead, was required of them – and not only because that was essential for economic 
growth but also… because it was necessary if the unions themselves were ‘to survive the impatience and 
genuine determination by our new nations to move ahead’.” – Mboya, Tom. (1963) Freedom and After 
(London: Deutsch), p.250. “This meant, in particular, that the unions would be obliged to accept ‘the 
fundamental condition that the business of the community must not be interfered with’ – in other words, 
limitations on the right to strike and, ultimately, the settlement of serious industrial disputes by ‘an 
authoritative fiat’ of the state.” – Webb, Sidney. Webb, Beatrice. (1902) Industrial Democracy (London: 
Longmans) p.813-814.  
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relationship between unions and the socio-political regime, the scope and extent of union 
strategies, as well as the question of their legitimacy (Dahl 1971: 1).  
 
4.3 – Trade Union Movements and the Question of Autonomy 
 
4.3.1 Typology of Autonomy – Relationship between Unions, State and Party  
 
Aside from the socio-political environment, the autonomy of labour unions, which 
encompasses what they do, can or cannot do, is also affected by their relationship with 
the political actors, namely the state or political parties. Accordingly, Martin defines 
three default positions that a trade union movement may occupy in relation to either the 
state or political parties. In the ancillary, labour unions are subordinated; the surrogate, 
happens when unions dominate either state or party; while in the autonomous unions are 
neither subordinated nor dominant (Martin 1989: 113)122. 
 
4.3.2 The Nature of Corporatism  
 
Singapore’s labour relations has often been described as corporatist, so what then does 
corporatism entail? Conceptually, corporatism is defined as ‘a system of interest 
representation’ where the ‘constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised’ by the state (Schmitter 1974: 93-94). ‘In exchange 
                                                 
122
 Five more subcategories can be derived from this three categories. They are 1) the state-ancillary and 2) 
party-ancillary, the 3) state-surrogate and 4) party-surrogate, and the 5) autonomous (p.113).  
 76 
for observing certain controls on the selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
support’ these units are given ‘representational monopoly within their respective 
categories’ (Schmitter 1974: 93-94). 
 
A heuristic category which is compatible with a wide variety of ideological and ‘political 
configurations’, it is more helpful instead to view corporatism as an ‘observable’, praxis 
defined concept: a system of interest representation, an institutional arrangement that 
links the ‘associationally organised interest of civil society with the decisional structures 
of the state’, which is ‘compatible’ with various regime-types (Schmitter 1974: 86-88, 
91-92, 94)123. 
 
As a system, the intention of corporatism is to systematise and institutionalise interest 
representation by categorising and thereby limiting and giving order to competing 
interests while emphasising their interdependency within the confines of an ‘organic 
whole’ (Schmitter 1974: 97)124. 
 
4.4 Contextualising Singapore’s Labour Movement  
 
                                                 
123
 ‘Regime-types’ i.e. ‘with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political 
mobilization, varying scopes of public policy etc’. 
124
 Corporatism emphasises ‘controlled emergence, quantitative limitation and vertical stratification’ as a 
strategy to limit and order competing interests. A comparison with pluralism would better show what 
corporatism is. Like corporatism, pluralism also sees the need to manage interest representation but does so 
using an opposing remedy which advocates ‘spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal 
extension and competitive interaction’; unlike corporatism, in pluralism the ‘the constituent units are 
organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and 
self-determined (as to type or scope of interests) categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, 
subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and 
which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories’ (p.96-97).  
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As a pure heuristic type, Singapore’s labour movement most closely resembles the 
Authoritarian, State-Ancillary typological categorisation. Its ‘“soft-authoritarian”’ regime 
(Zakaria 1994: 109) which exercises ‘extra parliamentary constraint on challenges to the 
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) (Bell 1997: 8; Rodan 1993: 77) and exhorts the 
development of [social peace and political stability] alongside economic success, is seen 
as an ‘Asian alternative’ to Western ‘no-holds-barred’ democratic-individualism 
associated with the unravelling of social cohesion and the ‘erosion of communal life’ 
(Bell 1997: 6-7; Dahrendorf 1995: 30; Rodan 1996: 336-338)125. 
 
In socio-political practice, ‘soft-authoritarianism’ has been translated to ‘paternalistic’ 
(Lazar 2001: 61, 66-67; Rodan 1993a: 58; Tremewan 1994: 45), a reference to the state’s 
involvement in the social lives of its citizenry, and communitarian (Chua 1995: 31; Lazar 
2001: 61, 66-67; Rodan 1989: 185; Rodan 1993a: 58; Tremewan 1994: 45)126. The latter 
constituting a set of cultural values that is perceived to have enabled East Asian nations 
to close the economic-development gap with the West (Chua 1995: 31-32)127. 
 
4.4.1 Position of NTUC Unions and their Relation to the State 
                                                 
125
 (Rodan 1993: 77) – This sees the use of both ‘crude’ measures – like political detention or imprisonment 
– and subliminal techniques.  
126
 Lazar situates the State’s ‘eugenicist’ conviction (of getting better educated women to reproduce) within 
the context of ‘strategic egalitarianism’, wherein granting women equality is contingent on the realisation 
of pragmatic economic and national interests. (Rodan 1993a: 58) – One highly publicised issue was how 
the state ‘called on women university graduates to produce more babies’, and the unequal fashion – by 
selectively bestowing ‘gifts’ – in which this is encouraged; see also (Rodan 1989: 185) – This is based on 
the Straits Times article ‘Talent for the Future’ 15th August 1983. (Tremewan 1994: 45) – The provision of 
public housing is seen to be a major feature of social control given that a majority of the population (86%) 
reside in it. 
127
 The cultural values identified to comprise ‘communitarianism’: 1) ‘placing society above the self’; 2) 
‘upholding the family as the basic building block of society’; 3) resolving major issues through consensus 
instead of contentions’; and 4) ‘stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony’; were later reworded 
and presented as an epithet of national ‘Shared Values’, to which a fifth value of 5) ‘regard and community 
support for the individual’ was added.  
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Within this context, the NTUC expresses two key objectives, to [better workers’ working 
conditions and enhance their socio-economic status], as well as to benefit the national 
economy through increased productivity and better industrial relations (NTUC 1984: 
1)128.  
‘In [this] sense there is no conflict, both [government and NTUC are] working 
towards national interests [and] what is reasonable and fair [for workers] will be 
upheld, but not to the extent that it will jeopardise national interest’ (Interview 
9a: 10). 
 
This provides justification for what has been discursively referred to as the ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship between government and union, which has seen the emplacement of 
ministers and Members of Parliament (MPs) within the central committee of the NTUC 
and its unions (Coe et al 2002: 352; NTUC 1970; ST 2004, 2 May)129.  
 
Such an arrangement together with the limitation on union autonomy, particularly when 
[furthering the interests of union members come into conflict with the interests of the 
state] (Interview 15: 3-4) reflects the subordinate status of unions and supports the claim 
                                                 
128
 Article 3(i) of the NTUC Constitution states the principal objective of Congress to be: a) ‘to improve the 
working conditions of workers and enhance their economic and social status, and b) to achieve the raising 
of productivity for the benefit of workers, the employers and the economy of Singapore through the 
promotion of good industrial relations between workers and their employers’.  
129
 Of the 21 members within the 2003-2007 NTUC Central Committee, 2 were ministers, while 3 were 
MPs. In addition, 5 others within the committee had at some point held office as Nominated Members of 
Parliament (NMP). While elected members comprise the Central Committee, the Central Committee may 
also upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General appoint members; a situation permitted under 
Article12ib) of the NTUC Constitution, which has seen the appointment of at least one MP – Mr Ong Ah 
Heng (Assistant Secretary-General) – and the appointment of one minister – Mr Lim Swee Say (Deputy 
Secretary-General – appointed in 2004); (Straits Times 2004: ‘Lim Swee Say being groomed to be the next 
NTUC Secretary-General’, 2 May).  
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that ‘there are no free, democratic trade unions in Singapore’ (Interview 9: 22)130. In 
essence, the NTUC is not a ‘genuinely independently’ labour movement (Barr 2000: 481; 
Rodan 1993: 98). 
 
4.4.2 Repudiation of Industrial Action 
 
Described as ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism’ by Deyo, labour relations 
emphasises the depoliticisation of organised labour and increases government regulation 
of labour affairs as a strategy for pursuing economic growth and averting political 
instability (Chua 1995: 17-18; Deyo 1981a: 353). Here, ‘the national interest comes first’ 
(Interview 1: 1) over special-sectional interest groupings, which are viewed to ‘threaten 
national survival’ (Deyo 1981a: 354).  
 
This is most apparent in the governance of labour relations where the ‘restrictive legal 
framework over industrial conflict’ eschews industrial action in favour of [non-
confrontational cooperation] (Interview 16: 12), which is viewed to be a form of 
‘responsible trade unionism’ (Interview 16: 12) (Deyo 1981b; Rodan 1993: 81; 
Singapore Statutes Cap.136; Wong 1983: 263)131. 
 
While the rejection of the use of industrial action has been justified on the basis that it 
carries [significant ‘negative repercussions’ for Singapore’s economy] (Interview 8: 14), 
                                                 
130
 Interview 15 was not recorded at the request of the interviewees.  
131
 (Deyo 1981b; Rodan 1993: 81; Wong 1983: 263) – Some have regarded the imposition of a ‘restrictive 
legal framework’ as an effort to ‘[supplant] effective independent trade-union organisations’. Industrial 
Relations Act (Chapter 136) – Part III: 18) Invitation to Negotiate, 21) Conciliation, 23) Compulsory 
Conferences; Part V: 32) Court to Arbitrate; Part VI: 47) Award to be final. 
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given the ‘hard fact that we [are] dependent on investors’ (Interview 13: 24), some sees 
it as being governed by ‘active patriarchalism’, wherein ‘discursive space’ is limited to 
pre-empt the [encroachment of labour on capital’s prerogatives] thereby leaving 
organised labour dependent on the ‘enforceable benevolence’ of the state to the extent 
that it is regarded as an effort to ‘[supplant] effective independent trade-union 
organisations’ (Deyo 1981b; Rodan 1993: 81; Wong 1983: 263, Woodiwiss 1998: 237, 
241). 
 
4.4.3 The Hand of Pragmatism and the Ideology of Survival 
 
The ‘ideology of survival’ that underlies the legislative governance of the union 
movement and its consternation to preserve the national interest is principled on the 
praxis (thought-action-practice) of ‘pragmatism’ (Chua 1995: 17-18; Papini 1907: 
124)132. As the ‘frame for action’, pragmatism takes an ‘“instrumental” view of truth’ 
(James 1907: 113; Shusterman 2004: 6, 8), prioritising ‘last things’ such as 
‘consequences [and] facts’ first (James 1907: 112; Shusterman 2004: 5).  
 
Its concern with consequences makes pragmatism an ‘empirically guided forward-
looking social tool’ that seeks to hold onto preceding ‘truth’ while willing to adopt new 
ideas that would help stabilise and illuminate the current situation, thereby enabling a 
‘maximum [degree] of continuity’ (James 1907: 113-114, 116; Shusterman 2004: 8).  
 
                                                 
132
 Pragmatism is not a philosophy (p.124). This ideology of survival is rooted in the tumultuous period of 
national independence.  
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In this incorporation process, the ‘new truth’ merely involves [the addition of new facts, 
or facts of old kinds, to our experience]; there is ‘no alteration in the old beliefs’ (James 
1907: 114). This is achieved not by discarding ‘older truths’, but by preserving, 
[modifying] and ‘stretching them just enough [to] admit the novelty’ of new ideas, and 
regarding [that novelty] in as familiar as the case permits (James 1907: 114). 
 
In pragmatism, ‘loyalty to [older truths] is the first [and only] principle’ (James 1907: 
114). ‘Their influence is absolutely controlling’ to the extent that any phenomena 
sufficiently novel to threaten and erode current preconceptions would either be ignored 
altogether or those who embrace them would be sanctioned (James 1907: 114).  
 
Even though there is no pure objective truth – as ‘truth’ is interpretive and hinges on the 
‘individual’s appreciation’ – pragmatists see truth as inherently tied to its utilitarian 
value, gauged against the experience of what works (James 1907: 115-116; Shusterman 
2004: 10)133. This means that pragmatists will embrace abstractions as long as they are 
‘profitable’ to the pragmatist’s pursuit (James 1907: 118-119)134.  
 
                                                 
133
 (James 1907: 112-113) – Pragmatism is a ‘theory of truth’, where [our] beliefs and ‘ideas (which are but 
parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience’; truth by virtue of instrumentality. (James 1907: 116) – ‘Objective truth must be 
something non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute correspondence 
of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It must be what we ought to think unconditionally. The 
conditioned ways in which we do think are so much irrelevance and matter for psychology’. ‘This 
pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success with 
which the “work” etc.’… ‘Truth, for him [the pragmatist], becomes a class-name for all sorts of definite 
working-values in experience’. 
134
 How useful abstract ideas are, would then be determinant on how close they are to the ‘truth’ as 
perceived by the pragmatist.  
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Thus, continued belief in an idea is dependent on: 1) firstly, the usefulness of the idea for 
‘life’s practical struggle’; 2) secondly, our fondness of the idea; and 3) thirdly, whether or 
not ‘belief in it [clashes] with some other vital benefits’ stemming from other beliefs 
(James 1907: 119 – 120)135. The last is most significant, as it reveals pragmatism as a 
‘mediator and a reconciler’ (James 1907: 120). This is crucial particularly for considering 
how individuals and institutions manage change and the significance of their choices. 
 
In this way, pragmatism may be mistaken to be a strategy in itself as Chua did when he 
described the waning favour for ‘pragmatism’ in lieu of electoral unpopularity as a result 
of passing ‘tough but unpopular policies’, when it is actually more a ‘method for action’ 
(Chua 1995: 20-22). This does not mean unprincipled action either, but rather, one geared 
towards particular objectives and beliefs (Papini 1907: 123, 125).  
 
In Singapore’s case, the perennial preoccupation with economic-survivalism. It is in this 
regard, that unions have declared themselves as being ‘more pragmatic’ (Interview 10: 
58). Viewing the ‘fundamental objective of a union [is to] offer assistance when people 
[are] in trouble’ (Interview 10: 63). Even if unions are criticised for ‘[listening] to 
government, [and working] too closely with [employers]’ (Interview 10: 64), eventually, 
‘in terms of unemployment, in terms of benefits, in terms of assistance, [these critics] 
have very little compared to us’ (Interview 10: 64)136. 
 
                                                 
135
 ‘The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths’. 
136
 See Annex 4.1.  
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This acceptance of pragmatism is also manifested by some unions’ rejection of the use of 
industrial action, believing its use would ‘cause a lot of disruption and damage’ 
(Interview 9: 12), ‘[frightening] away potential investors who may come in’ (Interview 
9i: 19) and should thus be reserved as [a last resort] (Interview 8a: 13) since [the impact 
would be a loss of business to the company and Singapore] (Interview 8: 14).  
 
4.5 Unions: Conflict as Integration 
 
The perception that unions within a socio-political regime pursuing a [neo-liberal 
economic] strategy are potentially politically destabilising is taken from Marx’s theory of 
conflict (Hing 2003: 105; Leggett 1993: 223). The latter argues that unequal distribution 
of resources produces conflict of interests that would lead to the political and ideological 
mobilisation of subordinate groupings, resulting eventually in ‘violent and change-
producing revolution’ (Turner 1975: 621; Turner 1993: 102-103)137. The problem with 
this vision is it expects the lineal and cumulative rise in the ‘intensity of conflict’ (Turner 
1993: 102)138.  
 
                                                 
137
 Marx’s basic Principle of Conflict in Systems of Inequality: (1) The more unequal the distributions of 
scarce resources in a system, the greater will be the conflict of interests between its dominant and 
subordinate segments. (2) The more the subordinate segments become aware of their true collective 
interests, the more likely they are to question the legitimacy of the unequal distribution of scarce resources. 
(3) The more the subordinate segments of a system are aware of their collective interests, the greater their 
questioning of the legitimacy of the distribution of scarce resources, and the more likely they are to 
organize and initiate overt conflict against dominant segments of a system. (4) The more the subordinate 
segments are unified by a common belief and the more their political leadership structure is developed, the 
more the dominant and subjugated segments of the system will become polarized. (5) The more polarized 
the dominant and subjugated, the more violent the ensuing conflict will be. (6) The more violent the 
conflict, the greater the structural change of the system and the redistribution of scarce resources (p.102-
103).  
138
 (Turner 1993: 105) – This is unrealistic because the value of variables located within the causal process 
is indeterminate, and any change would alter the resultant effect.  
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Like Marx, Simmel also saw conflict permeating society, but did not feel that social 
systems are characterised only by conflicting interests, or that the presence of conflict 
would necessarily lead to violent change (Turner 1975: 619). For Simmel, conflict 
represents more than the conflict of interests, it is a form of ‘sociation’, a constituent part 
of an ongoing dualistic conceptual interaction (Simmel 1950: 4, 10; Simmel 1955: 13, 15, 
17; Turner 1975: 619)139.  
 
This extends from Simmel cautioning against examining ‘dualistic relations’ – such as 
‘unity and ‘discord’ – in functionally unitary terms; that they are conceptual opposites 
does not mean the effect of one part of the dualism can be considered in isolation from 
the other, or assume that the net consequences for the group is similar to the individual’s 
(Simmel 1955: 16-17). What counts, is ‘the “unity”’ (synthesis) of the effect, which is the 
net result of the dualistic forces (Simmel 1955: 17)140. 
 
4.5.1 Simmel and Conflict  
 
 While Simmel did not account for the ‘ultimate causes of conflict’, choosing instead to 
examine the intensity of conflict, and its consequences for both the immediate parties and 
the ‘systemic whole’, he did however explain the trigger mechanism for the occurrences 
of conflict (Turner 1975: 623)141. This is significant not only because it emphasises the 
                                                 
139
 Absolute harmony is deemed to be ‘empirically unreal’, and it would not show any ‘life process’, 
(Simmel 1950) – Explanation of ‘sociation’. 
140
 Simmel describes this ‘unity’ as the ‘total group-synthesis of persons, energies and forms, that is, the 
ultimate wholeness of the group’.  
141
 He explained this while differentiating between the different types of conflict. 
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role of the individual in triggering conflict, but also raises consideration as to the 
conditions and motivations that induce individuals to take action.  
 
In this context, the intensity of a conflict is determined by three factors: one, the degree 
of ‘emotional arousal’; the greater the emotional involvement, the more violent the 
conflict (Simmel 1955: 43-48; Turner 1975: 624)142. Second, the nature of the contest 
between opposing groups, where it could be either a ‘contest over objectives’ or ‘contest 
between individuals’. In both cases, it could lead either to an escalation of violence or it’s 
mitigation depending on how it is perceived (Simmel 1955: 38-39; Turner 1975: 624).  
 
Third, the clarity of the goals articulated by groups in conflict; the ‘more clearly 
articulated [and focused] their interests [and goals]’, the more likely that ‘less violent’ 
solutions – like negotiation or bargaining – will be used to attain them (Simmel 1955: 39-
41; Turner 1975: 624)143. Of the three, this is most significant as it contradicts Marx’s 
hypothesis that objective consciousness of interests’ would result in the organisation for 
violent conflict (Simmel 1955: 40; Turner 1975: 624)144 
 
                                                 
142
 Simmel: Individuals who are more distant (i.e. strangers who share or know little about each other) have 
fewer points of contact. So the scope of difference is only limited to particular areas of interests. So any 
conflict will also be limited to those areas, hence limiting the scope of conflict. Turner: 1) Greater solidarity 
among members of conflict parties; 2) and greater prior harmony between conflict parties is seen to 
heighten emotional involvement. Despite this, the data of our research shows that the two conditions above 
helps mitigate conflict when it occurs rather than escalate it. Conflict parties [labour unions and 
management] are less inclined to resort to more extreme measures and are more inclined to bring about a 
speedy resolution.  
143
 This makes it possible ‘to view violent conflict as only one of many means’ to achieve them (p.624). 
144(Simmel 1955: 40; Turner 1975: 624) – ‘Consciousness of common interests’ can result in ‘highly 
instrumental and non-violent conflict’. However, the specific conditions under which this would happen is 
not mentioned. To an extent, the third proposition may be seen as an attempted refinement of the second, 
where conflict over stipulated (but not necessarily objective) goals results in an indeterminate outcome of a 
binary possibility.  
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4.5.2 Social Integration through Conflict 
 
Unlike Marx, Simmel saw mobilisation and organisation as giving groups a more 
instrumental role to reduce the chances of violent conflict and promote integration and 
adaptation to the system (Turner 1975: 624). Conflict’s integrating role comes about in 
two ways; first, groups will create more distinct boundaries to delineate themselves from 
others, and secondly, the presence of outward hostilities serves to rally members of a 
group, encouraging ‘cooperation, affection, mutual aid, and harmony of interest’ (Simmel 
1955: 18; Turner 1975: 625)145. 
 
Conflict is most likely to be integrative where there is a degree of functional 
interdependency between groups, and where the conflict is ‘less violent’ and intense but 
occur with higher frequency (Turner 1975: 625). The interdependency encourages the 
regulation and organisation of conflict, allowing tension to be released without the 
escalatory effect, this enables the conflicting parties to better articulate their interests 
thereby ‘promoting stability’ in the system (Turner 1975: 625-626). 
 
In violent conflict, integrative effects tend to be manifested either: a) before the event, 
where its anticipated potential violence push groups to prevent its occurrence, thus 
                                                 
145
 Simmel cautions against concluding that the absence of antagonistic ‘repulsive’ forces would naturally 
result in ‘a richer and fuller social life’, given that conflict exerts an effect on the internal dynamics – such 
as the ‘internal solidarity’ and degree of centralization (Turner 1975: 625) – of groups.  
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encouraging the organisation of the conflict groupings; or b) following a sustained period 
of conflict, where groups seek each other out in a bid for alliance (Turner 1975: 626)146.  
 
4.5.3 Trade Unions and their Integrative Function 
 
Within the context of the NTUC, ‘integrative’ features appear at several levels. At the 
highest, the symbiotic relationship between labour movement and the government 
emphasises common ‘national interests’, utilising the ‘philosophy of tripartism’ 
(Interview 9b: 5) to call ‘[government, labour and employers] to cooperate for the 
economic well-being of Singapore’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 1998: 109). 
 
The tripartite framework is best exemplified by the NWC. The council, established in 
1972, comprised government, labour, employers’ institutions and foreign business 
councils, that aim to sustain Singapore’s economic competitiveness through the 
recommendation of wage policies that are ‘[aligned] with productivity growth’ (Chew 
1996: 23-26; Chew et al 1998: 97-98; Lim 1998: 18-19; MOM 2007)147. 
                                                 
146
 a) ‘The more prolonged the threat of violent conflict between groups, the more enduring are the 
coalitions of each of the conflict parties’; b) ‘The more violent and the more prolonged the conflict 
relations between groups, the more likely is the formation of coalitions among previously unrelated groups 
in a system’. 
147
 Chew 1996 – The NWC was established to address the tight labour market situation and to ease the 
reliance on foreign workers, created by the ‘informal wage restraint policy’ enacted in the late 1960s when 
Singapore was facing a high level of unemployment. MOM 2007 – In the NWC Council 2007/2008, the 
Employers’ group sees representation from the following organisations: Singapore Business Federation 
(SBF), Singapore National Employers’ Federation (SNEF), Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(SCCCI) and representatives from the American (American Chamber of Commerce Singapore), German 
(Singapore-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce), Japanese (Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
Singapore) and Indian (Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) business councils. The 
Employees’ group was represented by the NTUC. While the Government saw representatives from the 
following ministries and statutory boards: Economic Development Board (EDB), Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA), and 
the Public Service Division (PSD). 
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However, it should be pointed out that ‘the [NWC] guidelines [is a] guidepost’ 
(Interview 9a: 55). Even though the government sets the example by implementing them, 
the large number and diversity of firms makes it difficult and unrealistic to implement 
any legal measure to ensure universal adherence (Tan 1998: 77) 
 
Contrasted with the loose cooperative framework at the macro level is the clear 
legislative framework governing labour relations at the meso level, exemplified by 
‘compulsory arbitration’ (Interview 9f: 2). Apart from regulation, the legal structure 
enables issues to be dealt with objectively and minimises escalation stemming from 
emotional impulses or ‘extraneous circumstances’, (Simmel 1955: 36). Nevertheless, the 
resort to ‘arbitration is the last resort’ (Interview 9f: 27), taken only after previous 
‘peaceful settlement of dispute’ (Interview 9f: 4) have failed.  
 
It is at the level of practise, which this thesis seeks to examine (in closer detail in the 
following chapter). In particular, how participation in day-to-day processes and practices 
– such as decision-making, collective bargaining and conflict resolution – of unions 
socialises individuals into view of the labour confederation and the socio-political view 
espoused by the government. 
 
Even though national organisations and structural processes are important in the 
maintenance and governance of labour relations, this thesis is also cognizant that this is 
not a static process but one dependent on the participation of individuals. In this 
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structure-agency duality, individuals play an important role in maintaining organisational 
structures and systems.  
 
4.5.4 The ‘Ideology’ Blind Spot 
 
Despite offering a good elucidation and antithesis to Marx’s perspective, Simmel’s theory 
of conflict does not engage the Marxian conception of ‘ideology’. Does the class which 
controls the ‘means of material production’ also control the ‘means of mental production’ 
(Abercrombie et al 1980: 7)? Does the ruling class exert ‘ideological control over the 
working class’ such that the latter ‘[identifies] its interests with those of capitalism rather 
than with a revolutionary movement’ (Abercrombie et al 1980: 9)? 
 
Bernstein who rejected Marx’s collapse theory [of capital] sought to find a way to extend 
the economic and political rights of the working classes within a ‘monarchical-capitalist 
order’ (Moses 1990: 116-118)148. He concluded that the system of wage labour could not 
be eliminated, that ‘the obligation to work would always remain’ and ‘socialism would 
not abolish factories and the need for workers’ (Moses 1990: 123). Thus, unions should 
direct their attention to attacking the system of wage determination instead (Moses 1990: 
122-123)149. 
                                                 
148
 Bernstein’s departure from Marx is also encouraged by what he viewed to be a serious flaw in Marx’s 
(original) ‘labour value theory’ – i.e. that the value of a commodity is based on the amount of labour-power 
invested in it. And if this was the case, then all the ‘ideas, policies and actions’ based on it would be 
‘fallacious and erroneous’ (p.120-122). 
149
 It was the view that taking on the ‘system of determining wages, the methods of calculating wages, 
indeed the whole legal position of the worker in the workplace’ enabled the process to take on a more 
collective outlook, which could be determined through collective bargaining. Not only would workers gain 
more freedom if ‘law and order prevailed in the factory’ but improving the system of wage determination 
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This revisionist stand was criticised by Luxemburg as ‘trade union bureaucratism’, a 
labour of Sisyphus’ that turned unions into an impediment for ‘mobilising the working 
class to political activism’, and hindered the proletariat’s expression of natural 
revolutionary zeal (Moses 1990: 129-131)150. 
 
The contrast between Bernstein and Luxemburg merits Marx’s questions. Yet, if it were 
not so, how may we account for the political quiescence – without succumbing to the 
accusation of ‘false consciousness’ – of the working class through its representation in 
the labour unions? 
 
4.6 Turning to the Sociology of Knowledge 
 
The consideration of ‘ideology’ is necessary in order to defend both the claim that unions 
act as an integrating force in society, and the potential charge of ‘false consciousness’ 
from being levelled against unions and their agents. Doing so gives focus to agency, 
particularly, in understanding the factors influencing thinking-processes and decision-
making.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and work conditions (which translate to more money and time) would enable workers to enjoy more 
creative time outside of work. 
150
 This revisionist stand of Bernstein was conceived in the time of Wilhelmine Germany where only 
politically neutral trade unions were allowed to survive. As much as Rosa Luxemburg agreed with the 
necessity of engaging in ‘parliamentary and trade union tactics’ as a means for the proletariat to acquire 
political and economic power as well as to ‘educate and organize the proletariat for the advent of 
socialism’, she felt that the nature of this everyday struggle also blurred the ‘vision of the ultimate goal of 
revolution’ (p.135).  
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4.6.1 Thought and Ideology 
 
To do this, we utilise Mannheim’s Sociology of Knowledge framework from ‘Ideology 
and Utopia’, which is concerned primarily with understanding the originating 
circumstances of individual thought; circumstances which are rooted in social-historcial 
situations, bound with particular ‘inherited’ situations of the group and differentiated 
further through the actions of individuals (Mannheim 1991: 3).   
 
To understand thought, it is first necessary to understand the problems of ‘ideology’ 
(Mannheim 1991: 49)151. A behaviour is seen to have an ‘ideological taint’ when it has 
been identified as an untruth resulting from ‘a distorted and faulty conceptual apparatus’ 
(Mannheim 1991: 54). The implied notion of truth and falsehood thus becomes a basis to 
question the veracity of an adversary’s thoughts and claims on the grounds that it is 
‘unrealistic’ given current practises and happenings (Mannheim 1991: 62-64). 
 
This was how Marxist theory intended to use ideology: as a negative ‘value-judgement’ 
that insinuates ‘a conscious political lie’ committed to preserve the control of the 
dominant class over the proletariat (Mannheim 1991: 66, 111). As such, ideology 
becomes relative, with groups using it to discredit their adversaries’ views on the basis of 
being ideological (Mannheim 1991: 65-66). This leads to the question of ‘what 
constitutes reality’, since no group can accuse another without being similarly accused, 
and also, what can be used to distinguish between truth and falsehood (Mannheim 1991: 
64-66). 
                                                 
151
 See Annex 4.2 for Mannheim’s conception of ideology.  
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4.6.2 Sociology of Knowledge – Ideology and Utopia 
 
Mannheim responded by advocating the development of a total conception of ideology, a 
Sociology of Knowledge that would take into account all ideological positions and not 
just that of the adversary’s (Mannheim 1991: 68-69). What resulted was a relative and 
relational ‘non-evaluative analysis’ which tie ideas to the social-historical context in 
which they emerge, without passing judgement on the ‘correctness’ of these ideas 
(Mannheim 1991: 70-71)152. 
 
According to Mannheim’s analysis, knowledge could be ‘distorted and ideological [if it 
failed] to take account of the new realities to a situation’, or when it tries to use 
inappropriate categories to conceal them (Mannheim 1991: 86). ‘False consciousness’, 
occurs when: 1) people interpret their social experience falsely, intentionally concealing, 
‘deifying, romanticising and idealising’ what they do when this is not so; 2) people’s 
behaviour are not synchronous with the ideals they avow to abide by; 3) a particular 
knowledge can no longer be sufficiently used to understand the actual world (Mannheim 
1991: 85-86). 
 
Mannheim’s key contribution lay in making a further distinction between ‘ideology’ and 
‘utopia’. Ideology and utopia belong to the ‘situationally transcendent’ category of ideas 
                                                 
152
 (Mannheim 1991: 70-71) – Whereas relativism traces the thoughts of a person to the ‘concrete position’ 
occupied – since all knowledge is dependent and held based on the ‘subjective standpoint and social 
situation of the knower’ – relationism, recognises that some truths cannot be conceived without taking into 
account the social context in which it appears (p.70-71). This makes all (historical) knowledge relational, 
dependent on the social position of the observer (p.71). 
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that ‘do not fit into the current order’ – as compared with ‘situationally congruous’ ideas 
that correspond with the ‘concretely existing and de facto order’ (Mannheim 1991: 175). 
 
Not all ideas that transcend reality are utopian. An idea is utopian if it transcends reality 
and possesses the potential to bring down ‘either wholly or partially’ [the prevailing order 
of things] (Mannheim 1991: 173-174)153. This is what separates utopia from ideology. 
Although ideology also holds onto situationally transcendent ideas, they are unable to 
realise their ‘projected contents’ – often having their meanings and intentions distorted in 
practice (Mannheim 1991: 175)154. 
 
While ideologies can become utopian, utopias are not ideologies (Mannheim 1991: 174, 
176)155. It is difficult to distinguish between the two as it involves not only ‘values and 
standards’, but also more subjective elements such as the ‘feelings and motives’ of those 
involved (Mannheim 1991: 176). 
 
4.6.3 Ideology and Utopia – A Matter of Position 
 
                                                 
153
 Just because an idea transcends the existing order does not make it utopian. To be utopian, the idea has 
to offer ‘revolutionary possibilities’, otherwise, they would only be seen as ‘appropriate ideologies’ that 
were ‘harmoniously integrated into the worldview’ of the period. 
154
 (Mannheim 1991: 175-176) – Distortions in practice can take place in three ways: 1) First, the 
ideological mentality arises when the ‘subject is prevented from becoming aware of the incongruence’ 
between his ideas and reality by the ‘axioms involved in his historically and socially determined thought’ 
(p.175). 2) Second, the possibility for discovering the incongruence between ideas and actions is 
‘concealed’ due to some ‘vital-emotional interests’ (p.176). 3) Lastly, the ideological mentality is based on 
conscious deception, where ideology is a ‘purposeful lie’ (p.176). 
155
 (Mannheim 1991: 174, 176) – Ideologies can become utopian when social groups try to realise them by 
actualising the ‘wish-images’ in their actions. 
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As it stands, ideology and utopia is differentiated based on the social standpoint of the 
individual. From the point of view of representatives of an [emerging order], ideas 
adapted to the present order would be ideologies and deemed ‘illusionary’ (Mannheim 
1991: 183)156. While utopia describes ‘unrealisable’ ideas from the standpoint of those 
within the existing social order – this is based on the political evaluations behind the 
‘whole system of thought’ of the ‘thinker’ (Mannheim 1991: 177, 185)157. 
 
Determining what is ideology and utopia is difficult not only because of the socio-
historical subjectivity involved, but also because they both alternate between being and 
coming into being; what is deemed utopian in the present context may well become 
reality tomorrow, thereby making identification possible only in retrospect (Bell 1960: 
373; Mannheim 1991: 183-184). 
 
4.6.4 Contextualising and the Critique of Ideology and Utopia 
 
As stated earlier, the examination of Mannheim is intended to defend against a possible 
accusation of Marxian ‘false consciousness’ in explaining the apparent quiescence of 
agency within the established industrial relations system. Such an explanation would be 
objectionable because it forcibly foists a version of ‘truth’ and value-judgement held by 
                                                 
156
 (Mannheim 1991: 183) – This group is known as the ‘ascendent class’, who are ‘in conflict with things 
as they exist’. 
157
 (Mannheim 1991: 177, 183) – This refers to the ‘dominant group’, who are in ‘full accord with the 
existing order’ (p.183). Mannheim recognizes utopia as a broad category and makes a further distinction 
between utopias which are a) absolutely unrealizable, and those that are b) relatively unrealizable. This 
recognizes that the label may be applied to obscure or suppress ‘the validity of the claims of the relative 
utopia’ (p.177). 
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one group onto another, a process which is problematic since it cannot defend itself from 
the same charge of ‘ideology’. 
 
In conceptualising ideology in relativist, relational, non-evaluative terms, Mannheim 
acknowledges ideology as being socially and historically bound, influenced by the socio-
political orientation of the individual, making it ‘flawed, limited [and] perspectivistically 
one-sided’ (Kettler et al 2000: 103). 
 
The appropriation of Mannheim removes the need to pass value judgements on the 
‘correctness’ of views and opinions articulated by interviewees. This enables the views 
articulated by labour union leaders (LUL) to be examined in relation to their social 
position and experience, as well as their interrelationship with other social actors. 
 
This necessitates locating them within the organisational structure in which they inhabit, 
bringing us back to the initial aim to examine: how the actions of LUL are affected by the 
structural-organisational norms within the unions, how their social position and 
experience leads to the reinforcement and validation of these norms and practices, and 
how this relates to the larger theme of unions functioning as conduits for social 
integration. 
 
However, this only offers analysis at the level of the particular conception of ideology, 
which is bound with the particularistic perspectives of LUL derived from their union 
experiences. This allows us to gauge assertions made by subjects, which ‘can be regarded 
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as concealments, falsification or lies without attacking the mental integrity of the total 
mental structure of the asserting subject’ (Mannheim 1991: 238). 
 
This way, the aim would be to show that the views and beliefs held by LUL are 
synchronous and influenced by their union experiences, which occur at two levels: 1) the 
first being structural-organisational, wherein the actions and behaviour of LUL are 
governed by particular rules and legislature at the national and union level; 2) while the 
second, involves the experiences accumulated in the course of their day-to-day practices. 
This differentiation helps identify the basis of how people come to ‘know’ and recognise 
what is ‘true’. 
 
4.7 Importance of the Everyday Experience 
 
Although Mannheim’s framework noted the importance of epistemology and social 
structures in influencing how people come to interpret and ‘know’ the world, it lacked the 
robust conceptual tools to trace the processes by which this takes place without loosing 
perspective of the wider intersubjectivity that continues to coexist alongside the common 
and the shared (Mannheim 1991: 253, 259; Berger et al 1966: 37)158. 
 
This theoretical gap is filled by Berger and Luckmann who viewed knowledge as rooted 
in everyday life, and traced how individuals subjectively create and interpret meanings 
                                                 
158
 To briefly describe, a common reality – what Berger and Luckmann term as ‘commonsense 
consciousness’ – is established because of the interaction and correspondence continuously taking place 
between individuals that allow for an overlap in the exchange of meanings; but intersubjective meanings 
and perspectives are retained because this overlap is neither perfect nor complete. 
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within this ‘everyday reality’ context – the ‘reality par excellence’ (Berger et al 1966: 
33). 
 
The incorporation of the everyday is necessary to discern the features used by unions to 
enable social integration; aside from structural features, support and legitimacy from 
labour union members is also important. Crucially, the ‘personal motivation’ of LUL for 
supporting the endeavours of the NTUC is rooted in the day-to-day realities experienced 
by LUL.  
 
4.7.1 The Role of Personal Motivation 
 
‘Personal motivation’ can be broken down into two forms: 1) the first is personal interest, 
and 2) the second is the acceptance of the labour movement’s objectives and the 
legitimacy of its system. In the first instance, LUL support of the system arises as a result 
of their pragmatic interests (Berger et al 1966: 59). Here, whether LUL believe in the 
principles of the organisation is irrelevant, what matters is their adherence to them 
(Berger et al 1966: 59). However, such views have never been offered, and can only be 
speculated.  
 
The second form, which I term as an ‘acceptance’ by LUL of the NTUC’s objectives and 
approach, is based on the belief that LUL are motivated by reasons other than personal 
functional utilitarian gains outlined under the first instance; reasons which are rooted in 
factors within the day-to-day practices and situations experienced by LUL. 
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The aim in this section is to apply conceptual analysis from Berger and Luckmann’s 
Social Construction of Reality to identify and understand how ‘acceptance’ comes about, 
and how this affects the views and perceptions of LUL. The focus here is to tease out the 
conceptual frames for explanatory analysis, leaving the more detailed analysis and 
discussion to the following chapter. 
 
4.7.2 The Shaping of Objective Reality: Agents’ Experience with Structure 
 
Although I state of ‘acceptance’ as being rooted in day-to-day practices and situations it 
would be more accurate to say that it is rooted in how people understand their reality as a 
result of their experiences. In this way, it would be apt to begin by examining how 
objective reality is created. 
 
The ‘objective world’ we refer to is an ‘institutional world’, a sui generis order that 
appears ‘as given, unalterable and self-evident’ (Berger et al 1966: 70, 77). The 
institutional world is experienced as an objective reality primarily because its 
(antecedent) existence transcends individual biography (Berger et al 1966: 77-78). 
 
Institutions, which are created through the ‘typification of habitualised actions [of social] 
actors’ are historically rooted and function as a form of social control by making conduct 
‘more predictable’ (Berger et al 1966: 71-72, 74, 80)159.  
                                                 
159
 (Berger et al 1966: 71-72, 74, 80) – Being historically rooted, they therefore need to be understood in 
relation to the historical circumstances of their founding. ‘Habitualisation carries with it the important 
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This has been expressed by interviewees in various ways such as, attributing the 
emphasis on non-confrontation to the period of Singapore’s separation with Malaysia in 
the mid 1960s] (Interview 16: 12), or accounting for [the secretary-general of the NTUC 
not being a worker with the formation of the NTUC, back to the time of the contestation 
between the NTUC and SATU] (Interview 8: 13). 
 
Doing so ‘[explains] and [justifies]’ the institution, and helps legitimise it (Berger et al 
1966: 79). To elaborate, even though the reality of institutions precedes the present, their 
reality appears as a ‘historical one’; for those in the present who have no access its 
original meaning, it appears more as a tradition as it is not part of their ‘biographical 
memory’ (Berger et al 1966: 79). 
 
Due to this, ‘legitimating formulas’ need to be incorporated within the ‘cognitive and 
normative interpretations’ of subsequent generations to give the institution the necessary 
cover of legitimacy (Berger et al 1966: 79). This is even more necessary as institutions 
move away from the socio-historical context of their founding, which leads to questions 
about their relevance (Berger et al 1966: 80). 
 
4.7.3 Institutional Conduct for Legitimating Realities – Methods for Seeking Agency 
Compliance 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
psychological gain that choices are narrowed’ (p.71). When speaking of the ‘typification of habitualised 
actions’, not only must the institution typify the type of habitualised actions, but they also have to typify the 
actors, combining the two process to attribute particular type of actions to particular type of actors (p.72).  
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4.7.3.1 Intersubjective Sedimentation 
 
The most direct method for institutions to reclaim their authority over individuals is 
through socialisation; institutionalising conduct to control and thereby make the 
behaviour of individuals more predictable (Berger et al 1966: 80)160. This can be done in 
two ways. One is is ‘intersubjective sedimentation’. This is the process where ‘several 
individuals share a common biography’; the experiences of which can ‘become 
incorporated in a common stock of knowledge’ such that its objectification can allow for 
this knowledge to be transmitted to other generations (Berger et al 1966: 85). 
 
Aside from transmitting important lessons, it also enables knowledge to be ‘reaffirmed’, 
and for ‘legitimations to succeed each other’ since new meanings and significances can 
be added onto the ‘sedimented experiences’ (Berger et al 1966: 86-88). For example, 
justifying non-confrontation on the basis of ‘international competitiveness’ (Interview 6: 
12) and how it could ‘frighten away potential investors’ (Interview 9i: 19). It offers 
institutions the opportunity to adapt and reinvent themselves, thereby justifying their 
relevance and legitimacy (Berger et al 1966: 87). 
 
4.7.3.2 Role Typification 
 
The second method is role typification; it is only through the [performance of roles] that 
institutions are experienced as ‘real’ by individuals (Berger et al 1966: 92, 96). By 
playing a role, an individual [enacts] in human conduct, what an institution represents; 
                                                 
160
 This is done to ensure the priority of their claim over the individual’s in defining a situation. 
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the role is the means by which the individual is inducted into ‘specific areas of socially 
objectivated knowledge’ (Berger et al 1966: 94, 96)161. 
 
Thus, learning a role does not only mean learning the routines necessary for performing 
that role but also the ‘various cognitive [and] affective layers [of] knowledge’ – such as 
the ‘norms, values and even emotions’ – that are ‘directly and indirectly appropriate to 
this role’ (Berger et al 1966: 94, 96). 
 
4.7.4 The NTUC and Legitimacy 
 
In examining and explaining how objective reality is created from the point-of-view of 
institutions, the above section is also a reminder that the NTUC is not exempt from 
having to justify and legitimise its continued existence. By passing on the meanings of an 
institution – such as [giving concern to the socio-economic conditions of its members] 
(Interview 17: 11) – ‘intersubjective sedimentation’ aids the NTUC’s adaptation to new 
circumstances and helps it gain ‘social recognition’ as an institution with a ‘“permanent” 
solution to a “permanent” problem’, thereby securing its relevance and continuity (Berger 
et al 1966: 87). In addition, by transmitting symbolic, formal or informal knowledge, it 
helps ‘systematically [acquaint]’ ‘potential actors’ with the institutional meanings 
(Berger et al 1966: 87-88). 
 
                                                 
161
 The roles played by individuals are in turn ‘representative of an institutional order that defines their 
character’, their ‘appendages of knowledge’, and is the source ‘from which they derive their objective 
sense’ (p.96). 
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Applied to our consideration of the NTUC, role typification suggests LUL perform the 
routines of their roles while being mindful not to breach the boundary of what is 
considered to be the acceptable norms, values and emotions of the wider social context 
that labour unions are situated in. 
 
The ‘wider social context’ may refer to two areas: 1) one, is the NTUC; given that 
‘[unions] are linked to [the] NTUC, [whatever the] NTUC agree at the national level, 
[unions] will have to implement’ (Interview 3: 16). 2) The other context is the operating 
(economic) environment, specifically, the ‘market trend [or] industry trend’ (Interview 
9a: 53) for wage and benefits, which is significant during the conduct of collective 
bargaining. 
 
A dialectical relationship where the NTUC and LUL mutually reinforce the other thus 
results (Berger et al 1966: 92). LUL in performing their roles – ‘[reviewing] the terms 
[for the] renewal of a collective agreement’ (Interview 9h: 4); ‘[bringing] proper 
communication to the people on the ground’ (Interview 11: 3) – enable the union to 
become perceived as a ‘real’ entity, similarly, LUL through their participation, come to 
derive a sense of the objective world. 
 
4.7.5 Issues and Considerations of Institutionalisation 
 
With regards to role typification, there is the concern that it would bring about greater 
institutionalisation of conduct, thereby leading to a loss in ‘alternative’ institutional 
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programmes (Berger et al 1966: 80, 91)162. For the NTUC, this is significant for varying 
reasons: on the one hand, it makes conduct more controlled and predictable, allowing for 
the development of a more consistent and stable labour relations system.  
 
In relation to the wider theme of social integration, greater institutionalisation and 
regulation help moderate conflict in the event of its occurrence. One concern with the 
institutionalisation of conduct is that it reduces institutional alternatives, and imposes 
restrictions on the authority and actions of LUL, which may affect the NTUC’s ability to 
respond to the needs of its membership163. 
 
4.8 Subjective Reality and the Production of a Unanimous 
Interpretation 
 
Since society possesses both ‘objective and subjective reality’, any understanding of it 
necessarily requires the examination of both aspects (Berger et al 1966: 149). While the 
previous section examined the creation of objective reality, this section will examine 
subjective reality in order to comprehend how individuals (through their experiences) 
come to understand their reality 
 
Like objective reality, subjective reality is also ‘composed of the three moments of 
externalisation, objectivation and internalisation’ (Berger et al 1966: 149). But whereas 
                                                 
162
 By making behaviour more controlled and predictable, conduct could now be ‘taken for granted’.  
163
 From the perspective of the organization, institutional practices such as having IROs (Industrial 
Relations Officers) ‘rotated out [every three years]’ (Interview 10: 18), helps prevent them from being 
‘[alienated] from the NTUC [and doing] things … not in line … with the general policy’, serving thereby to 
safeguard the functioning of the organisation.  
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‘objective reality’ begins by looking at how the individual is confronted with the sui 
generis nature of the objective institutional world, subjective reality starts by looking at 
how individuals derive differential meanings and interpretations from similar objective 
events (Berger et al 1966: 149). To understand how these perceptions are formed first 
requires understanding how people make sense of and interpret events through their own 
subjective interpretive schemes (Berger et al 1966: 149)164. 
 
This requires an appreciation of socialisation, which explains how a consensual 
interpretation of the objective reality prescribed by the NTUC is possible despite the 
subjective views of individual LUL (Berger et al 1966: 150). This helps substantiate our 
claim that LUL are motivated to help maintain the objectives and legitimacy of the labour 
movement because they identify with them and its principles. Thus, the aim is to examine 
the socialisation process to identify the factors and processes that shape an individual’s 
subjective perception such that a common interpretive stand results. 
 
4.8.1 Primary Socialisation  
 
There are two forms of socialisation, primary and secondary. Primary socialisation is the 
process where the individual’s first world is constructed, through the mediation of 
                                                 
164
 This begins with the process of internalisation and how individuals’ were first inducted to [participate] 
in the ‘societal dialectic’. 
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‘significant others’ (Berger et al 1966: 151, 155)165. It is important because it provides the 
‘basic structure’ for secondary socialisation (Berger et al 1966: 151, 155).  
 
Primary socialisation can only take place within a [highly charged emotional] 
environment where there is a high level of emotional attachment to the significant others, 
it is this which enables the learning process (Berger et al 1966: 151). Despite wide 
variations across and within societies in the content transmitted, the most important 
content passed on is language, and through it, the ‘motivational and interpretive schemes’ 
that enable individuals to participate in ‘socially appropriate’ conduct (Berger et al 1966: 
153, 155)166. 
 
Internalisation has occurred when an individual ‘[take] on the roles and attitudes of 
[significant] others’, by so doing, he takes on their world, making their roles and attitudes 
their own (Berger et al 1966: 151-152).  It is through this that the individual becomes 
[able to identify himself] and acquire a ‘subjectively coherent and plausible identity’, 
which allows him to locate himself within an assigned social position (Berger et al 1966: 
151-152). 
 
The significance of primary socialisation is that it allows the individual to create a 
‘generalised other’ that enables the individual to identify with ‘concrete others’ and [with 
                                                 
165
 (Berger et al 1966: 151) – In this process, a ‘double selectivity’ is said to occur, since what the proxies 
(choose to) transmit to the individual is influenced firstly by the proxies’ own social position (class) in the 
social structure, and secondly by the proxies own biographical idiosyncrasies. 
166
 Such as roles and attitudes which are inherited from significant others. 
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society] (Berger et al 1966: 153)167. The formation of the ‘generalised other’ signals the 
end of primary socialisation, at this point, the individual is considered to be ‘an effective 
member of society’ possessing a subjective world view and sense of self (Berger et al 
1966: 157). However, the continued involvement of the individual in society means 
ongoing interaction, socialisation and internalisation (Berger et al 1966: 157). 
 
4.8.2 Secondary Socialisation  
 
This further internalisation known as secondary socialisation presupposes primary 
socialisation, takes place at the institutional level and involves the internalisation of 
institutions or their sub-worlds (Berger et al 1966: 158, 160). It is more formalised and 
concerned with the acquisition of role-specific knowledge (Berger et al 1966: 158). 
Unlike primary socialisation, secondary socialisation does not require close emotional 
identification, and can be carried out in ‘anonymity’ of the ‘performer’ (Berger et al 
1966: 161-163). 
 
As secondary socialisation does not require such a high degree of emotional 
identification, its content also does not possess the sense of inevitability (Berger et al 
1966: 163, 167)168. This ‘makes it possible to detach part of the self’ from the persona 
performing the role (Berger et al 1966: 162)169.  
                                                 
167
 Society is seen as ‘a generality of others’. The formation of a generalised other takes place during 
primary socialisation beginning with the abstraction of the roles and attitudes of the immediate significant 
others into a limited and subjective norm that gets progressively extended and generalised into a norm that 
encompasses the wider society.  
168
 This also means that they are more susceptible to be displaced as well (p.167).  
169
 (Berger et al 1966: 162) – This allows [the individual] to separate ‘his total self and its reality [from] the 
role-specific partial self and its reality’. 
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For institutions, that contents do not possess the sense of inevitability is ‘pragmatically 
useful’ as they allow for ‘emotionally controlled’, rational learning to take place (Berger 
et al 1966: 163-164). This enables institutions to establish selective and progressive 
learning sequences according to the knowledge necessary and appropriate for the 
individual (Berger et al 1966: 160) 
 
While the ‘sub-worlds’ passed on and internalised in secondary socialisation may be 
considered ‘partial realities’ compared to the ‘“base-world” acquired during primary 
socialisation’, they are still ‘cohesive realities’ that possess ‘[normative, affective and 
cognitive] components’ that need to be legitimated (Berger et al 1966: 158). 
 
4.8.3 Training and the Acquisition of Legitimacy 
 
Ritualistic or material symbolic forms of legitimacy are important because they 
distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate (Berger et al 1966: 158). In this 
context, ‘training’ is important because it encapsulates the process of secondary 
socialisation and aid also in the legitimating process. 
 
Training itself is composed of several facets. One such facet is specialised skill training, 
where individuals are differentiated and trained according to their assigned role (Berger 
et al 1966: 158). Language is another; the use of terminologies, which are role-specific 
and carry meanings unique to the sub-world individuals inhabit serve as a form of 
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communication between members and also allow for them to subjectively identify with 
each other (Berger et al 1966: 158-159).  
 
These body of meanings are sustained in various ways; ‘[by] legitimations’, which range 
from maxims to elaborate constructions, or ‘representative’ forms like objects and 
ceremonies, such as tokens which are indicative of membership or status, to annual 
celebrations or initiation rites (Berger et al 1966: 159). Accordingly, how extravagant and 
elaborate these rituals are, is seen to be correlated with the importance placed on the 
particular knowledge and vocation (Berger et al 1966: 159). 
 
4.8.4 LUL and Secondary Socialisation 
 
For our purposes, we are more interested in secondary socialisation, particularly, how it 
relates to LUL ‘acceptance’ of the NTUC’s objectives and approach to labour relations. 
Under subjective reality, individual unions and the NTUC are the institutions responsible 
for the conduct of secondary socialisation, the product of which are LUL who are 
considered to have internalised the normative, affective and cognitive components in 
addition to role-specific skills necessary for the role in the labour ‘sub-world’/reality.  
 
However, any skills or normative-affective and cognitive components are useless unless 
they are viewed by LUL to be legitimate. This would be achieved through training where 
individuals are socialised into the ‘rudiments’ of the role – both materially and 
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symbolically, which we will elaborate further on in the following chapter (Berger et al 
1966: 158). 
 
Although this appears to explain how LUL come to possess similar interpretive schemes 
and understanding of the organisational goals, it offers no explanation as to why they 
would be accepted and obeyed. This is largely due to the primacy of primary socialisation 
which threatens these new secondary internalisations especially if the latter is: 1) 
inconsistent with the initial internalisation; 2) and is not as affectively entrenched, 
making them unreliable; easier to detach, alter, forget or reject (Berger et al 1966: 160, 
163-164). 
 
4.8.5 Maintaining the Efficacy of Secondary Socialisation 
 
Thus, the form of secondary socialisation is important as it affects the degree of 
internalisation. In turn, the degree of internalisation and identification varies according to 
the nature of knowledge being pursued and the motivation of the individual pursuing it 
(Berger et al 1966: 164, 166)170. In both instance, greater emotional involvement is 
correlated with greater identification and internalisation.  
 
For institutions, motivating members and getting them to be committed necessitates 
raising the intensity of the ‘affective charge’ during the socialisation process (Berger et al 
                                                 
170
 The need for identification can also vary according to the position occupied by the individual; higher-
ranking individuals on the social structure may be required to have a higher degree of commitment and 
identification as compared to those in the lower echelons. Such a factor would appear to be applicable to 
our consideration of labour union leaders. (p.166) 
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1966: 164). There are several strategies for this, ranging from the ‘simple’ conduct of 
induction ceremonies to processes that require more thorough-going transformation in the 
individual’s reality (Berger et al 1966: 164-166). 
 
Before elaborating on how through-going these transformations are, we will first examine 
how subjective reality is maintained. This maintenance is necessary due to the 
incompleteness of its socialisation, making it susceptible to being dislodged by 
challenging definitions of reality because ‘their reality is less deeply rooted in 
consciousness’ as compared to those internalised during primary socialisation (Berger et 
al 1966: 166-167). 
 
4.8.6 Routine Maintenance and Crisis Maintenance 
 
There are two types of reality-maintenance: routine maintenance and crisis maintenance 
(Berger et al 1966: 168). Routine maintenance involves how the ‘internalised reality of 
everyday life’ is maintained through institutional processes and routines; a process that is 
continuously ‘reaffirmed’ through the ‘individual’s interaction with others’ (Berger et al 
1966: 168-169)171. 
 
Conversations are the primary medium for routine (reality) maintenance; taking place 
under against a background where all meanings are implicit, causal conversations help 
                                                 
171
 (Berger et al 1966: 170-171) – ‘Others’ help reaffirm the subjective reality of individuals by  fulfilling 
the assumptions that have been internalised as the subjective reality of the individual, this provides the 
‘reality-confirmation’ component to complete the dialectical reality-maintenance feedback loop.  
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affirm the ‘routines of a taken-for-granted world’ and by extension, the taken-for-granted 
reality (Berger et al 1966: 172-173). 
 
Ironically, it is precisely because the subjective reality is never explicitly referenced – 
being taken-for-granted – that it becomes ‘shaky’, allowing new meanings to be added, 
thereby leading to the discontinuation and modification of the subjective reality (Berger 
et al 1966: 173). 
 
Crisis maintenance refers to strategies used apprehend threats that undermine the 
consistency of subjective reality. These strategies are similar to the processes required for 
a more thorough-going transformation in the individual’s reality when more ‘immersion 
and commitment’ from the latter is needed. 
 
4.8.7 ‘Alternation’: The Resocialising of Secondary Socialisation 
 
Termed as ‘alternation’, this transformation (in the subjective reality) suggests that 
subjective reality possesses a totality which it never had to begin with; this is because the 
socialisation process of subjective reality is always ongoing and never complete (Berger 
et al 1966: 176). 
 
Nevertheless, transformation can occur in different degrees, leading to varying extents of 
subjective reality modification; alternation is used to refer to the type of transformation 
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that appears most ‘total’, requiring ‘processes of re-socialisation’ to the extent that it 
resembles primary socialisation (Berger et al 1966: 176). 
 
This arises from the desire to change the reality outlook to the extent that it possesses the 
intensity of ‘affective identification’ during primary socialisation (Berger et al 1966: 
176). Similarly, for alternation to take place, there also needs to be a group of significant 
others whom the individual can identify with and mediate the plausible ‘new world’ – 
with all its associated affective and cognitive structures – to the individual (Berger et al 
1966: 177).  
 
The sequence of transformation can only take place if these factors are available. It 
begins with the displacement of ‘all other worlds’ particularly the one the individual 
currently inhabits; the individual is disaffiliated from his previous world by being 
segregated from the ‘“inhabitants” of other worlds’, this ensures that the latter’s (and all 
other people and ideas with similar) reality-disrupting influence would not impinge on 
the individual’s newfound reality (Berger et al 1966: 178-179). Finally, the entire 
transformation sequence needs to be legitimated (Berger et al 1966: 179)172. 
 
This requires the reinterpretation of all pre-alternation biographical experiences of the 
individual under the new interpretation of reality. But since not all experiences can be 
successfully reinterpreted – because they are too antithetical to the present – the 
individual might resort to selectively forgetting, denying or fabricating new events to 
                                                 
172
 The sequence stretches from the new reality to the different stages by which it is ‘appropriated and 
maintained’. 
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‘harmonise’ what is remembered with the ‘reinterpreted past’ (Berger et al 1966: 179-
180). 
 
Given the subjective nature of reinterpretation and the individual’s professed ‘sincerity’, 
this reinterpretation of the past cannot be considered a lie; rather it represents how the 
individual view the past in accordance with the ‘truth’ as he understands it in the current 
subjective reality (Berger et al 1966: 180-181). 
 
Still, not all transformation reach the extent of alternations; ‘partial-transformations’ 
which relate to the individual’s ‘social mobility’ and ‘occupational training’ occur more 
frequently (Berger et al 1966: 181)173. ‘Partial-transformations’ however, face problems 
in maintaining a consistency between the earlier and subsequent subjective reality, which 
in re-socialisation is solved by the reinterpretation of the past (Berger et al 1966: 181). 
This problem would only get progressively worse as secondary socialisation approaches 
re-socialisation without being so (Berger et al 1966: 181). 
 
4.8.8 ‘Partial-Transformation’ and the Outlook of LUL 
 
Secondary socialisation is particularly significant for our examination of LUL as it offers 
insight on the processes at work that would account for the close identification of LUL – 
in terms of their held views and perspectives – with the overall principles and objectives 
of the NTUC. Previously, examination was given to how LUL came to possess the 
                                                 
173
 ‘Partial transformation’ lies somewhere between alternation and secondary socialisation. 
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interpretive schemes of [the NTUC’s] organisational goals through their training, here we 
examine why these goals would be accepted and obeyed. 
 
As stated earlier, increasing the ‘affective charge’ during socialisation is one way to 
motivate and get LUL committed (Berger et al 1966: 164). In this way, it’d help that LUL 
are confronted with few alternative definitions of reality; this occurs at the societal level, 
where the socio-political discourse is dominated by the PAP, the political patron of the 
NTUC, and within the paradigm of labour relations, where the NTUC possesses a 
monopolistic influence (Berger et al 1966: 138, 143, 165). 
 
This overwhelming and continuous institutional presence (from the general social to the 
particularistic field of labour) helps to secure the status quo definition of reality and its 
consistency, which intensifies the socialisation process for LUL. More importantly 
however, is how the subjective reality of LUL acquired during secondary socialisation 
maintained? 
 
The answer rests in the everyday institutional processes and routines conducted by LUL –
all of which involves ‘partial-transformation’. This would mean day-to-day routines such 
as meeting sessions with union members and management, the mediation of disputes, 
attendance of NTUC-organised events, during which LUL perform the roles ‘taught’ 
during secondary socialisation [training], which serves to legitimise both the roles and the 
meanings and that they embody. 
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The dialectic loop between the subjective reality internalised by LUL is further reinforced 
through their communication with others (such as politicians, members and other LUL) 
while undertaking their routine responsibilities that necessitates the presupposition of 
knowledge and meanings, which are presumably shared amongst the parties they are 
conversant with174. 
 
Generally, crisis maintenance is not regularly performed because they seldom occur. In 
large unions where LUL may not have the opportunity to meet all the members under 
their charge, the ‘correspondence’ strategy supposed be employed for crisis maintenance 
may be adapted for use; by conveying news and updates of ongoing events helps labour 
unions reinforce the subjective reality of members (see Annex 4.3)175. 
 
What this suggests is that direct participation, performance and communication are 
important factors in influencing the perceptions of individuals; the greater the 
involvement and engagement, the more positive the perception. Given the greater 
intensity of their involvement, LUL are likely to have a more reinforced internalised 
subjective reality and also a more positive perception of the NTUC. 
 
By extension, it is likely given the importance of participation and engagement to expect 
a decreasing sense of identification with the objectives of the NTUC as well as its 
associated subjective reality as we move away from LUL who represent the ‘most 
                                                 
174
 The taken-for-granted nature of meanings attached to particular terms and words may not necessarily be 
obvious, unless one is a total outsider to the ‘trade union world’. Even whilst doing the research this feature 
was not immediately noticeable since the nature of doing research in such a field necessitated some prior 
degree of background knowledge.  
175
 (Interview 4d: 28) – ‘Actually the NTUC and the union system does act as an information flow system’. 
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involved’ grouping, to union members who are less involved and less informed (see 
Annex 4.4). 
 
4.9 Summary: Integration through Everyday Practices 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for 
addressing the central assertion of this thesis that is labour unions in Singapore function 
primarily as agencies that encourage social integration; an act realised primarily through 
the actions of LUL. While it is not surprising that unions conform to Simmel’s 
conception of integration, given their heuristic authoritarian categorisation, it is 
nevertheless of interest to see how such a structure is maintained.  
 
Given the thematic duality between structure and agency, it cannot be assumed that the 
structure would be maintained without the support of those who inhabit it. Thus, it is 
crucial to examine LUL, the agency within the structure of labour relations, to understand 
how their personal motivation influence and are influenced by wider structural factors, 
enabling the maintenance of the structure. 
 
This ties labour unions’ wider function of integration to the motivation of LUL for 
supporting the NTUC’s objectives and approach to labour relations, something which 
should not simply be attributed to ‘false consciousness’. Rather, this is something tied to 
the socialisation process, specifically, the partial-transformation undergone by LUL. 
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In this theoretical emphasis which draws heavily on the duality existing between agency 
and structure, I wanted to show that actions which take place within the ‘permissible 
constraints’ of structure, also acts as the guarantor of its continued existence (Luhmann 
1995: 283). This occurs not only at the social-institutional level but also within the 
individual, in terms of how they come to (subjectively) perceive and construct what they 
deem to be the ‘reality’ of their world. 
 
In this sense, the greater the symmetry between the objective and subjective reality, the 
more socialisation would be considered as successful (Berger et al 1966: 183). However, 
symmetry is not the only factor determining how successful socialisation is. Another 
crucial determinant is that of the availability of counter-realities, whether individuals can 
form a ‘counter-community’ to the one in existence (Berger et al 1966: 186). 
 
By this, the continued dominance of the NTUC form of trade unions relations would 
continue unless an alternative grouping challenges its dominance. Although there are 
currently labour unions not affiliated with the NTUC, these cannot be considered 
‘alternatives’ as they still operate under the similar structure of labour relations. 
 
The next chapter will examine in greater detail, the organisational structure of the trade 
union system in Singapore, drawing interview accounts, I will look at how individual 
trade unions function, the roles and duties carried out by LUL as well as the key themes 
and issues raised by them. 
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5.1.1 Focus and Contribution  
 
This chapter has two broad aims. The first is to present data collected from my research 
that examines the role and function of labour unions and LUL (labour unions leaders), as 
well as the structural-organisation they are located in. The second involves tying the data 
to the theoretical and conceptual apparatus reviewed in the previous chapter as a 
fulfilment of the central assertion of our thesis, which is, labour unions function as agents 
that encourage greater social integration by acting as socialisation platforms wherein its 
members can partake and engage in union affairs. 
 
A key characteristic and running emphasis of the NTUC (National Trades Union 
Congress) and its affiliated unions is the rejection of confrontational approaches (i.e 
industrial action) when dealing with employers, seeking instead ‘a more civilised method 
of resolving trade … or industrial dispute’ (Interview 6: 37) through trust, cooperation 
and ‘responsible trade unionism [by way of] non-confrontation’ (Interview 16: 12); the 
belief is that it helps facilitate a conducive  environment for economic development that 
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would enable workers’ conditions to be improved (ST 1997, 22 Aug; ST 2003, 6 Dec; ST 
2004, 21 Apr; ST 2007, 6 Jan)176. 
 
Aside from an official ‘two day strike [in 1986]’ (Interview 6: 38), a cursory examination 
reveals that there has not been any industrial stoppages since 1977 (ST 1997, 22 Aug)177. 
Trade disputes had also declined; from 1140 and 1091 cases in 1973 and 1974, to 484 in 
1980 (Department of Statistics 1983)178. This downward trend persisted into the 1990s 
where it has remained relatively stable (MOM 2004)179. This suggests the success of the 
labour movement in implementing the principle of cooperation and non-confrontation 
since the idea was seminally mooted in 1969 as part of the labour movement’s 
modernisation plan (NTUC 1970: 23, 27)180. 
 
While structural features such as legislature and institutional processes have contributed 
to such a climate, two things should be noted: First, the existence and continued success 
of the cooperation and non-confrontation principle cannot be attributed solely to the 
                                                 
176
 (Straits Times 2007: ‘I Walked the Tripartite Path Laid out by Nation’s Pioneers’, 6th January) – ‘The 
new trade unionist, like his predecessor, starts with the basic assumption that without economic 
development, there can be no real improvement in the living standards of workers.’, (Straits Times 2004: 
‘Union Leaders have Final say in Talks’, 21st April) – ‘Dr Ng (Eng Hen) [Acting Manpower Minister] said 
it as vital to protect the industrial harmony that has taken years to build and which could put many jobs and 
livelihoods at stake if if was undermined.’, (Straits Times 2003: ‘Militant Unions are going out of Fashion’, 
6th December) – ‘… workers who think an adversarial union best represents their interests, are dead 
wrong.’, (Straits Times 1997: ‘Promoting Mediation also Important in Industrial Relations’, 22nd August) – 
‘But with … an increasingly competitive global environment … we cannot take cooperative labour-
management relations for granted.’ 
177
 (Straits Times 1997: ‘Promoting Mediation also Important in Industrial Relations’, 22nd August) – The 
only exception being a two-day strike that took place in 1986, (Department of Statistics 1983) – Statistics: 
Ministry of Labour, ‘Industrial Stoppages and Trade Disputes, 1960-1982’   
178
 Statistics: Ministry of Labour 
179
 Statistics: Labour Relations Department, MOM. In 1993, 370 trade disputes were referred for 
conciliation, in 1994, 333 cases were referred. In 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, the figures were 309, 291, 
231 and 260 respectively.  
180
 See Chapter 3.  
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established structural features alone. The persistence of these structural norms suggests 
that the principle of non-confrontation enjoys a degree of support and legitimacy from 
members of the labour movement itself. 
 
Second, the advocacy of ‘non-confrontation’ (Interview 16: 12) does not mean the 
complete avoidance, absence, eradication or abhorrence of [industrial] conflicts in all 
forms, rather, it is an approach, which aims to ‘try and use a more peaceful means of 
resolution of dispute rather than [use] media grabbing’ (Interview 9: 12) forms of 
display – violent or otherwise – in the resolution of industrial conflicts. 
 
There are two key assertions here, 1) the first is that conflict is a necessary component for 
social integration; building on Simmel’s integrative property of conflict, I will examine 
how labour unions in acting both as agents and sites of contestation, create a more 
integrated labour movement and society. 2) The second is that support from NTUC LUL 
not only, i) enables the principle of ‘non-confrontation’ to be maintained in industrial 
relations, but also ii) indirectly contribute to the integrative property of labour unions. 
 
It is the ‘acceptance’ and support for the agenda of ‘non-confrontation’ stemming from 
the personal motivations of LUL – encompassing but not limited to personal beliefs –
rooted in their day-to-day practices and experiences that enables the agenda of ‘non-
confrontation’ to be continually maintained. 
 
5.1.2 The Thing about ‘Social Integration’  
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Before continuing, what is meant by ‘social integration’ needs to be clarified. When 
speaking of ‘social integration’ I am referring to the resolution of conflict resulting from 
[(power) disputes within the productive system] as opposed to ‘system integration’ which 
seeks to resolve system conflicts due to ‘“contradictions” between “property institutions” 
and the “forces of production”’ (Lockwood 2006: 347). Our focus is to examine how 
agency and existing structures help resolve the conflict within the confines of a particular 
system rather than the contradictions of the system. 
 
5.1.3 Premise and Assumptions  
 
This argument assumes the following: 1) firstly, established structural norms are not 
sufficient to ensure that the agenda of the labour movement would be carried out. 
Although structural features determine both the scope of action and the recourse available 
to institutions and the individuals working within them, overemphasising them makes it 
too deterministic and overlooks the role played by agency and the interconnection 
between the two. 
 
2) Secondly, given that individuals working within organisations may not voluntarily 
identify with the organisation’s aims or support its policies and goals, it would 
necessarily put in place features that would prevent this. These take the formalised forms 
of structural norms and bureaucratic hierarchies. 
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The implication is that an organisation can continue to function even if the individuals it 
employs do not accept its stated aims. While this may be true, it also brings to our 
attention: a) those who perform the supervisory function to ensure the adherence to the 
organisation’s aims. The establishment of structural norms is not a guarantee of 
conformity. b) Who determines an organisation’s aims and goals? 
 
This justifies the focus on LUL and the thematic structure-agency duality. Structural 
norms are after all passive guidelines and require more active inputs to prevail. What 
needs to be considered is the motivation for the ‘acceptance’ and support of particular 
organisational aims aside from self-serving remunerative interests and hierarchical 
compulsion. 
 
This ‘motivation’ refers to the individual’s identification and belief in the stated aims of 
the organisation. 3) The assumption being, it is necessary for LUL performing 
‘gatekeeper’ roles to believe and identify with the NTUC’s aims in order to: i) maintain 
and perpetuate the aims of the organisation, as well as to ii) augment the structural norms 
of the organisation by supervising and guiding the actions of other (subordinate) 
individuals. 
 
This (personal) motivation is applicable not only to those employed by the organisation, 
but also to those who have voluntarily aligned themselves with it. 4) For this latter group, 
it may be assumed that there is an even stronger sense of identification and closer 
alignment of personal beliefs. 
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5.1.4 Assumptions in Context 
 
The focus on LUL arises from the need to account for how the NTUC maintains the 
principle of non-confrontation. Although its foundation had been laid out by ‘historical 
forces’ (Interview 16: 12), its persistence cannot be attributed solely to institutional and 
structural norms, as these would be ineffective if they were not actualised through the 
conscious actions of individuals working within the labour movement. 
 
While bureaucratic hierarchy and the compulsion of employment suggests that this could 
be due to coercive pressures, it fails to address why a particular principle might be 
favoured over another. In the end, this ‘choice’ is a decision made by individuals. 
Throughout the course of the research, LUL consistently expressed a belief in the 
principle of non-confrontation. Ideological concerns aside, it is the view of this thesis that 
the ‘acceptance’ of this belief allows the continued application of non-confrontation, 
which has in turn enabled labour unions to function as platforms for social integration. 
 
5.1.5 Social Integration through Conflict and the Reduction of Violence 
 
Stating that labour unions bring about social integration is not intended to repudiate either 
their role or the existence of conflict, merely, that it is through conflict that unions 
encourage adaptation and the further integration of the system (Simmel 1955: 17; Turner 
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1975: 624)181. This view of conflict is a direct antithesis to Marx’s, who envisages that 
conflict would accentuate differences, begetting more conflict, eventually resulting in 
social change. 
 
For Simmel, the ‘integrative functions for the social whole’ refers to the resultant effect 
and function of conflict (Turner 1975: 625; Simmel 1955: 13)182. 1) Firstly, conflict 
preserves the unity of a group by enhancing boundaries; the presence of an opponent or 
threat provides the basis for rallying members of a group (Simmel 1955: 97). 
 
At the NTUC, this occurs at two levels: a) for individual unions, it is ‘when workers are 
faced with [a] real situation [that] the workers would definitely support the union’ 
(Interview 11: 19); threat and fear serving as a premise for rallying to the union183. b) At 
the national level, the ‘NTUC will focus on macro things on the long term basis’ 
(Interview 10: 21), such as a flexible wage system (see Annex 5.1).  
 
2) Secondly, conflict serves to [galvanise] (Interview 9b: 3) individuals, ‘[bringing] 
people and groups [who may] otherwise [not] have anything to do with each other, 
together’ (Simmel 1955: 99) (see Annex 5.2). a) For members, the unions and its ideals 
provides the focal point for members to interact and form associations.  
 
                                                 
181
 Simmel: A net overall integrative effect. 
182
 Simmel: ‘Conflict… is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of 
one of the conflicting parties.’ 
183
 (Interview 11: 19) – ‘if that real situation comes, they would definitely join. But if no such situation 
comes, if we just say for the sake of saying … “the management can get us out anytime”, the workers may 
not see the threat’. (Interview 14: 4) – [It was actually the fear brought about by the possibility that the 
company may undertake retrenchment that prompted the workers to seek aid form the union]. 
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The effect here and on the national level is psychological, enabling the creation of a form 
of associative connection (Simmel 1955: 99, 101). b) Given its close relationship with the 
state, the NTUC would be seen to provide an outlet for associative tendencies without 
generating the usually associated threats, a preservation of the status quo rather than a 
contestation of it (Simmel 1975: 99-100). 
 
In addition, 3) conflict serves as a valve for the ‘releasing [of] tensions’, spurring efforts 
to regulate conflict by creating norms, thereby bringing greater stability and ‘unity’ to the 
system (Turner 1975: 625; Simmel 1955: 13). While the effect is similar for all forms of 
conflict (violent and non-violent), our focus is on the ‘less violent’ variety, which is seen 
to have the greatest potential for developing integrative functions (Turner 1975: 625). 
 
By extension, any effort that mitigates violence is also contributing to social integration 
(Turner 1975: 624). But given that violent industrial conflict is something unheard of in 
Singapore’s present industrial context, we shall use ‘heightened conflict’ in place of 
‘violent conflict’ wherever applicable. 
 
5.1.6 Emotive Suppression through Institutionalisation 
 
Since ‘emotional arousal’ is a contributing factor to ‘heightening’ conflict, a desire to 
prevent the escalation of conflict necessitates the suppression of emotions (Turner 1975: 
624). This can be done by clearly articulating common interests, heightening their 
‘consciousness’, and improving group organisation (Turner 1975: 624). In practice, this 
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translates to conducting negotiations and ‘[resolving] trade dispute’ (Interview 6: 37) in a 
‘professional’ (Interview 13: 21) and ‘very civilised way’ (Interview 6: 7) (see Annex 
5.3). 
 
Nevertheless, ‘heightening’ conflict possesses its own merits. Its absence in the long term 
is said to result in 1) the dilution of an organisation’s boundaries and purposes; 2) 
increasing decentralisation; and 3) the weakening of internal solidarity, factors deemed 
contrary to the integrative property sought in conflict (Turner 1975: 625). 
 
The implication for Singapore is that it’s: 
‘no strike record is a double edged sword …,it is good for investment [and] for 
attracting people to set up company in Singapore …, but … if this no strike record 
is too prolonged then rightly or wrongly, people may perceive it as maybe the 
NTUC dare not to go on strike’ (Interview 6: 38-39). 
Deviating from the usual concern with the internal solidarity of groups, the concern here 
is that it might be perceived as weak by opposing groups, which may embolden 
opponents. 
 
How then should this be balanced? While heightened conflict should be eschewed as a 
condition for social integration, confrontation also cannot be absent. The key lies in the 
frequency and intensity of conflict. Simmel argued that in highly interdependent systems, 
‘conflicts of low intensity and high frequency’ can allow for the [release of social 
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tensions and their regulation], ‘thereby promoting stability in social systems’ (Turner 
1975: 625). 
 
This resonates closely with Singapore’s current labour relations scene, which has not 
experienced the ‘heightened’ conflict in the form of industrial action since the 1980s. 
Table 5A details unionised disputes referred to MOM (Ministry of Manpower) for 
conciliation between 1995-2002, however, these are only the ‘very severe cases, [having 
to] go to ministry’ (Interview 10: 39)184. 
 
Allegedly, ‘the number of disputes at the ministry represent only about 10% of what you 
actually see in all the workplaces, 90% [are] settled at workplace, only 10% goes to 
ministry’(Interview 10: 39). This does not reflect the ‘actual [IR] cases [reported to] the 
union [which is a lot]’ (Interview 10: 40)185. The ‘high frequency but low intensity’ 
nature of conflict observed here appears to fulfil the criteria necessary for social 
integration.  
 
The concern is that if this was made public, ‘investors will say, “actually sound problem 
you know dealing with unions … we always worry … that the investors don’t come’ 
(Interview 10: 40)” ’; reflecting the priority of the economic-developmental raison d’être 
(see Annex 5.4). 
                                                 
184
 Table 5B looks at the unionized trade disputes referred for arbitration from 1995-2002. 
185
 (Interview 10: 40) – To give a sense of how many cases there are: ‘it is consistent [for] all the years, 
consistently every year only 100 to 200 [cases] goes to ministry. [In] 2004 [there] is much lesser, I don’t 
know why it is much lesser, every year [it] is about 3 to 4,000 [cases]’. Refer to Table 5A for comparison. 
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Table 5A: Unionised Trade Disputes Referred for Conciliation  
(1995-2002) 
         
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
         
TOTAL  305 309 253 291 246 231 266 260 
         
Breakdown by Nature of 
Dispute  
        
Wage Increase & Conditions of 
Service  174 190 157 144 147 142 128 126 
Retrenchment benefits 32 21 14 46 18 19 37 48 
Bonus or Gratuity 24 19 31 26 24 19 27 25 
Other Industrial Matters (e.g. 
sales commision, shift 
allowances etc.) 75 79 51 75 57 51 74 61 
         
Breakdown by Sector 
        
Manufacturing  98 110 89 84 77 89 116 89 
Construction  3 3 4 1 2 - 5 - 
Commerce 87 54 42 85 65 44 29 44 
Transport, Storage & 
communications 31 33 19 26 23 27 27 34 
Financial, Insurance, Real 
Estate & Business Services & 
Community, Social & Personal 84 109 99 95 79 71 88 93 
Others 2 - - - - - 1 - 
         
Figures: MOM          
 
Table 5B: Unionised Trade Disputes Referred for Arbitration (1995-2002) 
         
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Disputes Referred to 
Industrial Arbitration Court 
for Arbitration 3 2 1 5 4 5 5 5 
         




The labour movement’s socially integrative features, may be subdivided into 3 categories 
– as outlined below – will be discussed through the chapter. Emphasis will go to linking 
how these features address the central premise of this thesis; that is labour unions 
contribute to social integration and stability. 
 
1) Philosophy/Ideology:  
 
The cooperative relationship between the tripartite partners of government, employers 
and labour is constantly emphasised. Though it stresses the interdependency between 
employers and labour, it also designates the government as the arbiter, highlighting the 
necessity of collaboration and the avoidance of a ‘zero-sum’ (Interview 6: 37) mentality 
(ST 1997, 4 Apr; Wong 1983: 263)186. This means the labour movement also needs to be 
cognizant of the priority of the national interests which it has to uphold (Tan 2004: 77)187.  
 
2) Structural-Procedural:  
 
The legislative provisions for compulsory arbitration and the regulation of the negotiation 
process, utilises the law to establish a) commonly recognised ‘binding norms’ that parties 
in conflict have to adhere to, while enabling at the same time, b) the exclusion of 
                                                 
186
 (Straits Times 1997: ‘Unions’ Role in Taking Singapore to the Top’, 4th April), (Interview 6: 37) – ‘And 
in the end this consensus is also always win-win for the employers as well as the workers, and so we don’t 
really go for a zero-sum game here you see.’ 
187
 Even though the labour movement needs to be committed to its membership and uphold the ‘basic 
principle [of protection]’ (Interview 4c: 5) and [the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment] 
(Interview 14: 6), it is unmistakeable that it is the national interests, the ‘interests of the community as a 
whole’, that is of greater importance – Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 136) – Part V: Section 34(1a). 
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‘everything personal’ in lieu of the [objective] nature of legal conflict (Simmel 1955: 35, 
37-38; Singapore Statutes Cap.136)188. 
 
By professionalizing the vocation of the union official (Industrial Relations Officer – 
IRO), whereby the NTUC trains career professionals to handle union work, minimises the 
personal involvement of the IRO, allowing for objective emotional detachment, which 
goes towards reducing the intensity of the conflict (Simmel 1955: 37). 
 
In addition, control over the training of IROs ensures the unfettered transmission of the 
NTUC’s principle of ideological beliefs, while acting also as a form of screening that lets 
the NTUC sieve out individuals who do not share their tenets. The same happens during 
the selection delegates at the union level; IROs have discretion in ‘eliminating [who they] 
think have ulterior motives’ (Interview 9c: 29) (see Annex 5.5). The rationale being that 
these individuals pose a threat to the integrity of the group (Simmel 1955: 49). 
 
3) Individual Beliefs 
 
The ‘acceptance’ of the NTUC’s principles by LUL (both IROs and delegates) also 
contribute to labour unions serving as platforms of social integration. This is linked to the 
structure-agency duality wherein acceptance and practice of the key ideological-
philosophical tenets of the NTUC acts to mutually reinforce both the structural-
procedural features and ideological tenets. 
 
                                                 
188
 Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 136) – Part III: Section 18, 20, 2, 23; Part IV: Section 31, 32, 35. 
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5.2 Organisational Analysis of the NTUC   
 
5.2.1 Open System or Direct System? – The Unseen Effect  
 
In chapter one, I examined the structure and governance of the NTUC at the branch, 
union and national level, describing the electoral process of union delegates. There are 
two methods of election, the ‘open system’ and the ‘direct system’. Of the two, the direct 
system [is more advantageous for the incumbent as you know directly and immediately 
who it is that wish to challenge you] (Interview 4b: 2) 
 
This makes it difficult and [less likely that people would directly challenge the incumbent 
in such a small group] (Interview 4b: 2) setting because of two factors: [one is the fear of 
causing the person to lose face, and second is the worry that there would be no support 
from others] (Interview 4b: 2). [Challenge and confrontation is much easier in an open 
setting where there are a lot of people] (Interview 4b: 2) and dissent may be more freely 
articulated. 
 
The advantage of the direct system is that it offers a [relatively stable system] (Interview 
4b: 2) if an arrangement can be worked out between those elected. However, failure 
would mean the opposite189. Internally assigning positions makes it easier for votes to be 
obtained but it also means that members have little influence in determining who gets 
elected to what position, since popularity does not determine the office occupied.  
                                                 
189
 As would be suggested by the occurrences of coups within the executive committees of unions.  
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In contrast, the open system selects office bearers [solely on counted votes] (Interview 4b: 
2); members [vote directly for those who wish to stand for a particular position] 
(Interview 4b: 2) thereby [minimising the opportunities for office positions to be assigned 
based on an internal arrangement] (Interview 4b: 2). This also helps keep [individuals 
from bending to peer pressure] (Interview 4b: 2) or to arguments based on ‘solidarity’, 
particularly where there exists an [inequality of power between members] (Interview 4b: 
2).  
 
5.2.2 Making Sense of the ‘Symbiotic’ Relationship 
 
The concern with power disparity, in small groups is particularly significant for the 
NTUCCC (NTUC Central Committee); of its 23 members elected in 2003-2007, 3 were 
MPs (Members of Parliament), 5 were or had previously been appointed as NMPs 
(Nominated Members of Parliament). Having a Minister as the titular head of the labour 
movement, does little to dispel the impression that labour unions are dominated by the 
state (Griffith 1987: 64, Leggett 2005: 144, Rodan 1998: 65-66). 
 
However, government presence is not confined just to the strategic level of union 
leadership. Most unions also have MPs and ministers serving in some capacity190. It was 
explained that ‘it is the job of the advisor to [answer] when the union do something which 
is against the Singapore economy’ (Interview 4a: 21) and that, ‘[the] government want 
                                                 
190
 These could be ex or current officials. Usually they serve as the Executive Secretary, Advisors or 
Trustees of the union. 
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some MP here and there and in the central committee to control the feeling and not to go 
on strike’ (Interview 4a: 25). 
 
Given that unions ‘are quite good in … feeling the ground’ (Interview 10: 11), their 
placement has been rationalised as being part of a feedback system that taps on unions’ 
ability to ‘know what’s happening at the ground’ (Interview 10: 10), to address any 
potential problems that may arise. Aside from this, it is also an avenue for them as:  
‘policymakers [to] come down to the level of the workers and understand the 
basic concerns in the needs [and] articulate the workers’ concern and their 
views’ (Interview 9c: 26). 
 
In addition, ‘there’s no secret about this very close symbiotic relationship between the 
ruling party and the national body [NTUC]’ (Interview 9: 21)191. ‘The affinity or the 
relationship between political party and the union movement is not unique [only] that we 
seem to have the same party in power’ (Interview 9: 22). 
 
For the most part, this relationship is taken as a positive and (mutually) instrumental one,  
‘in the sense that it keeps workers representation a voice in a lot of government 
bodies, we have union, labour reps sitting in … to voice out workers’ concern, on 
policies to be made’ (Interview 9: 23). 
                                                 
191
 (Interview 9: 21) – The close proximity between the government and union is ‘not unique to Singapore, 
if you look at Britain, you look at US it’s the same thing, the labour party rides on the trade union to come 
into power also. In the US it is the democrats’. See Annex 5.6 for the rationale for the close proximity.  
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Other than representation, this relationship also offers leverage when bargaining with 
employers since ‘government leaders and their influence … raises the credibility of the 
union’ (Interview 9: 23). 
 
But however beneficial, the dependence of labour on the government is inevitable not 
simply because of the disparity in skills and ability – ‘you cannot ask a … electronic 
worker to run a cooperative’ (Interview 4b: 13) – there is also the loss of leaders as 
workers themselves aspire for upward mobility: ‘the better ones don’t stay in the working 
class [so] there becomes a dearth of leadership’ (Interview 9: 23) (see Annex 5.7).  
 
If anything, these views reflect the successful mitigation of an otherwise inevitable 
conflict between the labour movement and the political party, had political leaders not 
been institutionally ‘inducted’ (Interview 9i: 4) into the labour movement. Though there 
is no doubt that ‘if the union leadership challenges the political leadership, [it is the] 
political leaders [who will] triumph’ (see Annex 5.8). 
 
This theoretically validates Simmel’s view of how ‘the very interests of the group 
necessitate a structure prohibiting or limiting competition’, showing the devices used to 
bring this about; namely centralisation and the supervision of decision-making powers 
within the hands of political leaders (Simmel 1955: 67, 88). 
 
But whereas labour MPs of the 50’s and 60’s were from the grassroots, ‘today the labour 
MPs are not …, they are inducted’ (Interview 9i: 4). In the view of an autonomous (
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NTUC affiliated) LUL this would account for the type and quality of the union leaders 
today (see Annex 5.9). The state of the union leadership is not surprising given that ‘the 
government definitely want to build the image that … the labour movement in Singapore 
is under control’ (Interview 5a: 13) (see Annex 5.9).  
 
Aside from the perceived qualitative difference between leaders of the past and now, this 
illustrates the dialectical duality between agency and structure wherein institutional 
changes enacted to meet particular objectives – in this case, political-economic aims – 
lead to changes in practices, and the characteristics of agency employed. 
 
5.2.3 Union Independence/Democracy?  
 
What then can be said about the independence and democracy of unions in light of the 
induction of MPs and Ministers into the NTUC and unions? Interestingly, LUL appear 
split in their views, alternating between rejection and acceptance, in how they view the 
relationship between the PAP and the NTUC. 
 
While one interviewee asserted that [the NTUC is not part of the government, just that it 
is coincidental that the Secretary General is a minister in the cabinet] (Interview 8a: 9), 
another stated that ‘the labour movement has identified itself with the ruling party’ 
(Interview 9c: 30). 
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Is the selection process of leaders really democratic? This is an important consideration 
because the independence of the labour movement is often associated with the extent to 
which it is seen to represent and uphold the interests of those whom they claim to 
represent. 
 
Setting aside the presence of politicians, the usual process of leadership succession 
usually takes the nomination-voting-confirmation trajectory. If this was so, how can a 
‘designated successor’ of the NTUC Secretary-General be announced in the press even 
before the election process has taken place (CNA 2004, 2 May; ST 2005, 17 Jul)192? 
 
Thus, while there is ‘strong democracy [in terms of] freedom of association’ (Interview 
4e: 9), ‘there is no free democratic trade unions in Singapore’ (Interview 9: 22). While 
the admission is not necessarily astounding, the candour was. More importantly, was why 
such a situation is accepted and justified. There are in general three justifications: 1) 
Singapore’s economic vulnerability; 2) the fear of electing a corrupt leader; and 3) the 
current status quo, which is seen to have benefited the ‘working class’ (see Annex 5.10).  
 
If anything, this highlights pragmatism; the validation of beliefs on the basis of the 
(desired) consequences it brings about (Barbalet 2007: 35). An ‘undemocratic’ electoral 
arrangement is evaluated to be acceptable based on the resultant factual ‘concreteness’ it 
is attributed to help bring about (James 1907: 111). 
 
                                                 
192
 (Channel News Asia 2004: ‘Lim Swee Say being groomed to be the next NTUC Secretary-General’, 2nd 
May), (Straits Times 2005: ‘Swee Say takes over as NTUC chief in mid-‘06’, 17 Jul) 
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Understandably, the ‘government [would] also want to put control’ (Interview 4c: 31) 
over the position of the NTUC Secretary-General. This would at least in part be 
politically motivated since ‘this [is] a very powerful person, Secretary-General of NTUC 
means you are talking about half a million people doing what he say’ (Interview 4c: 31). 
 
Such an arrangement is seen to be justifiable so long as the ‘democratic process’ wherein 
‘there is freedom of speech, and freedom of voting’ (Interview 4c: 34) remains. 
Understanding this requires an elaboration of the process in which a successor becomes 
‘confirmed’. However, it should first be stated that this process itself had arisen and 
functions as a ‘test period [in order to avoid any] mismatch’ (Interview 9c: 25-26) and 
embarrassment that may arise in the event that ‘heir’ is found to be unsuitable. 
 
To begin with, even though ‘[the successor] is designated he will still go through a 
election’ (Interview 4c: 31), and in order to ‘to get him there, you must … get a lot of 
people to support him’ (Interview 4c: 31). The electoral process is thus ‘democratic’ in 
the sense that ‘you need to go around gather the kind of rapport’ (Interview 4c: 35). This 
is needed since support is ‘not necessarily 100%’ and ‘it’s not by virtue of him being a 
Minister or what people vote for him’ although it certainly ‘helps’ (Interview 4c: 36). 
 
There are two ways to secure support: 1) the first, which is more indirect, relies on the 
support of LUL [delegates]; the candidate ‘must make sure he have people … like friends 
go down the ground and saying good about him’ (Interview 4c: 36). 2) The second, 
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requires the candidate himself ‘to go around gather the kind of rapport’ (Interview 4c: 
35), since one ‘cannot just expect to sit still and expect to [be] voted’ (Interview 4c: 35). 
 
The second form of support, applies to all MPs and Ministers, and does not occur only 
during election time, but is continually built-up through ‘ground work’ (Interview 4e: 2), 
as acts of service, where within individual unions ‘he must build up rapport’ (Interview 
4e: 15) by going ‘round and familiarise himself and network with the union’ (Interview 
9c: 24). This is to ‘to gain acceptance and be able to work with them … so that there will 
be … no problem on the election day’ (Interview 9c: 24). 
 
The individual is further helped in his candidacy by ‘the very sympathetic government-
owned and controlled domestic media’, which may drum up the necessary publicity such 
that ‘they already drill in the mind, he’s the one, no more’ (Interview 4c: 31) (Rodan 
1996a: 114)193. 
 
Nevertheless, the designation for a post would only be done after a period of assessment, 
which involves ‘identifying, bringing that person in to test him, how he works with the 
grassroot’ (Interview 9c: 25). Ultimately, the ‘[person’s] individual characteristic will 
still determine whether he is a suitable … candidate; not so much … capabilities but the 
ability to work with … other people’ (Interview 9c: 25). 
 
                                                 
193
 (Interview 9c: 25) – But being ‘slated for something’ is not sufficient, a brief discussion was made about 
a previous NTUC Secretary-General, Mr Lim Chee Onn – the first minister to be inducted into the NTUC – 
during which it was pointed out after some time, because ‘there were some working relationship issues … 
with some of the affiliates … over his personal style’, ‘he gave up that position and went into private 
sector’.   
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However, even after all the preparatory work, not all union delegates would vote for the 
designate, since there will be ‘some who don’t like him’ (Interview 4c: 31) and will not 
vote for him. But generally the person just needs to be ‘acceptable … difficult to say 
popular’ (Interview 9c: 25) (see Annex 5.11).  
 
Interestingly, there appears to be an evaluation system for designate heirs of the NTUC 
Secretary-General position; supposing the number of NTUC delegates voting at the 
convention of delegates numbered 380, and the designate manages to ‘get say 280 
[votes]’ (Interview 4c: 33), this would not be considered good, ‘because PAP very high 
standard’ (Interview 4c: 33); ‘suppose you get 170, [this is] also not good for Lim Swee 
Say [he] must get 320 or 370’ (Interview 4c: 33). 
 
Hence, while the appointment of a designate may appear like a straightforward affair, it 
actually encompasses a good deal of background preparatory work; all that is required 
from the designate is to ‘do his part to make sure he don’t cock up’ (Interview 4c: 35), as 
long he is able to do this, it is ‘very hard for him to lose’ (Interview 4c: 36). 
 
So how should the succession ‘process’ be understood within the wider scope of how 
LUL construct and perceive reality? Firstly, as part of an institutionalised system, both 
the manner of the succession as well as the close relationship between the NTUC and 
PAP confronts the individual LUL as part of their objective reality, having long been 
inaugurated and legitimised. 
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The legitimation expressed when examining why the absence of democratic trade unions 
was justifiable, is in fact ‘intersubjective sedimentation’; a mixture of biographical 
experience and affirmed knowledge which goes towards supporting and continuing the 
current institutional arrangement (Berger et al 1966: 80, 85)194. 
 
At the subjective level, the process of political leaders working to ‘gain acceptance’ 
coincides with the ‘routine’ everyday of LUL required to work and interact with them. As 
such, ‘people will know if you are ‘‘playing the game’’ (Interview 8: 13), that is insincere 
and involved in double dealing195. Thus, it is through this experience of working with and 
observation of labour MPs that help validate, constantly ‘reaffirm’ and maintain the claim 
that government leaders work for workers and the unions (Berger et al 1966: 168-169). 
 
5.3 General Trend in Union Structure 
 
Organisationally, the trend points to an increasing consolidation of labour unions; smaller 
unions are giving way to larger ones. Since 1998 there are no longer any unions with a 
membership size of less than 50, the number of unions in the 50-249 members category 
has also fallen, along with their membership (see Table 5C). 
 
During the period 1993-2003, the number of mid-size unions in the 250-999 and 1,000-
4,999 categories also fell (see Table 5C). But the extent of this reduction is more apparent 
                                                 
194The reasons given being:  1) the country’s economic vulnerability; 2) risk aversion: the fear that a 
situation worse than the present one may result under a different system; 3) and the fact that the current  
arrangement has been beneficial to both workers and unions.  
195
 (Interview 8: 13) – [If such things happen, they would come to light and people will come to know 
sooner or later]. 
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when viewed in terms of membership. The loss for both categories was not only in 
absolute membership figures but also in the proportion of membership that they 
represent; in 1993, the 250-999 category accounted for 6.2% of union memberships, by 
2003, this was reduced to 2.9% (see Table 5C). 
 
Similarly, unions in the 1,000-4,999 category which accounted for 28.6% of membership 
in 1993, saw its share reduced to 11.9% by 2003 (see Table 5C). Unions with 5,000-
9,999 members fared no better; representing 23.7% of the membership in 1993, they only 
accounted for 8.8% in 2003 (see Table 5C). 
 
The largest unions (whose membership exceeds 10,000) are the only exception to this 
trend of decline, not only have their numbers increased, from 5 in 1993, to 8 in 1998 and 
13 in 2003, but their share of the total membership also rose, from 40.6% in 1993, to 
53.3% in 1998 and 76.3% in 2003 (see Table 5C). 
 
This ‘consolidation’ is perhaps the result of how labour unions are organised, which 
coincides with the economic restructuring that took place196. The restructuring triggered 
by the AFC (Asian Economic Crisis) in 1998 did not affect Singapore as badly as the 
electronic semiconductor slump in 2001, which ‘drastically affected [the] electrical and 
electronics’ (Interview 9a: 28) industry and saw the [relocation of quite a few big 
companies] (Interview 9a: 28) (Huxley 2002: 156)197. 
 
                                                 
196
 The explanation of Turf Management is covered in Chapter 1. 
197
 (Interview 9a: 28) – Companies such as Motorola and Seagate relocated. 
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Table 5C: Membership of Employees' Trade Unions by Size of Trade Union,  
(1993 - 2003) 
 
(At Year-end)            
Size of Trade 






1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
            
TOTAL  235,723 232,927 235,157 255,020 260,130 272,769 289,707 314,478 338,311 389,676 417,166 
 
           
Under 50 50 35 29 26 26 - - - - - - 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% - - - - - - 
            
50 - 249 2,111 1,941 1,651 1,451 1,329 1,490 1,386 1,257 1,224 1,045 674 
 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 
            
250 - 999 14,613 15,541 18,000 16,765 16,858 16,448 14,977 15,415 10,104 10,837 12,123 
 6.2% 6.7% 7.7% 6.6% 6.5% 6.0% 5.2% 4.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.9% 
            
1,000 - 4,999 67,324 62,722 53,972 65,412 57,152 57,698 54,902 45,931 54,887 45,642 49,538 
 28.6% 26.9% 23.0% 25.6% 22.0% 21.2% 19.0% 14.6% 16.2% 11.7% 11.9% 
            
5,000 - 9,999 55,817 59,231 65,412 67,240 58,974 51,757 58,011 68,315 39,730 40,902 36,536 
 23.7% 25.4% 27.8% 26.4% 22.7% 19.0% 20.0% 21.7% 11.7% 10.5% 8.8% 
            
10,000 and Over  95,808 93,457 96,093 114,483 125,791 145,376 160,431 183,560 232,366 291,250 318,295 
 40.6% 40.1% 40.9% 44.9% 48.4% 53.3% 55.4% 58.4% 68.7% 74.7% 76.3% 
            
Source: Labour Relations Department, MOM          
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The electronic industry slump and poor U.S. and regional economic performance resulted 
in the collapse of ‘Singapore’s manufacturing export’ in the electronics sector and 
hastened the restructuring process (Huxley 2002: 156-157). Manufacturing shrank 19%, 
while the economy contracted by 5.6% in the July-September quarter of 2001 (Huxley 
2002: 157; Singstat 2007)198. Retrenchment which spiked in 1998, rose again, while the 
unemployment rate increased to 4.4% in 2002 (See Table 5D Retrenchment and Table 5E 
Unemployment). 
 
The effect was most keenly felt in the electronics sector, which in 2003 accounted for 
30% of Singapore’s manufacturing output, down from 49.7% in 1997 (Prystay 2004: 46). 
Other industrial sectors, notably, aviation, marine engineering, biomedical and chemicals 
performed well (Huxley 2002: 157; Prystay 2004: 46). 
 
The emerging markets of India and China also added to the pressure of reducing 
Singapore’s dependence on ‘traditional manufacturing and low-skilled jobs’, a 
development which will see older workers ‘[getting] retrenched [as it is] quite tough [for 
them] to go and learn a new skill’ (Interview 10: 29) (Rodan 2005: 143). 
 
These together with the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) affliction and the 
Iraq War worsened the economic situation saw the flight of many enterprises to cheaper 
manufacturing sites overseas, and the laying off of many workers by ‘celebrated’ local 
                                                 
198




Table 5D: Retrenchment Figures (1993-2004) 
             
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
             
Retrenched Workers 
(Number) 6,487 9,444 8,788 10,956 9,784 29,086 14,622 11,624 25,838 19,086 16,400 9,900 
             
Number Retrenched Per 
1,000 Paid Workers 8.4 11.6 10.2 11.9 10.1 29.0 15.2 11.5 24.7 18.2 15.8 n.a. 
             
Retrenching 
Establishments 
(Number) 305 295 351 399 358 1235 781 525 1239 1149 1106 n.a. 
             
             
Table 5Di): Re-Employment Rate (1993-2004) 
             
   
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Re-employment Rate 
(%) 
            
Annual Average    n.a. 68.6 70.1 61.0 61.9 64.8 60.2 60.8 62.4 n.a. 
             
             
All Figures: MOM Statistics Detail - Source: Labour Market Survey         
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Table 5E: Unemployment Figures (1993-2004) 
             
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
            
Unemployment Rate 
(%) 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.3 4.4 4.7 4.0 
 




2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.9 5.3 4.5 
 
            
Resident Unemployed 
Persons ('000)             
Annual Average  29.2 31.0 32.3 32.9 30.3 54.3 61.0 59.6 62.8 82.4 92.2 80.0 
 
            
Resident Median 
Duration of 
Unemployment as at 
June (Weeks) (Non-
Seasonally Adjusted)* 
5.3 4.9 n.a.  4.9 7.4 8.9 13.4 n.a.  9.7 13.9 12.1 12.0 
             
Resident Long-Term 
Unemployment  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
Annual Average Rate 
(%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.2 n.a.  0.9 1.4   
Number ('000) 4.2 4.5 4 5.5 5.7 11.8 18.4 n.a.  15.4 23.9   
             
Figures: MOM Statistics Detail - Data are sourced fro the June Labour Force Survey (LFS). As the survey is on households, it excludes construction workers living at worksites and 
workers who commute daily from abroad to work in Singapore. 
Data for residents refer to Singapore citizens and Singapore Permanent Residents only. 
*Data for 1995 and 2000 are not available because the Labour Force Survey was not conducted in these years due to conduct of the General Household Survey 1995 and the 
Census of Population 2000 by the Singapore Department of Statistics. 
Long-term unemployment rate refers to the proportion of the labour force who have been unemployed for at least 25 weeks. 
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corporations like SIA (Singapore Airlines), SPH (Singapore Press Holdings), and PSA 
(Port of Singapore Authority) (Case 2004: 118 – 119; Saywell 2003: 46)199. 
 
The airline, hotel, retail and travel industries were particularly affected. In some unions, 
the effects contributed directly to a [20-30% loss in membership] (Interview 2a: 3), while 
leading others to consent to the implementation of ‘flexible work schedule [and] flexible 
wage scheme’ (Interview 9g: 5, 10). 
 
Most jobs losses occurred in the manufacturing industry. Between 1998 and 2005, 
manufacturing posted the highest incidence of retrenchment, with as many as 47 per 
1,000 employees retrenched in 2001, and up to 20 per 1,000 in 2005 (see Table 5F) 
(MOM 2006a: 2-3). Retrenchment was highest in the sectors of electronics (95 per 
1,000), textiles (64 per 1,000) and rubber and plastic (73 per 1,000) manufacturing. 
 
Despite this, the employment share of manufacturing was only slightly affected; 
declining from 21.6% (1997) to 20.5% (1998), and later 19.8% (2001) (see Table 5G). 
On the other hand, Services saw an increasing share of employment; in 1997, it 
accounted for 61.7% of employment, in 1998 it was 62.8%, rising to 66.4% in 2001 and 
68.9% in 2005 (see Table 5G) (MOM 2006: 12). 
                                                 
199
 The effect of SARS was particularly felt in the tourism sector; ‘tourist arrivals contracted 63% year on 
year to 678,000’. The export demand for electronics dampened by weak global demand and an uncertain 
U.S. economy saw a 7.5% fall in manufacturing output in the second-quarter (of 2003). Construction output 
fell by 10.9% while the services-sector dropped 3%.  
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Table 5F: Incidence of Retrenchment by Industry (2000-2005)  
 Number Retrenched per 1000 Workers 
Industry (SSIC2000) Year  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
OVERALL 11.5 24.7 18.2 15.8 9.7 9.3 
GOODS PRODUCING INDUSTRIES 16.6 32.9 22.8 18.2 11.3 14.8 
MANUFACTURING 25.1 47.4 30.9 23.4 13.9 20.0 
Food Beverages & Tobacco 22.7 11.7 12.8 11.3 8 5.8 
Textile & Wearing Apparel  10.4 64.7 29.1 19.6 43.8 34.0 
Paper Products & Printing 4.5 8.4 37.9 16.2 3.7 4.3 
Petroleum & Chemical Products 17.1 16.7 13.3 14 23 6.4 
Rubber & Plastic Products 3.8 72.7 37.9 31.3 23.4 39.7 
Fabricated Metal Products 7.5 41.8 39.3 23.5 9.1 13.0 
Machinery & Equipment 9.4 32.1 35.7 15.7 9.5 9.7 
Electrical Products  9.1 63 71.8 23.1 52.1 48.5 
Electronic Products 65.4 95.1 48.1 40.3 17.8 41.5 
Medical & Precision Instruments 0.7 9 17.3 20.4 13.3 7.5 
Transport Equipment 4.4 4.6 3.3 7.4 2.1 0.4 
Other Manufacturing Industries 8.2 35.5 21.5 19 10.3 19.3 
       
CONSTRUCTION 1.6 4.3 5.7 4.9 3.1 1.6 
OTHERS* 2.3 15.5 20.4 39.2 41.9 1.0 
       
SERVICES PRODUCING INDUSTRIES 6.9 17.5 14.5 14 8.5 5.1 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  8.3 21.5 15.2 17 9.1 6.2 
Wholesale Trade 9.4 27.4 19 18 10.9 8.0 
Retail Trade 5.8 6.6 6.2 14.5 5 2.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 7.9 3.9 7.2 6.9 9.2 0.9 
Hotels 13 2.5 11.4 12.3 17.5 0.2 
Restaurants 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.4 5.6 1.2 
Transport, Storage & Communications 6.4 14.2 9.5 18.4 11.8 5.5 
Transport, Storage & Supporting Services 7.5 13.4 5.6 20.1 12.5 3.1 
Post & Telecommunications 1.5 17.8 27 10.1 9.1 16.5 
Financial Services 9.6 31.8 36.6 27.6 13.3 8.8 
Financial Institutions 10.2 34 39.3 30.1 13.8 9.6 
Insurance 5.1 13.6 15.7 11.5 9.1 2.6 
Business & Real Estate Services 4.4 21.4 15.5 10.3 4.7 4.3 
Real Estate Activities 0.9 4.1 5.8 3.9 2.7 2.7 
IT & Related Services 5.4 49.7 45.6 22.6 8.9 4.2 
Professional Services 6.6 11.8 10.8 8.7 3.7 5.4 
Other Business Services 3.7 32.7 13.8 11.3 5.5 4.3 
Community, Social & Personal Services 5.2 3.8 3.7 3.4 4.5 4.1 
Education  0.7 1.4 1.3 3.1 4.4 0.3 
Health & Social Work 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.4 5.6 
Other Community, Social & Personal Services 11.2 7.8 8.2 6.2 8.8 4.2 
Source: MOM Retrenchment and Re-employment 2005     
Notes:        
(1) Data pertain to private sector establishments each with at least 25 employees   
(2) * - Includes Agriculture, Fishing, Quarrying and Utilities     
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Table 5G: Employment by Sector (1993-2005)  
             
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004P 
             
Employment as at 
year-end ('000)  1642.1 1714.2 1823.2 1925.8 2046.1 2022.7 2062.6 2171.1 2171.0 2148.1 2135.2 2201.3 
             
Employment by 
Sector as at year-
end (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
             
Manufacturing 25.7 25.3 24.5 22.8 21.6 20.5 20.3 20.5 19.8 19.8 19.7 20.3p 
Construction  10.8 11.1 12.7 14.7 16.1 16.0 14.9 14.2 13.2 11.8 11.0 10.3p 
Services 62.8 62.9 62.3 61.9 61.7 62.8 64.2 64.7 66.4 67.9 68.7 68.9p 
Others 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5p 
             
Employment 
Change ('000) 70.8 72.1 109.0 102.6 120.3 -23.4 39.9 108.5 -0.1 -22.9 -12.9 66.2p 
             
1st Qtr 15.9 9.0 14.2 17.4 16.2 9.1 -9.6 13.7 23.2 -10.3 -4.1 13.7 
2nd Qtr 10.3 28.9 27.1 23.3 37.2 -5.9 15.5 29.7 3.3 -3.8 -26.0 10.9 
3rd Qtr 18.6 7.9 20.4 22.1 31.1 -20.3 7.7 30.0 -12.5 -8.5 0.9 14.1 
4th Qtr 25.9 26.3 47.3 39.8 35.8 -6.3 26.3 35.1 -14.1 -0.3 16.2 27.5p 
             
Source: MOM Statistics Detail             
Notes:              
1. Data are compiled from administrative record            
2. Change in employment is the difference in the employment level at the end of the reference period compared with the end of the preceding period 
3. p = Preliminary             










Table 5H: Share of Total Job Vacancies by Sector (1995-2005) 
(As at Sep)            
            
            
            
            
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% 
           
Manufacturing  41.7 35.5 29.9 26.2 29.5 33.2 23.3 33.8 32.9 29.7 30.3 
Services  49.1 49.0 51.3 56.5 59.3 60.3 68.0 61.6 60.3 64.1 65.3 
Construction  9.1 15.4 18.6 17.1 7.7 5.7 7.1 3.6 5.4 5.4 3.8 
            
Source: Job Vacancy Survey, MOM (2005) 
        
 150 
Another indication of the growth and shift towards services is the increasing proportion 
of job vacancies in the sector; in 1998, services accounted for 56.5% of the total job 
vacancies in the private sector, this rose to 68% in 2001, and 65% in 2005 (see Table 
5H). By contrast, vacancies in construction contracted between 1998 and 2005, while 
manufacturing’s share in the same period remained stable, barring a dip in 2001 to 23.3% 
(see Table 5H). 
 
5.3.1 Restructuring and Union Consolidation  
 
The impact of economic restructuring on labour unions rests on its effect on employment; 
the loss of jobs either as a result of retrenchment, the relocation of enterprises overseas or 
made ‘structurally redundant’ (Interview 8: 4) from structural-technological changes, 
meant a loss of membership for affected labour unions: 
‘the boom sector will need workers … so the membership in this sector will go up 
… so we have to recruit more from the growing sector to cover the [members] 
that we lose from … the sector that decline’ (Interview 3: 15). 
 
As manufacturing was the most affected it is not surprising to see that there has been a 
steady decline in the number of labour unions in manufacturing, from 21 (1998) to 20 
(1999), to 17 (2000) then to 15 (2003) (see Table 5I) (MOM 2004). This decline is linked 
to their increasing consolidation and how the boundaries of labour unions are managed.  
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Table 5I: Employees' Trade Unions by Industry (1995-2005)  
(At Year-end)               
 
       
 
      
Industry (SSIC 1990) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Industry (SSIC 
2000) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
                         
TOTAL  82 82 81 83 82 80 76 TOTAL 72 71 70 68 68 68 
                         
Manufacturing  23 22 22 22 21 21 20 Manufacturing 17 16 15 15 15 15 
Construction  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Construction 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Commerce  4 4 4 4 4 3 3 Wholesale and Retail Trade  1 1 1 1 1 1 
             
Hotels and 
Restaurants 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Transport Storage and 




14 14 14 14 14 14 
Financial, Insurance, 
Real Estate and 
Businesses Serveces; 
and Community, Social 
and Personal Services 
30 31 29 31 31 30 29 Financial Services 4 4 4 4 4 4 
             
Business and Real 
Estate Services 5 5 5 5 5 5 




24 24 24 23 23 23 
Others1 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 Others1 4 4 4 3 3 3 
 
       
 
      
Source: Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics (2004 and 2006), 1Include Agriculture, Fishing, Quarrying, Utilities, and Activities not Adequately Defined 
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As mentioned, the categorical classification of labour unions defines the limits of their 
boundaries and therefore the extent of their membership200. As such, the loss of 
membership due to restructuring will affect those unions responsible for giving 
representation to workers in that industry – particularly, house or industry unions in 
manufacturing.  
 
Conversely, general unions which are not bound to a specific enterprise, industry, 
occupation or craft may now find, with the expansion of the service industry, greater 
opportunities to unionise new enterprises thereby expanding their membership. The 
disappearance of smaller unions while indicative of consolidation amongst labour unions, 
also points to the importance of a union’s membership size, ‘because membership is 
strength, membership is money, and money is how you survive’ (Interview 4a: 2). 
 
The expansion of large unions holds implications for union representation at the NTUC 
level, particularly during any NTUC convention of delegates, since an increase in 
membership size means the union have more proportional representation, and more 
influence. This voting influence would therefore make the union of greater strategic 
importance to the union-based political leadership (see Annex 5.12). 
 
5.4 Membership and Finances 
 
                                                 
200
 See ‘Turf Management’ Chapter 1 section 1.6. 
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‘The more members you have, the more finances you have, the more things you can do’ 
(Interview 4b: 36), is what makes membership so important. Membership size determines 
the ‘ability [of the union service their members] … if your membership size is small, your 
revenue is small’, this reduces the union’s ‘capacity to hire full-time staff’ (Interview 9: 
3) and places greater demand on union delegates (see Annex 5.13)201.  
 
Despite the importance of membership dues – since unions’ ‘only source of income is 
from subscription’ (Interview 10: 22) – they are for the most part barely sufficient (or in 
some cases insufficient) to cover the running costs of the union; as one interviewee puts 
it: ‘I don’t know whether there’s any union that really can … operate just on their … 
their membership dues’ (Interview 9a: 32). 
 
One reason could be the union membership fee, which is kept low – at S$9 a month (from 
1st January 2006) – to make union membership affordable202. Another reason may be due 
to the disbursement of the union dues. According to one unionist: ‘running the labour 
movement in Singapore is very expensive’ (Interview 10: 47); only 75% of the 
subscription due collected by the union is kept by the individual unions, the remaining 
‘25% [is paid] to the NTUC’ (Interview 9a: 32) as affiliation fees. 
 
For this, unions get access to the services and information provided by the NTUC. These 
will include NTUC collated statistical information such as ‘wage increases, bonus … 
benefits … terms and conditions [of collective agreements]’ (Interview 9a: 53), to NTUC 
                                                 
201
 (Interview 9: 3) – Such as to ‘have their own leaders engage in collective bargaining’.  
202
 Prior to 1st January 2006, the fee for union membership was S$8.  
http://www.ntuc.org.sg/announcement_membership_fee.htm  
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administered benefits and programmes like ‘job matching’ – which is ‘a very expensive 
thing’ (Interview 10: 47). In terms of how they use the funds, ‘the union has total 
control’, complete ‘autonomy over their funds’ (Interview 9a: 31) collected. 
 
5.4.1 Financing the Union: Investment & Fund Raising 
 
Unions cannot be just ‘solely depending on revenue’ (Interview 9: 4) as ‘75% [is] also 
not enough’ (Interview 4b: 39) for the union to support itself. As it is, ‘rental [and] staff 
… are the two main’ (Interview 9a: 33) union expenditure – with ‘staff salary [taking up 
over 30%]’ (Interview 10: 64) – and the remaining being spent on ‘benefits, welfare 
[and] operating costs’ (Interview 10: 64), such as union administered ‘grants’ (Interview 
10: 64) (See Annex 5.14). Thus, unions need to look for other means of finance. 
 
This typically involves soliciting donations from the management of unionised firms 
either directly or through ‘major fund raising events [like] dinner and dance [or] golf 
friendly’ (Interview 9a: 36), both of which are ‘very effective [ways] for raising fund’ 
(Interview 9a: 36). Depending on the union’s size, an event can be expected to raise 
approximately S$50,000 to S$150,000. Donations also vary according to company 
sizes203. 
 
The funds raised are then used as ‘seed money’ (Interview 4d: 35) and invested elsewhere 
to generate more funds. Despite having financial autonomy, unions are not at liberty to 
                                                 
203
 (Interview 4d: 36) – It was stated that a Singapore-based global container, shipping and logistics 
company donates approximately S$50,000 to S$100,000 a year to their union. 
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invest freely. Investments are governed by strict guidelines and ‘under the … trustees’ 
name’ (Interview 4d: 37). The latter’s ensures the propriety of investment and prevent 
‘abuse [from taking] place’ (Interview 4d: 41-42)204. 
 
Generally, the union ‘only can invest in government stock, government bonds’ (Interview 
4d: 37), they ‘cannot invest in shares [and] can only buy blue chip’ stocks (Interview 10: 
65)205. In addition, they also invest in NTUC cooperatives which offer higher returns and 
pay out yearly dividends which are used to ‘[take care of] the running costs’ (Interview 
4b: 41) (see Annex 5.15).  
 
5.4.2 Financing the NTUC: The SLF and the Government   
 
Like the unions, the NTUC also requires revenue to function. Despite dues from their 
affiliates, ‘the subscription they collect only [covers] like 19% of their cost. The other 
80% they also find money from elsewhere’ (Interview 10: 47). While the NTUC receives 
support in the form of ‘government grants’ (Interview 9: 4), which is not surprising given 
the ‘symbiotic relationship’, what is surprising is the duration of the support, which has 
persisted through the 80’s till the present, albeit through the SLF (Singapore Labour 
Foundation) (BT 1979, 7 Nov; ST 1969, 18 Nov; ST 1984, 18 Jul)206. 
                                                 
204
 (Interview 4d: 41-42) – ‘You remember last time Peh Yew Kok case? … One person sign and [run], they 
don’t want that to happen’. 
205
 See Annex 5.14. 
206
 (Business Times 1979: ‘Seminar in 1969 a Turning Point for Union Movement’, 7 Nov) – The 
Singapore Labour Foundation was established in September 1977 by an Act of Parliament with the aim ‘to 
train cadres for unions and cooperatives’; and to provide social welfare – in the form of social aid as well as 
recreational facilities – for union members and their families. (Straits Times 1969: ‘Dependence on 
Government for Money Criticised by Delegates’, 18 Nov), (Straits Times 1984: ‘Why is Dissent the Trend 
Now?’, 18 July) – It was noted that: ‘the affiliates’ contribution to the NTUC of a quarter of their members’ 
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Taking the 63 NTUC-affiliated labour unions and 9 cooperatives as its members, the SLF 
funds or subsidises schemes managed by the NTUC to improve the employability of both 
ordinary union members and union leaders207. Support from the government to the NTUC 
has been expressed through allocating the site of the new NTUC headquarters located at 
One Marina Boulevard to the SLF (NTUC News 2003)208. Not only was the NTUC not 
required to pay for the development costs but the rent for its office space – from ‘the 7th 
to the 12th floor’ (Interview 4d: 40) – would also be waived by the SLF (NTUC News 
2003)209. 
 
While we do not know the extent of the NTUC’s financial dependency or the SLF’s 
financing of the NTUC, we know that the SLF contributes to the NTUC and its 
programmes; providing a yearly grant (which amounted to S$11.15m in 2006), and 
contributing to welfare schemes like the Public Transport Assistance and Back to School 
Project (NTUC News 2004)210. 
 
In addition, the SLF also finances NTUC-affiliated unions, giving a grant of $2 per 
member per year to unions, while providing subsidies on NTUC conducted courses – 
                                                                                                                                                 
monthly subscriptions was barely enough to keep the NTUC going. With the intake of highly-qualified 
officers, expenses have gone up. The NTUC Research Unit received a $500,000 grant from the 
government.’  
207
 (SLF) – Training and education schemes currently offered by the SLF: 1) Ong Teng Cheong Education 
Trust Fund, 2) SLF Incentive Study Awards and Bursary Awards for ITE Students, 3) SLF Educational 
Tour Awards for Model Workers, 4) Skills Save Account and Individual Saving Account.  
208
 The site was purchased at the market price of $140.6m, and later developed at the cost of $282m. 
209
 The NTUC occupies 26% of the total floor area, which amounts to $75m of the development cost. 
210
 The SLF gave $1m to the Public transport Scheme, allocated $992,600 for union leaders’ training 
programmes and tertiary programmes. It gave $17.5m for a five year project to encourage skills upgrading 
and to set up individual learning and saving accounts. (SLF 2006) – The SLF gave $1m to Back to School 
Project to match the NTUC’s contribution to its Back to School Project in 2005. It also gave $500,000 to 
the Public Transport Fund and contributed to training schemes.  
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such as union leaders’ or skills training – as well as programmes initiated at the 
workplace or union level211. 
 
While highlighting the close relationship between the SLF (a statutory board of the 
MOM) and NTUC, the above also shows the oblique relationship existing between the 
government and NTUC-affiliated unions, which suggests that the unions’ ‘dependence’ 
on the government extend beyond leadership, raising the question as to their ability to 
operate without government support. This contradicts the vehement views of those who 
disagree citing the labour movement’s [ability to carry out any programme 
independently] (Interview 16: 11)212. 
 
5.4.3 Division of Membership – Ordinary and General  
 
Given the importance of membership, how does the membership trend look like? Overall, 
union membership is on the rise (see Table 5J), both in real terms and in terms of union 
density; in 1993 union density was 14.8%, by 2003 it had risen to 20.5%, suggesting that 
an increasing proportion of the working population are taking up union membership. 
                                                 
211
 (SLF) – Workplace and union level programmes such as work excellence committees, conferences and 
seminars. 
212
 Examples cited here was the Public Transport Fund and the Back to School Programme both of which 
were seen to be NTUC initiated. The public Transport Fund is a $4 million fund set up by the NTUC and 
the CDCs that aims to help cushion the impact of public transport fare hike in 2005 on low income 
families. The fund was to be disbursed in the form of a $50 voucher by NTUC, through its unions, and the 
CDCs through the Citizens’ Consultative Committees, the vouchers can be redeemed at any transit link 
ticket office when topping up EZ-Link cards. The CDCs, Singapore Labour Foundation (SLF) and NTUC 
club contributed $500,000 each, while another $500,000 comes from ComCare Fund. The remaining $2 
million came from the 2 public transport companies. 
http://www.ntuc.org.sg/ntucunions/news/news_030605b.asp The Back to School programme is for families 
whose income is less than $1,500 per month. The $1.15 million programme will offer successful applicants 
$100 vouchers that can be used to purchase textbooks, and school uniforms. The programme was held in 






Table 5J: Overall Union  Membership and Breakdown of NTUC Membership (1992-2003) 
       
Year  Employed Persons (at 
mid-year) 
Union 





Membership Union Density 
            
1992*# - 228,686 230000 226,993 1546a - 
1993* 1,592,000 235,723 236110 225,902 9125 14.8% 
1994 1,649,000 232,927 234363 226,195 8461 14.1% 
1995 - 235,157 237443 226,258 11248 - 
1996 1,748,000 255,020 257815 226,399 31557 14.6% 
1997 1,830,000 260,130 262484 228,529 36085 14.2% 
1998 1,870,000 272,769 277507 228,764 48976 14.6% 
1999* 1,886,000 289,707 293831 224,498 65067 15.4% 
2000 - 314,478 312794 225,378 88296 - 
2001 2,047,000 338,311 337387 239,572 112009 16.5% 
2002 2,017,000 389,676 387278 242,249 147706 19.3% 
2003 2,034,000 417,166 406449 - 164200b 20.5% 
       
Figures: Employed Persons - MOM, Union Membership - 2005 Ordinary Delegates' Conference)   
* Figures estimated for NTUC      
#
 1992 Introduction of General Branch 
Membership      
All figures are as at Dec each year (except a and b), taken from NTUC National Delegates Conference Oct 2003   
a





Table 5K: NTUC (General & Ordinary Branch) Membership (1992-2003) 
         
























                  
1992*# 230000 - 222976 96.9% 3.1% 1546a 0.7% - 
1993* 236110 2.7% 226993 96.1% 1.8% 9125 3.9% 490.2% 
1994 234363 -0.7% 225902 96.4% -0.5% 8461 3.6% -7.3% 
1995 237443 1.3% 226195 95.3% 0.1% 11248 4.7% 32.9% 
1996 257815 8.6% 226258 87.8% 0.0% 31557 12.2% 180.6% 
1997 262484 1.8% 226399 86.3% 0.1% 36085 13.7% 14.3% 
1998 277507 5.7% 228529 82.4% 0.9% 48976 17.6% 35.7% 
1999* 293831 5.9% 228764 77.9% 0.1% 65067 22.1% 32.9% 
2000 312794 6.5% 224498 71.8% -1.9% 88296 28.2% 35.7% 
2001 337387 7.9% 225378 66.8% 0.4% 112009 33.2% 26.9% 
2002 387278 14.8% 239572 61.9% 6.3% 147706 38.1% 31.9% 
2003 406449 5.0% 242249 59.6% 1.1% 164200b 40.4% 11.2% 
         
* Figures estimated        
#
 1992 Introduction of General Branch Membership       
All figures are as at Dec each year (except a and b), taken from NTUC National Delegates Conference Oct 2003   
a
 Figure from May 1992, b Figure from Jun 
2003        
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This rise can be credited to the NTUC. From 1993-2003, its membership rose at an 
average of 5.4% annually, this is due to the introduction of the GB (General Branch) 
membership scheme in 1992, which has since been rising at an average of 39.5% between 
1994-2003, much larger as compared to the OB (Ordinary Branch) membership which 
averaged 0.7% for the same period, and in real terms has remained relatively constant 
(see Table 5K)213. 
 
GB membership appears to have:  
‘originally started as [an] idea of making more money [to] propagate union 
membership beyond the working class, to sell the idea of union membership … or 
privileges of union membership … to all categories [of workers] even 
management’ (Interview 9a: 39)214.   
 
But unlike OB membership where workers are conferred the ‘traditional’ coverage of 
representation, GB membership: 
‘you [the union] don’t do any job you get membership … it’s like a club 
membership, like country club kind of membership … you cannot found [sic] it as 
union membership you know’ (Interview 4b: 12)215. 
                                                 
213
 The average annual change in OB and GB membership from 1993-2003 is 0.8% and 80.5% 
respectively. The higher average for GB membership was due to the sudden rise following its initial 
introduction.  
214
 (Interview 9a: 39) – Continued from above: ‘maybe to, how do you, what do you say, ok a bit upmarket, 
that we just don’t [just] fight for bread and butter issue, and we have membership in golf, country club, and 
some of these clubs you know, which can appeal to the executive type’. 
215
 (Interview 4b: 12) – Further it was stated that ‘people feel that you go and internationally publicise 





Table 5L: Union Density Rates (1993-2003) 
     
Year Union Density 
Union Density 
(less NTUC GB 
M'ship) 
NTUC Density NTUC Density (less GB M'ship)  
1993* 14.8% 14.2% 14.8% 14.3% 
1994 14.1% 13.6% 14.2% 13.7% 
1995 - - - - 
1996 14.6% 12.8% 14.7% 12.9% 
1997 14.2% 12.2% 14.3% 12.4% 
1998 14.6% 12.0% 14.8% 12.2% 
1999* 15.4% 11.9% 15.6% 12.1% 
2000 - - - - 
2001 16.5% 11.1% 16.5% 11.0% 
2002 19.3% 12.0% 19.2% 11.9% 
2003 20.5% 12.4% 20.0% 11.9% 
     
Figures: Calculated from Employed Persons - MOM, Union Membership - 2005 Ordinary Delegates' Conference) 
* Figures estimated for NTUC    
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However, GB membership has been defended on the grounds that it ‘is also one way that 
allows [the union] to have some inroads into organising workers in [a] company’ 
(Interview 9a: 6), as long as the union know ‘[they] have general branch membership 
above 50% [they] will easily serve a notice to the employer’ (Interview 9a: 5). Although 
admittedly, this does ‘not [happen] very often’ (Interview 9a: 6).  
 
In any case, the GB membership is significant because if it was not considered, overall 
union density would show a decline, registering 14.2% in 1993 to 12.4% in 2003 (see 
Table 5L). This is signification for the NTUC too. Without GB membership the density 
of NTUC membership shows a decline, from 14.3% in 1993 to 11.9% in 2003 (see Table 
5L). 
 
This appears to correspond with respondents’ claim that the decline in OB membership 
began ‘in the last eight or ten years’ (Interview 10: 23) due to, ‘outsourcing, 
restructuring, corporate changes; mergers, takeovers. So [the union may lose members’ 
(Interview 9a: 28)216. 
 
5.4.4 Union-Government Relationship – Beyond ‘Dependency’ 
 
However, simply describing the relationship between government and labour movement 
as ‘dependent’ does little to show the dynamism and complex relation that exists between 
unions and government. Support for unions is not done out of altruism, if anything, ‘the 
                                                 
216
 This interview was conducted in 2005. 
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government have their own agenda’ (Interview 10: 47) for supporting the union 
movement. 
 
The most ostensible being to involve LUL in the policy-process, which may take place in 
various ways: having LUL attend government committees and having [unions carry out 
policies] (Interview 4b: 33-24), or by having them provide feedback ‘to tell them what’s 
happening at the ground [even] before any official statistics’ (Interview 10: 10) (see 
Annex 5.16). 
 
Yet, even though in terms of ‘national policy and guidelines [the unions] will take the 
cue from NTUC’ (Interview 9: 5):  
‘[the unions’] job is not to push policy through, it is to convince people … 
pushing policy through is unilateral … we want people to understand the policies 
and why we are doing it’ (Interview 4b:31). 
 
What is suggested here is that unions have no say in determining policy direction, 
instead, their role and that of LUL is to explain and convince their membership of such 
policies. What was conveyed is the inevitability about the process, because no matter 
what, ‘[the LUL] still have to convince the ground’ (Interview 4b: 32), which even if it 
accepts begrudgingly, ‘ultimately they would all agree [with] you’ (Interview 4b: 32). 
 
A point which deserves to be highlighted is the ‘pragmatic acceptance’ of policies by the 
union membership, meaning they comply because there is ‘no realistic alternative’ (Mann 
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1970: 425). However, should ‘something go wrong’ (Interview 4b: 32) it is certain the 
membership will lay the blame on the LUL who is ‘the one who [convinced them]’ 
(Interview 4b: 32).  
 
Interestingly, the relationship between the NTUC and its affiliates may be more fractious 
than it appears. As noted previously, while the NTUC runs several welfare programmes, 
the benefits are distributed by the unions rather than the NTUC. According to an 
interviewee, this is because if:  
‘the union don’t take credit … if suppose NTUC give direct to the worker … then 
[the] worker would say union useless one, NTUC identify me. Our bridge is gone 
you know, who will join union?’ (Interview 4b: 35). 
This would challenge the perception that ‘[unions] see no necessity to’ (Interview 9e: 3) 
prove their relevance.  
 
While this may be true to the extent that there is:  
‘no [inter] union rivalry in Singapore [hence] there is no need for one union to 
up the ante against another union [and] generally the affiliates are happy with 
the organisation structure and the way things are run’ (Interview 9e: 3) 
It also shows that unions still seek to preserve some form of (individual) organisational 




If anything, taking ownership of disbursing grants and administering programmes reflect 
the affiliate unions’ struggle to differentiate themselves from the national body. Given 
unions’ participation in national policies, it would certainly not be in the government’s 
interest to have them be perceived as ‘useless’ (Interview 4b: 35), as that would serve to 
deter people from joining. 
 
Added pressure for unions to differentiate themselves comes from ‘free riding’ where 
union and non-union members enjoy the same benefits. This undermines the influence of 
unions and contributes to the low take up rates of the union membership: 
 ‘almost all companies give the same to everybody, whether they are union 
members or not … it would … not make sense for them to discriminate union 
members and non-union members because ultimately that would make the unions 
stronger, … if I favour union members, everybody will join … and then that would 
make the voice of the union stronger’ (Interview 11: 21).  
As it stands, unions are ‘not able to do anything about this … right now’ (Interview 11: 
22), other than to ‘get the company to positively discriminate [the] union members’ 
(Interview 11: 22) (see Annex 5.17). 
 
5.5 Role of Labour Unions: Bargaining and Conciliation 
 
The reference to the importance of the labour movement in the national policy process 
raises again the question of the functional role of labour unions, previously covered in 
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Chapter 1. This section will examine some of the specific areas covered in greater depth. 
One prominent topic with the onset of the AFC is retrenchment. 
 
5.5.1 Retrenchment, Quantum Negotiation and the Globalisation Connection  
 
The union prepares for the potential occurrence of retrenchment by getting two things 
stipulated in the CA; one is the ‘contractual notice of termination’ (Interview 9f: 9), 
where the union’s ‘policy is to ask for 2 months’ (Interview 9f: 9) instead of the usual 1 
month’s notice. The second is the quantum to be paid out. As the ‘union cannot stop 
retrenchment’ (Interview 10: 58), when it occurs, the issue is ‘always a question of 
quantum, what is a fair, equitable quantum’ (Interview 9f: 5). 
 
It is reportedly increasingly difficult to get employers to stipulate the quantum in the CA 
since the AFC in 1997, this is because, ‘in the past … retrenchment … was [a] very 
remote possibility’ (Interview 9g: 2), it is not so now. Employers ‘don’t want to commit 
to something which they think … they may not be able to … fulfil or rather … they would 
rather have a … free hand … to decide’ (Interview 9g: 3). 
 
In addition, the motivation behind retrenchment is also changing. Previously, it was done 
when companies were ‘suffering business losses and [needed] to cut headcount’ 
(Interview 9g: 3). Now ‘it’s more complex … restructuring [may be] due to mergers and 
acquisitions, [or because companies want to] concentrate on [their] core business 
[resulting in] redundancy and retrenchment’ (Interview 9g: 3). 
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The change has been specifically attributed to ‘globalisation’ and the competitive 
‘restructuring of the economy’ (Interview 9g: 3), with ‘companies relocating … to 
cheaper call centre. Manufacturing is a good example … even in the Services sector we 
see outsourcing’ (Interview 9g: 3) (see Annex 5.18).  
 
In manufacturing, the textile and garment industry in particular has been greatly affected 
as ‘the quota for manufacturing has been lifted since 1st Jan 2005’ (Interview 3: 7) 
(Nordås 2004: 1, 13)217. The ‘lifting of this quota [has led to a drop in] the price of the 
order’ (Interview 3: 7), this means the value of the orders can no longer cover the 
production costs, and the only solution is either ‘to shed labour’ (Interview 3: 7) or 
relocate elsewhere – which a lot of companies here did, resulting in ‘a lot of retrenchment 
… from this sector’ (Interview 3: 7). 
 
Apart from economic restructuring, these events precipitated by the AFC also indicate the 
shifting economic trajectory of Singapore towards what has come to be known as the 
‘New Economy’ or ‘Knowledge-based Economy’ (Rodan 2001: 146, 154; Yeung 2001: 
21).  
 
Although Singapore’s pursuit of growth is nothing new, as can be seen from it’s earlier 
‘regionalisation’ foray into regional ASEAN countries, and the emerging economies of 
                                                 
217
 This refers to the liberalization of the textile and clothing sector; where import quotas will be lifted as 
subject to the general rule of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1 January 2005.  
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India and China, the ‘New Economy’ is different in the sense that flow is now not only 
directed outwards, but also inwards (Rodan 2001: 152; Yeung 2001: 23)218. 
 
Globalisation push and the ‘New Economy’ defined by greater ‘international 
competitiveness’ (Interview 6: 12), has also contributed to the ‘restructuring of the 
economy’ (Interview 9g: 3); companies [are] relocating’ (Interview 9g: 3), jobs are being 
‘outsourced to the lowest wage destination’ (Interview 6: 28), and [labour intensive work 
is being phased out] (Interview 8: 4).  
 
This adds not only to retrenchment but also the loss of employment as companies 
downsize, leading to a (previously discussed) upsurge in retrenchment and 
unemployment, and a change in the distribution of employment (see Table 5D, 5E and 
5G for trends). 
 
What differed was the median duration of unemployment, which was rising, people were 
staying unemployed longer; in 1996 it was 4.9 weeks, in 1998 it was 8.9 weeks, by 2002 
it took almost 3 months to find a new job (see Table 5E). The longer duration needed to 
find a new job is due just to higher rate of unemployment but also the lower re-
employment rate (see Table 5Di), which suggests a general scarcity of jobs and that 
employers were not rehiring. 
 
5.5.2 Collective Bargaining and the Strategies of Negotiation 
                                                 
218
 The regionalization drive was declared in 1993, but had in fact begun much earlier. Countries of 
Singapore’s regionalisation efforts include Indonesia (Bintan Industrial Park), Burma, Vietnam (Vietnam-
Singapore Industrial Park) as well as India and China (Suzhou Industrial Park). 
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In Chapter 1 I discussed the process of collective bargaining, now I will look at how 
negotiations are conducted. While the negotiating process may resemble a haggling 
process and appear straightforward, the reality is more complex. This is due not only to 
the inexact and personal nature of its conduct, but also because while negotiation tries to 
locate a point deemed equitable by both the LUL and employer, the issue also hinges on 
whether or not what is offered and agreed on satisfies the ‘minimum’ demand of the other 
party. 
 
To begin with, negotiations are usually initiated under four kinds of situations: ‘when 
there’s a collective agreement due for renewal, … when there’s a wage increase due, 
[when negotiating for] bonuses or retrenchment’ (Interview 10: 4).  
‘The IR officer will be leading the negotiation, [he or she] will be the chief 
spokesman, and … the key officials from the branch, like chairman, secretary, 
treasurer will be there … basically to be … transparent with them so that they 
will know what the union is fighting for, the basis, the rationale, and for them to 
feedback to [the union] information in the company’ (Interview 9f: 15).  
 
The process begins with the LUL serving a ‘list of demands … to the company [from 
which the union will then] bargain’ (Interview 9h: 5) from. Depending on the negotiation 
process, the number of meetings required to conclude a collective agreement ‘varies from 
2 or 3 meetings to [up to even] 30 meetings’ (Interview 9h: 9); in terms of duration, ‘it 
can vary from 1 month to 1 [or] 2 years or [even] more’ (Interview 9h: 9). However the 
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latter is ‘very rare’, since ‘by that time, the case would probably have ended up in [the] 
Ministry of Manpower’ (Interview 9h: 9) already219. Usually, negotiations ‘should be 
concluded within a year’ (Interview 9h: 9). 
 
The items up for negotiation are not arbitrarily determined, but are decided on several 
factors: 
‘If it is a renewal of a collective agreement – that means there is already an 
existing one [the IRO and the branch committee] will review all the terms 
together and getting their views and contribution [such as whether] they have any 
request to increase this or to add in something else’ (Interview 9h: 4). 
 
Prior to the negotiations, the LUL of the branch committee will be given time:  
‘to go and study the collective agreement that they have at the moment and then 
… survey their members, whether members have any requests, any suggestions. 
Sometimes it may not be new requests but it may be questions on the application, 
interpretation or operation of the collective agreement’ (Interview 9h: 4). 
It is after this that the prepared terms would be submitted to the management. 
 
In addition, the terms and items included are also ‘benchmarked’ against ‘the employment 
market, [and] employment practices’ (Interview 9h: 8). This data can be obtained by 
affiliated unions from the NTUC, which has ‘got a database [of] 200 over collective 
                                                 
219
 (Interview 9h: 9) – On the unlikelihood that negotiations would be long drawn out affairs: ‘Because the 
minimum period for collective agreements is 2 years and [a] maximum [of] 3 years, and there is also a 
requirement in the Industrial Relation Act that … they would not certify any agreement which has a period 
shorter than one and a half years before it expires, [means that] there is already a constraint on the 
negotiating party to conclude collective agreement within a certain time frame’. 
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agreements’ (Interview 9h: 8), which the union can access so as to discern the ‘general 
practice’ (Interview 9h: 8) in whichever sector or industry. 
 
Having such data is crucial when negotiating with the employer; it allows them to ‘speak 
with conviction what is the market practice’ and to justify ‘why I’m not accepting this’ 
(Interview 9a: 49) offer from the management. This is necessary: 
‘Because today’s collective bargaining is more about reasoning, persuading, 
justifying …. It’s not like the old style whereby you don’t have information … go 
in and give a ballpark figure … and engage in … “change alley”’ (Interview 9h: 
21)220. 
 
However, a lot still depends on the management, LUL have: 
‘to size up the employer, is it a multinational? … do they see themselves as market 
leaders …? Some employer will just tell you straight “oh no [we] will not give 
this until the majority of the market give this, so we are followers …”, so you size 
up the employers whether … what is their HR practice or philosophy …. If they 
want to position themselves as a good employer …, “we take care of the welfare 
of our members, we are prepared to venture into non-standard benefits”, then you 
can put forward. Some … employers are very miserly, “we give what we have to 
give but we are not going to give more than what we have to give”’ (Interview 9h: 
6)221.  
 
                                                 
220
 This refers to the style of bargaining where one begins bargaining from a high figure, lowering the 
figure each time until a compromise is sought.  
221
 (Interview 9h: 6) – So the unions need to ‘know how to package [their] demands [and] claims’. 
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The LUL’s strategy then is to ‘pick the cluster leaders to negotiate first … the rest will 
then benchmark themselves [and see] what they can actually … pay’ (Interview 10: 13). 
For ‘[companies not doing well the union will] keep them till the last’ (Interview 10: 13). 
This strategy is ‘the most effective because, the companies that can afford to pay also 
want to settle early’ (Interview 10: 13)222. 
 
Nevertheless, despite trends and attitudes ‘at the end of the day, it is still [about] 
affordability’ (Interview 9h: 6). The union can only try to get as ‘good [a] deal as [the] 
company can afford’ (Interview 9: 10), which varies according to how well the company 
performs as well as the overall economic environment. 
 
5.5.2.1 ‘Foot in the Door’ – Other Strategies for Persuasion  
 
The key rule during collective bargaining is to adopt a ‘give and take’ stance, wherein 
when ‘[someone makes] a proposal [the other party] should make a counter proposal’ 
(Interview 5a: 22). To make no proposal or ‘a negative proposal’, which is to offer 
‘[terms] and [conditions] worse than what [is] existing’ (Interview 5a: 3) is considered 
insincere and ‘provocative’, and would simply impede negotiation proceedings. 
 
What sort of strategies can be used to ‘encourage’ employers to accede to their requests? 
First, it should be stressed that not all employers are unwilling to give in to the demands 
of unions. But their rationale for giving would not be as altruistic as because ‘they want 
                                                 
222
 (Interview 10: 14) – Companies also want to settle early so they ‘don’t have to … compute back 
payment’ and allow the changes to take effect at the beginning of the financial year.  
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to be good employers’ (Interview 9a: 49), rather, they do so because ‘[they] want to be 
competitive, [they] want to have “Best Practices”’ (Interview 9a: 49). 
 
Often, ‘market leaders’ (Interview 9a: 49), like multinational firms or employers who are 
sufficiently ‘enlightened’ and self-motivated such that the union: 
‘don’t have to tell them, or make the demand, [they] will give [because they] 
know, [they] have done [their] own survey and [they] know [what] is being given 
and … want to better it’ (Interview 9a: 49). 
 
This group comprise about ‘half’ of the employers’ cohort, the other half are ‘market 
followers’; ‘reasonable employers’ who are ‘comfortable where [they] are, [they] don’t 
want to be trail blazers [but] if more companies [were] giving [a] benefit then [they] will 
follow’ (Interview 9a: 50)223.  
 
There is however a minority group ‘who are the scrooge’ (Interview 9a: 50); they ‘are 
not enlightened, they sometimes don’t have HR people, some … are maybe sole 
proprietors, so they really have a very vested interest’ (Interview 9a: 50) in not offering 
any benefits; ‘some [are] our local Singaporeans, they are the people who do our own 
workers in’ (Interview 9a: 59). 
 
While what to bargain for is dependent on how members [prioritise] (Interview 9h: 5) 
their demands, one of the union’s strategies is to ‘get something first, put your foot in the 
door … and then later on open it wider’ (Interview 9h: 13) (see Annex 5.19). This 
                                                 
223
 (Interview 9a: 50) – Usually ‘they give fairly good terms and they have good HR practices’. 
 174 
usually entails first accepting an offer which is less than proposed by the LUL and 
improving on it subsequently. 
 
The second way is to establish precedence; by approaching ‘those good [employers] that 
are willing to’ give first, LUL can then ‘pick on the potential and build on the successes’ 
(Interview 9h: 16). This is useful when dealing with the follower-type of employers; LUL 
can cajole them by citing ‘employers who have already given’ (Interview 9h: 15), and in 
some cases by appealing to their pride and vanity ‘[telling] them [about] employers that 
give’, emphasise that ‘[they] are good [employers]’ and that ‘[they would] not want to be 
seen as a bad employer’ (Interview 9h: 16). 
 
By citing employers who are giving certain benefits, LUL may encourage other rival 
unionised firms within the industry to match these benefits on the pretext of being 
‘competitive’ (Interview 9h: 16). The key here is for the unions to capitalise on the 
situation every time ‘somebody [an employer] break ranks and give’ (Interview 9h: 
16)224. 
 
However, despite the best efforts of unions to cajole or make use dissension to claim 
benefits from employers, in the end whether or not firms accede to the demands of LUL 
are influenced also by: 1) ‘the nature of [the] benefits’ (Interview 9h: 16) being claimed, 
and 2) how significantly the employer views the benefit sought. 
                                                 
224
 (Interview 9h: 16) – Even though employers have their Employers’ Federation who would advise them 
not to give in to certain union demands, some employers – particularly multinational firms – might 
eventually ‘break ranks and give’ because they are also under the jurisdiction of their headquarters, which 
might have their own set of ‘best practices’.  
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In both instance, cost is a factor; whether or not it is something the company is prepared 
to spend on, and ‘[how significant] is the impact’ (Interview 9h: 16) of the benefit on 
matters like the firm’s ‘hiring policy [or its] retention impact on [their] workforce’ 
(Interview 9h: 17), are considerations that would influence firms’ decisions.  
 
For employers worried about incurring ‘excessive or high charges’ (Interview 9h: 15) 
from the abuse of benefits, the unions would try to reassure them, for instance, to assuage 
an employer’s fear of being overcharged for dental benefits, the union might propose 
using the service of an accredited NTUC-linked cooperative (Denticare), where the 
employer can be assured against any misuse. 
 
5.5.3 Mitigation of Conflict during Negotiation 
 
Negotiations are usually conducted in a ‘close door’ format rather than in public or 
‘through the media’ (Interview 6: 37). The intention is to ‘look for a win-win situation’ 
(Interview 6: 37), which is not possible once ‘their position [is voiced] in the media’ as 
shifting ‘once [one’s] position is known [means] a loss of face’ (Interview 6: 37).  
 
Sometimes negotiations ‘can be fiery, [they] can be explosive’ (Interview 6: 37), [union 
delegates and the management may raise their voices and should at each other but 
outside of the room they can all go for coffee together] (Interview 8: 6). This shows the 
 176 
effort at [keeping work and personal feelings separately] because [at the end, the aim is 
to reach a decision that can benefit everyone] (Interview 8: 6) (see Annex 5.20). 
 
In this respect it was expressed that it is: 
‘the sensibility of the issue which is more important. … most of us who are 
practitioners actually [go] into the issue not only for the present but [for] that 
long term relationship’ (Interview 6: 37)225. 
This raises several issues, the key theme being the mitigation of the intensity of conflict. 
 
Firstly, commenting on the overall conduct of negotiations, conflict appears on the whole 
to be mitigated as a result of individuals being conscious of and delineating within 
themselves the persona carrying out a (‘circumstantially’) professional role, and in so 
doing, help prevent it from being carried over into a form of personal enmity thereby 
softening hostilities (Simmel 1955: 38). 
 
However, our classification and explanation seems more of heuristic proximity than an 
accurate encapsulation of what happens, which judging by the descriptive is something 
more complex. Firstly, despite the potential for it to escalate into conflict, it does not 
appear possible to be emotionally detached from the negotiation process (Simmel 1955: 
43-48). 
 
                                                 
225
 See Annex 5.20. 
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This is due to the subjective and interpersonal nature of negotiations, wherein the 
individual’s character, cultural background, personal preferences, and pride, are all 
factors which drawn into play rather than excluded:  
 
1. [Negotiations may be made more tough and tense according to how the 
management chooses to execute its prerogative, which is tied to the personal style 
of each management team] (Interview 8a: 11). 
 
2. [Even in situations where the management may be in the wrong, the union still 
cannot just go up to them and tell them that they are wrong. A lot actually 
involves face saving for the management] (Interview 8a: 11). 
 
3. ‘Old men and the Japanese are very funny people’. [Some of the older men and 
Japanese do not like to negotiate with IROs whom they see as] ‘young girls’, 
[they do not wish to speak to them as they feel that they are young, inexperienced 
and are wasting their time] (Interview 8a: 11). 
 
Similarly, while it is stipulated that the clear articulation of groups’ goals and interests 
may help open the possibility to using ‘less violent’ means to achieving them, the ‘closed 
door’ nature of negotiations appear to contradict this (Simmel 1955: 39-41). Allow me to 
clarify. First, a distinction needs to be made between the ‘specific’ and ‘general’ interests 
or goals of groups. ‘Specific’ interests refer to clearly detailed demands and terms as 
opposed to ‘general’ ones which are more abstract and tend to refer more to a qualitative 
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attribute. In this sense, the specific interests of a group may differ from its general 
interests. 
 
Thus, while clearly stipulating general interests and goals may be useful in preventing the 
escalation of conflict between groups, this is not the case for specific interests as 
represented by the ‘closed door’ nature of union-management negotiation, given their 
fundamentally opposing interests – where ‘businesses are here to maximise profits and 
workers through their unions … basically, exist to maximise benefits’ (Interview 9: 9) – 
rigidly adhering to their specific demands by either party would only impede rather than 
resolve differences. 
 
Making this distinction is not intended to contest Simmel’s proposal, but rather to 
augment it. Just because conflict groups have shared interests does not necessarily negate 
or reconcile their fundamentally opposing interests. Further, the organisations’ 
submission to the common ‘general’ interests is akin to ‘[the individual submitting to] a 
higher social purpose’ (Simmel 1955: 195).  
 
However, the submission to an acknowledged ‘higher purpose’ requires unions to 
compromise the extent to which they carry out the purposes for which they were 
conceived, which here refers to the need for unions to exercise restraint in demanding and 
pursuing benefits for their members (Simmel 1955: 195). This restraint may also be 
rationalised on the basis of the underlying ‘functional interdependency’ between the two 
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groups, as ‘[there can be no] union if there is no company’ (Interview 4c: 20) (Turner 
1975: 625). 
 
The union-management ‘competition’ during negotiation also shows how an integrating 
end may result due to the nature of the competition, wherein both parties are trying to win 
‘without using [their] strength on the adversary’ (Simmel 1955: 58). Here, the ‘victory in 
the fight is not really the success of the fight itself, but … the realisation of values outside 
of it’, as suggested that the aim was not to ‘go for a zero sum game’ (Interview 6: 37) of 
‘mutual annihilation’ (Simmel 1955: 59). 
 
For society, the value of such competitive contest stems from the ‘[production of] 
objective social values’ as a result of ‘subjective motives’ (Simmel 1955: 60). While 
from the viewpoint of the competing union and management, ‘it uses the production of 
objective values as [a way to attain] subjective satisfaction’ (Simmel 1955: 60). 
 
5.5.4 Avoiding Structurally-based Conciliation 
 
Despite the availability of arbitration as an avenue for conflict resolution, the reason why 
‘very few [cases] go to open court’ (Interview 4a: 10) is because neither LUL nor 
management want their cases heard in open court. For LUL, court holds a great deal of 
uncertainty; there is the ‘risk [of] getting an award for less’ and ‘[they] also don’t want 
to risk [the] court setting … a new precedent’ (Interview 9f: 11) that may be 
unfavourable to the union.  
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For the management, aside from having ‘to reveal their financial statements’ (Interview 
9f: 11) there is the chance that ‘their company name [may] get spoilt’ (Interview 4a: 10) 
since it may be featured in the newspaper. Thus, having it settled without arbitration 
would ‘[save] everybody’s time [and] a lot of unnecessary ill feelings’ (Interview 9f: 27) 
 
Moreover, given that the NTUC and its LUL ‘[emphasises] partnership with the 
employer’ (Interview 9f: 27), going for arbitration represents ‘a kind of failing’ 
(Interview 15: 10) because: 
[it showed that both parties were unable to compromise with each other and the 
issue has to be brought into the open, and when they head for mediation, it is very 
likely that one party would eventually lose out; there would have to be a winner 
and loser] (Interview 15: 10)226. 
In addition, it also:  
‘entrenches this kind of feeling that the employer is not fair [and] if you don’t 
demand and … fight for it, they will never give us, which is a bad feeling’ 
(Interview 9f: 27). 
 
The establishment of a legal-structural arrangement wherein arbitration is compulsory, 
progressive and binding, not only sees the importance given to the peaceful resolution of 
industrial conflict but also the recognition of the legal structure’s superiority and of both 
                                                 
226
 (Interview 15: 10) – In this case, [the loser is unlikely to feel good in the end knowing that they lost. So 
any issue brought to the IAC is likely to lead to one party feeling happier over the other]. 
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parties’ ‘equal subordination’ to it (Simmel 1955: 37)227. It is the recognised objectivity 
and depersonalised subjection to the law that prevents emotional intensification and the 
escalation of conflict (Simmel 1955: 37). 
 
If anything, compulsory arbitration suggests the impossibility and redundancy of a 
provision for industrial action (i.e. strikes) (Singapore Statutes Cap.333)228. Despite this, 
NTUC affiliates have affirmed that unions can still strike if they wanted to, even though 
an autonomous union official does not share this confidence, stating that even though: 
‘there is no word saying [NTUC unions] cannot strike [their] right is restricted, 
[they] have to surrender some of [their rights] to [the] NTUC, [who is] the one to 
make the final decision’ (Interview 5a: 39). 
In this individual’s view, strikes represents a union’s willingness ‘to take a firm stand’ 
(Interview 5a: 39), without which, employers [would not give good benefits to workers] 
(Interview 5a: 39) (BT 2003, 1 Dec; CNA 2003, 1 Dec; ST 2003, 1 Dec)229. 
 
In December 2003, a near strike involving ALPS-S (the Air Line Pilots Association – 
Singapore) appears to substantiate this, but its subsequent chastisement by the Singapore 
government, which in the wake of the incident changed the Trade Union Act to enable 
                                                 
227
 Compulsory nature of arbitration see: Industrial Relations Act (Cap. 136) Section 18  20, 21, 23, 31, 32, 
35.  
228
 Trade Union Act (Cap. 333) Section 27 (15) – Definition of ‘Industrial Action’ 
229
 (Business Times 2003 – ‘Employers must play their role too’, 2 Dec) – ‘the government also took pains 
to urge SIA management to do its part on wage reform so that the staff could share in the rewards of 
improved corporate performance’, (Central News Agency 2003 – ‘Singapore Government to Amend Trade 
Union Act’, 1 Dec) – ‘A member of the ALPA-S executive committee… Captain P. James… said he SIA 
should treat its employees as partners… and not just something with a price tag that can be replaced’. 
(Straits Times 2003 – ‘SIA Pilots: Law to be Tightened’, 1 Dec) – This was said with specific reference to 
the Pilots’ Union, Alpa-S (Air Line Pilots’ Association – Singapore), which almost went on strike. A 
situation for which the ‘management is not blameless’.  
 182 
trade unions’ EXCO ‘to negotiate and commit to collective agreement without having to 
seek ratification from their members’ gives credence to the difficulty in mounting 
industrial action despite its apparent legitimacy (BT 2003, 1 Dec)230.  
 
Despite the absence of strikes, union leaders have assured me that they were always a 
possibility. The importance of the strike or the threat of it is illustrated through two near-
strike cases told to me during the course of my interviews. The first involved a prominent 
hotel surrounded the issue of bonuses, while the second case involved a ‘multi-model 
public transport operator in Singapore’. 
 
In the latter case, the [the board of the corporation decided not to follow the terms and 
conditions stated in the collective agreement signed with the union, deciding instead to 
give less than what was originally agreed upon] (Interview 8a: 13). Specifically, the 
management decided to renege on the annual increment agreed in the collective 
agreement. 
 
Despite the best efforts of the union to negotiate, no resolution was possible because the 
‘management [were] very unreasonable’ (Interview 12: 22), this led eventually to the 
decision to take industrial action. In the end the strike was adverted only because of the 
intervention from the MP attached to the union. 
 
                                                 
230
 (Business Times 2003 – ‘Government acts to stem fresh tension between SIA Management, Pilots’ – 1 
Dec) 
 183 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming view amongst the interviewed LUL is that strikes are 
‘the ultimate weapon’ (Interview 9: 12), given that they ‘cause a lot of disruption and 
damage to the company’ (Interview 9: 12). As such, they ‘should be the last resort’ 
(Interview 4c: 24), used only when ‘the treatment given by the company [is] so 
untenable, that union has to put its foot down’ (Interview 6: 39) or if [the other side is not 
amendable to meet for reconciliation] (Interview 8: 13). 
 
In addition, strikes damages worker-management relationships, and bring about [negative 
repercussions for the nation] (Interview 8: 14). This refers to Singapore’s substantial 
‘[dependence] on foreign investment’ (Interview 9: 12) for job creation, and the desire 
not ‘to drive away foreign investment by giving the image of a very disruptive labour 
movement here’ (Interview 9: 12) (UNCTAD 2006)231. 
 
In the view of some LUL, the difficulty rests not in getting approval for a strike but that 
even if one was called, [workers would not follow them] (Interview 8: 14). There are two 
reasons for this; one is the [fear that they will lose their jobs] (Interview 8: 14), the other 
is because workers today [are not experiencing any deprivation of the basic, and are not 
subject to poor work conditions, and neither are they exploited as they were in the past] 
(Interview 8: 14). Hence, they are unlikely to strike, as [they would lose more than they 
would gain] (Interview 8: 14). 
 
                                                 
231
 FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP in 1990, 2003, 2004 and 2005 was 82.6%, 121.7%, 156.2% and 
158.6% respectively. 
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The discussion in this section has illustrated two points: The first being, although it is 
legislatively possible to undertake strikes, the government’s stand is clear, they would not 
countenance the conduct of industrial action, as it infringes on the ‘national interest’.  
This places the government as the arbiter that designates what is acceptable and what is 
not. In so doing, it is indicating that labour unions and the extent of their action, is 
dependent on the support of the government, thereby cementing the subordinate position 
of the labour movement. 
 
The second point has to do with how the system of industrial relations gains legitimacy 
with LUL. Rather than emphasises role typification, I attribute more importance in this 
case to the subjective experiences of LUL and how this ‘fits’ with the aims and outcomes 
of the system that they are located in (Berger et al 1966: 71-72, 74, 80, 87). 
 
With reference to the system of dispute resolution, what this means is that this system is 
not legitimated simply through the participation of LUL in it. Its approach also has ‘to be 
justified’ and compatible with the subjective reality of LUL, which is how the ‘reality of 
everyday life’ is experienced (Berger et al 1966: 168-169). 
 
In this case, through routine maintenance from the subjective everyday experiences such 
as: the experience in seeing how strikes can be adverted because of the intervention of 
MPs; conversations with employers who emphasise the importance of an ‘efficient 
government machinery [and business transparency]’ (Interview 10: 26); witnessing the 
uselessness of strikes – ‘organise strikes, all get sacked, next day they bring in another 
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1,000 workers’ (Interview 10: 26); and positive experiences during the conduct of 
collective bargaining (Berger et al 1966: 168-169). In this sense, crisis maintenance 
through negative criticisms and repercussions from the SIA debacle also help reinforce 
the institutionalised manner of resolution (Berger et al 1966: 174-175). 
 
5.5.5 The Socialising Function of Negotiation: Role and Influence of Union leaders 
in the Determination of Benefits 
 
Although the ‘divisive’ and ‘destructive’ effects of conflict are well known, it also has an 
‘immense sociating effect’ as it encourages the opposing parties to rally together and 
consolidate amongst themselves (Simmel 1955: 61). This is particularly so in terms of the 
decision-making function, which is seen during negotiation sessions as both unions and 
management are led by their respective representatives (Simmel 1955: 61). 
 
LUL, in particular the IRO exert a heavy influence on the proceedings. This is due to 
several reasons; firstly, although branch representatives also participate in preparing the 
demands for negotiation, they still need to consult the IRO in the event of a ‘question of 
interpretation [or] ambiguity’ (Interview 9h: 4); or they may be ‘quite vague about’ 
(Interview 9h: 12) national initiatives and need the IRO to explain and prevent employers 




Secondly, although it is ‘the committee themselves [that] drives [negotiations]’ 
(Interview 9i: 13), in the end, the IRO must be ‘convinced, [then they] will put [the] 
proposal in [and] advocate for the members’ (Interview 9h: 12)232. This was explained as 
being due to the IRO having to ‘justify why [and put up] supporting arguments to press 
for [a] claim’ (Interview 9i: 4), thus there needs to be a ‘valid basis’ (Interview 9i: 5) in 
order to convince the management that what is being asked for is ‘reasonable’ (Interview 
9i: 5). 
 
The consideration then of what is deemed reasonable and therefore ‘realistic [or] 
unrealistic’ (Interview 9h: 8) is ‘a matter of perception’ (Interview 9i: 5), which is best 
determined by [benchmarking against current ‘employment practices’] (Interview 9h: 8). 
For instance, one employment trend following the economic downturn was to ‘cut down 
benefits especially annual leave, sick leave, [and] retrenchment quantum’ (Interview 9i: 
13). Thus, the IRO would discourage suggestions that wish to make improvements in 
those areas. However, this does not mean that the union would allow the employer to 
reduce the existing benefits, keeping with ‘the principle … that existing benefit should 
not be reduced’ (Interview 9i: 14). 
 
Nevertheless, IROs may find themselves representing members’ demands even though 
they may ‘not [be] very convinced’ (Interview 9h: 12) or if the chances of getting them is 
very slim (Simmel 1955: 61). The socialising effect being played out here involves the 
continued correspondence between IROs and members of the branch, with the former 
advising and explaining what might be possible to negotiate and what is not to the latter, 
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 Driving the negotiations for enhancements.  
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and in so doing, places a ‘scope’ – thereby having the effect of ‘socialising’ – on the 
views and perspective held by the former. 
 
Given that unions affiliated with the NTUC are obliged and ‘take the cue from the 
national body’ (Interview 9h: 19) – because ‘they are the planners’ (Interview 9h: 19) – 
raises the question if IROs may find themselves caught between representing what the 
union and its membership wants and the initiatives of the national body. 
 
The view is that such a ‘kind of situation would not arise because at the end of the day it 
is still up to … the union to negotiate with your own employers’ (Interview 9h: 20). 
However, it is expectable that ‘if you are negotiating something that is [the] exception 
rather than the rule, [then] you can’t get support’ (Interview 9h: 20). It was also 
emphasised that unions have a great deal of autonomy in this respect from the NTUC: 
‘they don’t go into the nitty gritty of individual sector or company negotiation, that is left 
to [the] individual union. They only look at broad national issues’ (Interview 9h: 20). 
 
Through their participation in advising and arbitrating over the sort of benefits that union 
members should push for, and their involvement in ‘the whole negotiation and 
bargaining process’ (Interview 11: 28) LUL help maintain and are indirectly articulating 
the NTUC’s objectives and approach to labour relations. 
 
5.5.6 Collective Bargaining and the Flexible Wage System – A Microcosm of 
Tripartism and Union Autonomy  
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While collective bargaining is independently conducted by individual unions, it is still 
subject to the regulation of particular agencies, namely, the IAC (Industrial Arbitration 
Court) which has to certify all the collective agreements. For instance, as the law states 
that the ‘company [is] not allowed to pay more than 1 month of [annual] wage 
supplement’ (Interview 9a: 7), even if the company was willing to pay more and have it 
stipulated into the agreement, it would be rejected by the IAC (Singapore Statutes 
Cap.91)233. 
 
Restricting the stipulation of the AWS heralds the ‘[move] towards what the government 
is recommending, [a] flexible wage system’ (Interview 9b: 15). This ‘flexible wage 
system’ (Interview 9g: 6) represents a departure from ‘a rigid wage structure’ (Interview 
9g: 6) to one wherein companies are encouraged to ‘moderate wage increase’ (Interview 
9g: 6) in favour of bonuses which represent a ‘self-adjusting … variable payment [tied] 
with the company performance’ (Interview 9g: 7)234. 
 
Introduced in 1985, the flexible scheme had by the 1998 Crisis seen monthly salary to 
constitute 80% of annual wages with 20% in variable form (Interview 9g: 8)235. The 
current ‘recommendation is that [of the] 80% monthly, we should take out 10% and make 
                                                 
233
 Singapore Statutes Employment Act Cap. 91 Section 48 (3) – Because it contravenes the Employment 
Act.  
234
 (Interview 9b: 15) – However, ‘there is also a qualifier that [the] company come [sic] up with Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs), measurable standards of the company performance’. The shift towards a 
‘flexible wage system’ was made in 1987. 
235
 (Interview 9g: 8) – ‘The 20% include your 1 month [AWS] – the thirteenth month – and maybe another 
1 or 2 months bonus’. The AVC (Annual variable Component), which is based on the individual’s work 
performance should not be confused here with the AWS, which is based on the performance of the 
company.  
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it [a] monthly variable’ which together with the year end AWS make annual wages a 70-
10-20 ratio (Interview 9g: 8). 
 
‘The rationale for making this monthly 10% variable is, there is no longer going 
to be any CPF buffer in the future should we [Singapore] hit another recession. 
So it is up to individual employers to build up their own buffer’ (Interview 9g: 
8)236. 
In addition, a monthly variable is justified on the grounds that it helps ‘to save jobs’ since 
‘it may not be … possible for companies to hold on until the year end to cut the [AWS]’ 
(Interview 9g: 8), which leaves only the option of cutting headcount. 
 
The inability to stipulate more than 1 month of AWS into the collective agreement, wage 
structuring (and move towards a flexible wage system) on the ostensible pretext of 
[rewarding individual performance] (Interview 8: 10), and justified ‘from the national 
point of view, [to] make our country more attractive … to … investors’ (Interview 11: 
32), illustrate that unions are either subject to legislature or have had to align themselves 
according to national initiatives. 
 
5.5.7 Cooperation without Loss of Autonomy 
 
                                                 
236
 (Interview 9g: 7-8) – During the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent SARS and September 
11 attacks led the government to slash employer CPF contributions from 20% to 10%. Although it was 
subsequently restored to 16%, shorter economic cycles and the financial downturn has meant that ‘even the 
CPF is no longer a sacred cow’, and may have to be [tinkered] again in future in order to moderate wage 
costs. 
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Nowhere is this more pronounced than the NWC, a tripartite body ‘which meet every 
year to discuss on the national wage guidelines, [which is] important because it affects 
the investment climate of Singapore’ (Interview 6: 34). Its facilitation by the government 
suggests the latter is of central importance in setting the industrial climate and in 
maintaining the priority of economic investment.  
 
This apparent dominance of the government confirms the labour movement here as being 
of an authoritarian conception wherein labour unions an extension of the state are used to 
push ‘national agendas’ (Interview 9h: 11) (Martin 1989: 51). However, despite this 
dominance and the willingness of unions to ‘push for [policies like the flexible wage 
scheme]’ (Interview 9h: 12), the push stops short of coercion wherein acceptance still 
hinges ultimately on the willingness of the employer. 
 
More importantly, supporting national initiatives and doing so while exercising labour 
discipline is not perceived as a loss of trade union autonomy (Martin 1989: 74, 76, 79). In 
this case, even though the implementation of a flexible wage scheme is nationally 
directed, unions do not carry it out at the expense of their members’ interests.  
 
This is reflected in how unions assess the shift. Even though ‘a lot of employers … 
wanted to jump on the bandwagon’ with the announcement of the flexible wage scheme 
(Interview 9b: 15), unions were not always willing to make the switch especially when 
the newer terms and conditions were not spelled out clearly and gave the employer too 
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much discretion, or when the newer terms were seen as being unfavourable to the 
members (see Annex 5.21)237.  
 
On the part of the union, any shift to a flexible scheme must be backed by figures 
according and the union must be satisfied ‘that … it is achievable [and that] the 
benchmark is realistic’ (Interview 9b: 16). This means that there has to be ‘information 
sharing [the company] must be transparent …, and [they] must be prepared to open 
[their] audited results’ (Interview 9b: 16). It addition, it was emphasised that unions do 
not adhere blindly to tripartite recommendations nor will they tolerate employers who 
flagrantly take advantage of national initiatives (see Annex 5.22).  
 
Thus even if unions would ‘take the cue from [the] NTUC’ (Interview 9: 5) ‘national 
policy and guidelines’ (Interview 9: 5), and even though ‘labour policies tend to be pro-
employer’ (Interview 13: 24), LUL still view themselves as autonomous possessing the 
necessary discretion when it comes to the discussion and setting of terms on matters such 
as collective agreements238. 
 
Further, they have demonstrated that they were willing and able to exercise this. For 
example, unions have managed to avoid the call from the NTUC and the NWC to 
‘rationalise the benefits’ (Interview 9h: 18) in their collective agreements by simply ‘not 
                                                 
237
 In such instances, unions also had the backing of the government (see Annex 5.21).  
238
 (Interview 9: 5) – Using annual leave as the example, what the interviewee means when referring to 
autonomy is that they need not follow guidelines established by the NTUC, so even though the law 
(Employment Act Cap. 91 Section 43), may state that a maximum of 14 days annual leave, the union may 
formulate something different and need not keep within the bounds of the national standard.  
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[stating] in the collective agreement’ (Interview 9a: 54) some of the terms that they were 
able to negotiate for239. 
 
5.6 Labour Union Leaders (LUL) 
  
In this last section I will examine the role performed by LUL within the labour unions. In 
particular, attention will be paid to how LUL impart and perpetuate the ideological 
beliefs of the NTUC as they perform their role. In addition, I will examine how LUL 
come to possess these schemes and the process for their acceptance. 
 
5.6.1 Union Delegates  
 
There are two types of LUL. The first are union delegates, they enter the union as a result 
of being a unionised employee at a unionised firm. They are elected or chosen from 
amongst the membership of a unionised firm, to hold positions within the union, and 
comprise the majority of the members within the union EXCO. Often they are 
[volunteers, part-timers] (Interview 8: 2) – usually with the exception of the General-
Secretary and the President, which are usually full-time positions – who have taken on 
this appointment on top of their primary occupation. 
 
Union delegates are usually motivated to take on the appointment for several reasons: 
some join out of curiosity, [to see how things work then they drop out] (Interview 8: 11), 
                                                 
239
 (Interview 9h: 18) – To ‘rationalise the benefits’ means to ‘standardise’ them such that ‘the benefit must 
… have some relation to the work’.  
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while others do so because they wish to contribute [new ideas] (Interview 8: 11); [a lot of 
it is really about the self-satisfaction that comes about from helping solve other people’s 
problems] (Interview 8: 11). 
 
To perform their role, delegates need to be able to be ‘sincere’, be trusted and have good 
rapport with other members, and be willing to represent their concerns should they have 
any (see Annex 5.23). However, it is ‘not easy to draw people into the committee’ 
(Interview 9c: 2), as being a union delegate is a rather [thankless job with little perks] 
(Interview 8: 11), it often demands ‘commitment after work to attend the meetings and 
functions [and] there is also a lot of pressure’ (Interview 8: 11), with the [high turnover 
rate] (Interview 8: 11) being testimonial to this. 
 
But these are not the only reasons. For some who ‘are able but unwilling’ (Interview 9c: 
2), their rationale is that being a [union leader gives them too high a profile] which ‘may 
jeopardise their promotion prospect’ (Interview 9c: 2) plus ‘they know that it would make 
demands on their personal time’ (Interview 9c: 2)240. 
 
As such, current union officials have ‘to try to talent spot [to] renew leadership’ 
(Interview 9c: 2), looking for individuals who are [mature, good at handling human 
relations] (Interview 9c: 3), and who are interested and willing to help others, help 
disseminate information and generally ‘to be problem solvers for the members’ 
(Interview 9c: 5). 
                                                 
240
 (Interview 9c: 2) – In such cases, ‘it [also] depends on the company culture and the company’s attitude, 
the management’s attitude towards union’. 
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Still there are some who join ‘for their own personal benefit’ (Interview 9c: 5). These 
individuals will just ‘be concentrating on what affects them, not generally speaking for 
[the] general membership [and are] quite laissez faire’ (Interview 9c:5) (see Annex 
9.24). Faced with incapable or selfish leaders, unions are more likely to retain them if 
they ‘need them’ (Interview 9c: 3) or if there are no alternatives, particularly in a large 
organisation241.  
 
5.6.2 The IRO (Industrial Relations Officer) 
 
The other type of LUL is the professional IRO (Industrial Relations Officer). IROs ‘are 
representatives from the NTUC. They can work at the union and take charge of matters’ 
(Interview 4: 3). Except for larger unions who hire their own IROs, most IROs, who ‘are 
all graduates’ (Interview 10: 18), are hired and trained by the NTUC and later ‘seconded 
to the union’ (Interview 10: 18). There, they attend to ‘individual [grievance] cases [and 
they] do collective bargaining’ (Interview 11: 8), which constitutes the bulk of their 
work, taking up approximately 90% of their time (Interview 11: 9). 
 
Other than this, IROs also play a consultative role, ‘gathering feedback’ (Interview 9h: 4) 
from members, listening to their comments, and [conduct visits to various companies to 
see the branch committees] (Interview 8a: 10). But unlike union delegates, IROs need not 
                                                 
241
 (Interview 9c: 3-4) – ‘… once it’s like this, we’ll talk to the committee, whether you want to continue to 
serve or make way for others, and sometimes, we need them, we don’t want to drop them, but if they are 
there just occupying a seat we also don’t want to have that you know’. See also Annex 4.3. 
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stand for elections, they need ‘only [to] be appointed’ (Interview 9a: 60) to the union’s 
EXCO242. 
 
However, the services of the IROs are not free, with the union having to ‘reimburse’ the 
NTUC for the services of the IRO; the cost varying according to the experience of the 
IRO; [IROs from the NTUC possess different amount of experience, those who are newer 
will be paid less] (Interview 4: 4). Thus, the number of IROs a union have depends on 
[each union’s size and how much money it has] (Interview 4b: 19). 
 
Amongst the IROs, the Executive Secretary is the most senior. Within a union they have 
about the same authority as the General Secretary; ‘with the absence of the G.S. [General 
Secretary], he can run [the union] exactly like a G.S. … and he is not [an] elected 
leader’ (Interview 4a: 22) but possess voting rights within the union EXCO. 
 
5.6.3 The NTUC and Government Joint  
 
In some cases the Executive Secretary of the union is an MP. The position represents the 
key link between the NTUC and the political party; since MPs cannot enter the EXCO of 
the union in the way as union delegates, their only option is to be appointed into the 
EXCO, by ‘[becoming] E.S. of a union … then they can come into NTUC’ (Interview 4a: 
23). 
 
                                                 
242
 Not all IROs are appointed into the union EXCO, usually only the very senior ones.  
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The Executive Secretary can be appointed into the union with the sanction of the NTUC 
Secretary-General and the approval of the union’s General-Secretary.  From here on, if 
the Executive Secretary was an MP, he or she would be able to enter the NTUC as a 
delegate from the union as long as the union’s General-Secretary appoints them as a 
union delegate. If they ‘don’t create E.S. then not even one MP can sit in the EXCO of 
NTUC’ (Interview 4a: 27). 
 
The above suggests that in ‘exchange’ for taking in the MP, the latter will ‘take’ the 
union’s General-Secretary along into the NTUC Central Committee ‘because without his 
union he [the MP] cannot be here’ (Interview 4a: 24). For the non-MPs entering the 
Central Committee ‘no one is going in because of pay, only name and privileges only’ 
(Interview 4a: 25). 
 
This would be in the sense of getting ‘first hand information … if there’s a convention 
[they may] ask you to go, [or you may be asked to sit in a board as a director]’ 
(Interview 4a: 25). It was mentioned that some may ‘go to the union and say “see I’m in 
the NTUC central committee I’m so powerful, you cannot pay me this allowance, pay me 
double”’ (Interview 4a: 25)243. 
 
5.6.4 The Sacrifices of Appointment  
 
As a delegate from the ranks, the General-Secretary of the union is fundamentally still an 
employee of the firm although (most) work full-time at the union. In this situation, ‘if 
                                                 
243
 This statement however is uncorroborated.  
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[there is] a arrangement with the employer, [the] employer [will] continue to pay you 
salary’ (Interview 9a: 45-46) even though the individual is doing the work of the union. 
 
However, the individual is:  
‘still subject to election after three years, if you’re not elected you go back to your 
former job. Then [it is a question as to] whether the company still have a vacancy 
for you or not’ (Interview 9a: 46). 
 
But ‘during that three years you might lose out on what’s happening in the industry in the 
business’ (Interview 9a: 45), although the ‘[employers] are obliged to take you back 
[but] by then you [could be] too far, too long away from your job to fit [back] in’ 
(Interview 9a: 46), that’s the risk. ‘So these are the sacrifices’ (Interview 9a: 45) and it is 
a reason why workers are unwilling to join the union as a delegate. 
 
5.6.5 Professionalizing the Field and Maintaining the ‘Inner Consistency’ 
 
Representing the professionalisation of industrial relations IROs are seconded to the 
union primarily because its members are either unable or [just not qualified to run it] 
(Interview 4b: 20). Their presence will ensure the smooth running of the unions such that 
‘no matter what happen to the leaders, the union will [continue to] run smoothly’ 
(Interview 4b: 20). And because IROs are not subject to elections, their presence allows 




The use of IROs when negotiating with the management represents a desire to establish a 
more stable system, given the perceived objective position of the IRO, who perceivably 
does not have an immediate stake in what is being discussed, can help [avoid 
misunderstandings and escalations in conflict] (Interview 4c: 12-13). 
 
In this way they function as arbiters, not only do they look at the demands of workers to 
determine what is achievable and what is not but they also have supervisory role such as 
ensuring that the ‘company [is] paying according to their key performance indicators’ 
(Interview 9i: 17). However, arguing that the acceptance of ideological schemes is rooted 
in everyday practices and interaction, the main difficulty is also trying to show how these 
practices play out without coming across as convenient or forced. 
 
For IROs, socialisation into their role (through training) begins at the point of joining the 
NTUC. This represents an attempt at ‘partial-transformation’ wherein they are inducted 
not only into the interpretive schemes and understanding of the NTUC’s organisational 
goals, but also the skill training necessary for them to carry out their assigned roles 
(Berger et al 1966; 158). The ‘biggest role’ of which is [to implement the policies of the 
NTUC] (Interview 4b: 30). 
 
This socialisation is maintained and reinforced through the rudiments of ‘reality’, the 
everyday experiences found within routines (in this case, their job), as one interviewee 
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said the ‘only way to learn IR [Industrial Relations] is when you’re on the job’ (Interview 
10: 32) (Berger et al 1966: 168-169). 
 
This encompasses not only the processes of conducting collective bargaining, why it is 
done and the manner in which it is carried out, but also more mundane and seemingly 
unimportant methods such as the role played by both IROs and union delegates in 
keeping correspondence with branch members, which helps affirm both the routine of the 
‘taken-for-granted world’ and by extension, the taken-for-granted reality (Berger et al 
1966: 173-174). 
 
Apart from routines, subjective reality is also maintained through crisis maintenance 
(Berger et al 1966: 174-175). Aside from the ‘what not to do’ lessons that may be 
gleaned from the SIA debacle, interviewees have tended to be dismissive towards 
‘alternative’ and more confrontational approaches of industrial relations, which are seen 
as ‘western conception of trade unions’ (Interview 17: 2). 
 
The sanctions whether through direct government intervention, chastisement or ridicule 
represents the ‘explicit and intensive’ measures deemed necessary for extraordinary 
situations, aimed at keeping the ‘subjective-reality’ from breaking down till such time 
when more permanent remedies may be established (Berger et al 1966: 175-176). 
 
The most ostensible being the process of selecting and renewing leadership. While there 
is currently no ‘conscious effort’ (Interview 9c: 1) to renew the leadership at the branch 
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level, IROs working with the branch do look out for suitable people possessing the right 
qualities and try to initiate them into the union, in this sense the union does ‘make a 
conscious effort … to nurture … leadership’ (Interview 9c: 4)244. 
 
In this way, the IRO acts as the ‘mentor’ whose role is to help ‘develop their leadership 
potential’ (Interview 9c: 10-11) to ‘coach them how to handle problems [and guide them 
on] how to approach [the] management’ (Interview 9d: 7). With the exception of 
‘technical matters [such as] labour legislation’ (Interview 9c: 14), the IRO tries to keep a 
‘light touch on the committee’ (Interview 9c: 14) as much as possible. This stems from 
the belief that ‘the [IRO] should be unbiased, [and] take whoever is elected …, work with 
the committee [and] develop them’ (Interview 9c: 15).  
 
But despite this, IROs still (sometimes) exercise influence and ‘are expected to’ 
(Interview 9c: 29) to when deciding who gets elected into the branch committee. This 
means: 
‘eliminating [who they] think have ulterior motives; not so much as to be so 
selective or elitist [but] more [because] we don’t want people who come in with 
bad motives, or self-interest’ (Interview 9c: 29). 
 
This applies to individuals with ‘have some hidden agendas’ (Interview 9c: 29) and wish 
to further their own agenda through the union, this is especially so for individuals with 
                                                 
244
 (Interview 9c: 4) – In the case of workers who are ‘willing to serve but they … don’t know how to 
organise themselves’ the IRO would ‘help them [by organising] regular committee meetings at a common 
place, [helping] them to maintain communication’. 
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‘political motives’ (Interview 9c: 29)245. In this context, people who are members of the 
opposition party will not be permitted. Although there are no legislative restrictions, this 
is rationalised as being for ‘internal housekeeping’ (Interview 9c: 30) since: 
‘the labour movement has identified itself with the ruling party …  if you want to 
be a union leader under a union that is affiliated to NTUC you should similarly 
subscribe to the same ideals’ (Interview 9c: 29). 
 
‘So if you [don’t] subscribe to this philosophy [of] tripartism and working with 
the ruling party… you shouldn’t  even be a union leader – if you are a member of 
an opposition party whose philosophy may you know not be in sync’ (Interview 
9c: 31) 
In this way, IROs help to maintain the norms and values as well as the inner consistency 
of the system. 
 
Training however is not confined only to IROs, union delegates are also sent for 
training246. The view is that this ‘will help [change the mindset and attitude] of these 
workers’ (Interview 9d: 11). Although what we have here is not ‘alternation’ – where 
there is [total re-socialisation] – as it lacks the same intensity, it does run in a similar vein 
given that it appears as an attempt to either maintain or further entrench the LUL’s (in 
this case union delegates’) subjective reality (Berger et al 1966: 166-167, 176). 
                                                 
245
 See also Annex 5.5. 
246
 The introductory industrial relations course which introduces the concept of unionism covers the 
following topics: 1) History and development of the labour movement in Singapore, 2) Organisational 
structure of unions, 3) Fraternal relations with other overseas unions, 4) IR framework in Singapore, 5) 
Process of collective bargaining, negotiation and arbitration, 6) leadership, roles and responsibilities, 7) 
Handling grievances, 8) Topical issues, current affairs and challenges to workers – e.g. seniority wage 
system, older workers etc.  
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For both IROs and union delegates, their subjective view and understanding of what trade 
unions are and how trade unionism should be, is constantly reinforced during their 
interaction with each other through their routine of carrying out their union work (Berger 
et al 1966: 168-169). This reality is further reaffirmed through their interaction with 
significant members (labour MPs) who embody this subjective reality and in similar 
fashion reinforce it during their participation within union affairs, thereby creating an 
overall socially integrating effect (Berger et al 1966: 170-171). 
 
5.7 Summary  
 
The aim in this chapter is to present the empirical data collected during the course of 
research with respect to the role and function played by NTUC-affiliated unions and their 
LUL. To this end examination was made of how the NTUC and its labour unions are 
organised internally as well as in terms of the legislative structural framework governing 
labour unions and what they do247. In addition, the role and function of LUL and the 
manner in which they carry out their work is also explained. 
 
All this is done with the intention of addressing and supporting the primary thesis, which 
is that labour unions contribute on the overall social integration and stability. Our 
argument being that this is as much the result of legal-structural norms as it is due to the 
everyday practices. Structurally, the legal system helps greatly in containing conflict. By 
                                                 
247
 With occasional references to earlier chapters e.g. Chapter 1. 
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legislating arbitration and emphasising conciliation together with tripartite cooperation 
enables the peaceful resolution of conflicts but also help prevent their escalation. 
 
More importantly, our argument is that the function of integration is found in the day-to-
day practices performed by LUL, who in the course of performing them not only 
reinforces the socialisation process but also serve to legitimise the initial conception. As 
we explained in the previous chapter, this view hinges on the thematic duality between 
structure and agency wherein the continued maintenance of the system of industrial 
relations is only possible if there is support from those who inhabit the structure, which 
are the LUL, the practitioners. To this end, the function of social integration performed 
by labour unions is rooted and tied to the socialisation process of LUL. 
 
These processes which we have pointed out throughout the chapter are not obvious given 
that they are part of the everyday take-for-granted. With the exception of more ostensible 
methods such as the careful selection of LUL and training, routine aspects like role 
performance are all part of the routinised everyday aspects248. It is this everyday taken-
for-granted factors which aid in the socialisation process and the integration of the 
individuals within it. 
 
                                                 
248
 This includes the participation in negotiation, mediation of conflicts or dissemination of news and 
information to union members, interaction with others, witnessing chastisements which indirectly validate 
the current system, the absence of alternative systems, and the personal experience of individual LUL. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
Focused contextually on the labour movement in Singapore, this thesis asserts that labour 
unions function primarily as conduits for social integration. This assertion is made in 
relation to the support given by the dominant coalition of labour unions under the aegis of 
the NTUC to the government and its principle practice of adopting a ‘non-
confrontational’ approach to industrial relations.   
 
While historical-structural linkages have undeniably played a role in its establishment, it 
is the views and attitudes of LULs (labour union leaders) that have enabled the non-
confrontational system of union practices to persist. This was shown to be possible 
because of the support from LULs, which results from a conscious decision-making 
process wherein the decisions and views of LULs are shaped not only by the existing 
objective set of social-structural conditions but also by their own subjective experiences, 
rooted in the routine day-to-day practices. 
 
In chapter 1, I examined the organisation of the NTUC, focusing on the leadership system 
as well as the system of collective bargaining and conflict resolution. Chapter 3 traced the 
historical development of Singapore’s current labour movement and identified the key 
events and development within the broader political-economic framework and the NTUC 
which influenced the nature and trajectory of the labour movement’s development. 
Theoretically, tracing these [historical forces] (Interview 16: 12) helps us understand how 
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the current institutional structure of the labour movement and the ‘habitualised actions’ of 
its social actors is legitimised (Berger et al 1966: 71-72). 
 
The examination of union typologies in chapter 4 identified Singapore’s labour 
movement as an authoritarian state-ancillary type that is subordinate to a dominant 
political party. Following this, I identified the salient features of Simmel’s conception of 
conflict which enable conflicting groups to respond in a way that leads to an overall 
socially integrative effect. 
 
While this underlines the importance of practice and the roles played by individuals in the 
maintenance of the structure, it also raises the issue of ‘value consensus’ and the question 
as to why a particular value (embodied by the system) comes to be accepted in the first 
place; a query which invariably carries the accusation of ‘false consciousness’ (Mann 
1970: 423). 
 
This was addressed through the adoption of Mannheim’s conception of ideology, which 
focuses on the ‘inner consistency’ of thought systems rather than their ‘relativistic’ 
aspects (Mannheim 1991: 64-66). This returns focus to the individual, and calls for an 
examination of how individuals understand and interpret their reality, a theoretical gap 
filled by Berger and Luckmann’s treatise on the construction of reality. 
 
Stating the people understand reality through their experiences, Berger and Luckmann’s 
treatise examined how individuals create and interpret meaning within the context of 
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everyday life, which possesses both objective and subjective forms of reality. While 
objective reality is legitimated through institutions, it still needs to be understood and 
interpreted through the subjective experiences of the individual, which applied to our 
consideration, comes through the socialisation of LUL to the meanings, goals and 
interpretive schemes of the labour movement. 
 
In the last chapter, I used the empirical views and perspectives of LULs towards the 
structural features than encourages social integration to address the thesis’s concern, as 
well as to capture both the objective reality and the routine day-to-day activities that 
LULs are engaged in, which aid in their ‘acceptance’ of the NTUC’s views and 
interpretive schemes. 
 
Thematically, the (structural) constraints and limitations labour unions and LULs work 
under, makes it enticing to claim that the quiescence and compliance from LULs as well 
as union members (i.e. workers) results from ‘pragmatic acceptance’, which is where 
individuals ‘[comply] because [they] perceive no realistic alternative’ (Mann 1970: 425).  
 
Such a statement is difficult to refute, but it is not possible to agree with it totally either; 
although there is a noticeable dearth of choice and options, agents have been shown to be 
able to work within the limitations of the system. In addition, it appears to apply more to 
union members, for whom there is little chance to take a ‘non-NTUC’ option, than it does 
to LULs (particularly IROs), who have shown at times a willingness to capitalise on 
structural ambiguity to pursue their aims. If anything, the charge of pragmatic acceptance 
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has served to highlight the importance of LULs, whose role aids in the maintenance of 
the system. If change is to occur, it needs to take place from within. 
 
However whether or not this is possible remains questionable, especially since 
Singapore’s labour movement is an authoritarian state-ancillary type, which prioritises 
‘national interests’ and economic productionism. While it is difficult to dismiss the 
consternations of vulnerability, it should also be recognised that excessive top-down 
control and restriction in focus will discourage any counter status quo initiatives and 
weaken the labour movement’s organic ability to renew itself, thereby weakening in the 
long term, its ability to respond to changes and new challenges.  




Labour Structurally Weak 
 
 






Subordinated ‘Partnership’  
Phase II (1969-1979) 
Dependent ‘Partnership’   
Phase III till present  








Phase I (1954-1968) 
Null  
 
How then can we situate the Singapore labour movement, particularly in its relationship 
with the development-oriented state? Adapting Eva Bellin’s matrix of mapping state-
labour relation based on the state’s ‘political confidence’ and the ‘relative strength of 
labour’s structural position’, we can map a periodic state of state-labour relation based on 
the different development phases (Bellin 2002: 87)249.  
                                                 
249
 See Chapter 3.  
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In pre-independence Phase I, which predates the formation of the (developmental) state, 
political parties leveraged on organised labour to jostle for power. This might be 
considered a period of ‘genuine’ cooperative partnership. Come post-independence in 
Phase II, the ascendancy of the state and its development focus, also spelled the 
subordination of labour. By Phase III a dependent relationship had emerged.  
 
If anything, the matrix shows that the developmental state’s relationship with labour is 
characteristically complex, since labour’s goals, in particular that of ‘economic 
distribution’ clashes with the ‘developmental state’s logic of accumulation’ (Bellin 2002: 
86). And labour’s ‘organisational agenda’ to develop ‘capacity for collective action’ 
threaten the developmental state’s aim to keep an ‘uncontested grip on power’.  
 
But despite this, organised labour’s ‘capacity to deliver organised political support’ 
makes it a crucial ‘political ally’ for the developmental state, who would wish to sponsor 
and leverage on it to ‘deliver social peace’ and achieve wage restraint at the same time, 
(Bellin 2002: 86). It is this balancing act that characterises the relationship between the 
developmental state and organised labour within Singapore. The issue is the extent of the 
balance.  
 
While Phase II established the subordination of labour, Phase III onwards was focused 
more on sponsoring organised labour’s development in a way that complemented the 
state’s corporatist development strategy. This ‘simultaneous embrace of sponsorship and 
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repression’ has since characterised the relationship between state and organised labour 
(Bellin 2002: 86).  
 
It is unlikely that this relationship would change in the near future given Singapore’s 
embrace of globalisation and dependency on FDI (foreign direct investment), which 
makes private capital more autonomous and independent, placing pressure on the state to 
enact policies that guarantees capital’s interests and give it confidence (Bellin 2002: 47, 
49).  
 
The successful modernisation and reinvention of the labour movement along corporatist 
lines and its acceptance of economic neoliberalism – which the West belatedly mooted as 
‘The Third Way’; a way to meet the demands of the new global economy – may have 
made the labour movement a victim of its own success (Blair et al 1999; Giddens 1998: 
6-8). This is due to the successful management and containment of conflict having led to 
the ‘ossification’ in its ability and motivation to innovate and respond creatively (Coser 
1957: 197). 
 
If anything, the current unionised group of workers occupy a relatively privileged 
position, given that they enjoy the benefits of representation such as protection and 
collective bargaining, such that they may be regarded as a ‘labour aristocracy’ – ‘skilled, 
unionised and [better off]’ than most other workers (Lummis 1994: 1). Certainly they are 
in a better position than the rising class of ‘contingent workers’ that have been spawned 
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as a result of market liberalisation and the endeavour ‘not to introduce rigidity to the 
labour market’ (Interview 6: 21) 
 
Several reasons have been given for the employment of ‘contingent workers’: [relieving 
costs, to supplement current staff and to ‘maintain jobs’] (Interview 8: 4), the latter – 
which is essentially achieved by [giving the company flexibility without having to 
increase staffing] (Interview 8: 4) – being ironic since it is a perspective offered from 
point-of-view of the union.  
 
Yet, despite the acknowledgement that [outsourcing will weaken the unions] (Interview 
4: 2) as it results in the loss of union members, and the potential pool of new members 
that the burgeoning pool of contingent workers represent, not to mention that these tend 
to be the most vulnerable ‘[and] are living from hand to mouth’ (Interview 9a: 16), there 
has been little response from unions to this trend.  
 
From the point-of-view of the union, this is a ‘grey market … that is difficult to unionise’ 
(Interview 9i: 23) primarily because the tenure of workers are not fixed. The need 
however is unmistakeable, not only does [this group of workers not know their rights] 
(Interview 9i: 23), but because they can be so easily laid off, they cannot even protest or 
make complaints when they do not receive the ‘basic benefits that workers are supposed 
to receive’ (Interview 14: 2), putting them in a doubly disadvantaged position.  
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The need to give representation to this group of workers stems not only from their 
obvious vulnerability and tendency to be exploited but also because ‘contract labour is 
going to be very common and [will not just] apply to the low skill’ (Interview 9i: 25). 
However, efforts should ‘not just [include] the local workers [but should also include] 
foreign workers’ (Interview 5a: 39) as well.  
 
This represents the new challenge for the NTUC and its labour unions, a test not only of 
its efficacy as a social-policy platform but also of its continued institutional relevance to 
give voice and represent workers’ concerns, while balancing the demands of the ‘national 
interest’ and global capitalism (Coats 2005: 54). 
 
If anything, this thesis has shown that unions still have a relevant role to play, and barring 
any unforeseen events are likely to continue to operate and exist. The issue is what would 
be its form and scope. While it is tempting to attribute this responsibility solely to the 
state and the political leaders, the fact is it is also dependent on union leaders, how they 
respond to the changing industrial landscape and their social aspirations.  
 
While state sponsorship might have provided an initial motivation for organised labour to 
ally with it, the continued support the state enjoys from organised labour despite its pro-
capitalist stance does suggests that the state addresses the social aspiration of organised 
labour, who has decided that its long-term interests is aligned with that of the state rather 




Annex 1.1  
 
Summary: The excerpt below shows the difficulty and frustration faced by an interviewee 
when trying to provide evidential and verifiable documentary wrongdoing by the 
employer to the Industrial Arbitration Court. In this case, the difficulty lay in proving that 
workers were coerced into working overtime, and the difficulty in negotiating legal 
interpretations. Figures have been replaced by ‘x’ to preserve anonymity. 
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
The worker they have a reporting time, going off time. Also, there is a card for the 
management to compute all these. Compute all these and calculate the working hours. 
Now, this is the number of [days] and then … the total number of hour worked and then 
the total number of overtime. But … when this go to the dispute … the registrar you 
know, he say “where the evidence? How you are saying that the worker work overtime?” 
 
I say it’s the punch card. … Now, supposing, you know … the management … have 
forward all these to the union … to compute, … then … I manage to calculate … and 
work out the total number of hours they work, the total amount of overtime …. This is by 
itself an evidence that the worker has been working here is x hours.  
 
Worked … by the workers during a period of x years.  
 
[By] x workers.  
 
And these x workers have been working x, the average is roughly about x hours. The 
average per year is x [hours]. x hours is roughly about … x month working hours is x, x 
months. Now, x month, … the overtime rate is more and then you have to at least x 
months …. But the management is not paying them, and then … the management produce 
all this evidence you know, to show the court saying that, … they work by themselves. 
That’s the thing, they work by themselves.  
 
The management just make them to sign and produce to the court as evidence. … Then 
the court accept it. … at first I thought the court won’t accept it, but the court still accept 
it. If the court accept it, … because it is arbitration court, I cannot challenge. I can’t 
challenge because it is arbitrate. … they [make] the worker … sign two time or three 
times you know, all the time … saying that … the management not asking them to work 
overtime….  
 
… they make the worker sign all those document, then they show to the court. This is the 
evidence by the management show to the court. … this is the thing! [It asked if] the hotel 
management ask [the worker to work], then they make the worker to answer “Chong lai 
mei you”, that means [they have never].  
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… “Does the hotel owe you any payment or overtime money? Chong lai mei you”, that 
means never. They make all the worker sign, it’s written by them, they make the worker 
all sign. … You see? And then they produce this as evidence. They produce this as 
evidence to the court.  
 




Interview excerpts:   
 
‘…you know about this Industrial Relations Act? You know this law … under the 
provision there are referee, in the older day I know who are the referee because they 
send me a list, nowadays there is no referee. Maybe they have I wouldn’t know, they 
don’t send. Now [there are] a lot of rules and regulation, previously, we know what step 
to be taken, nowadays even though I go to see the registrar, the registrar wouldn’t know. 
Then he ask me why you know about it? I said I have taken up this law in the past, … I 
know that under the law you can apply to the court, ask them to appoint a referee to help 
you to dispute and all these sort of thing, but if you don’t have all these then what 
happen? … 
 
Like suppose certain rules and regulation supposing you have a piece of collective 
agreement and if you look into … the provision of the Industrial Relations Act, you need 
to rephrase it … for the worker to read but now you can go to various company and see if 
any management has done it or not, none. Now … even certain thing you want … there is 
certain rules and regulation like making application and this and that … if you don’t go 
through you wouldn’t know. And then now, if the court is not coming out for hearing, 
even the format how to make application also no one know how to do it you see.’  
 
(Interview 5a: 30) 
 
Annex 4.1  
 
Summary: The excerpt below is a response from a unionist renouncing the use of 
industrial action as a means for improving working benefits such as wages and working 
conditions.  
 
Interview excerpts:  
 
‘…the way is not to strike, the way is not to, you know, go on the streets. It’s not to 
confront. The way is to find some, find some platform, sit down, talk about it, put 
forward. Any employer want to see a happy workforce. No employer want to waste time 
over know a workforce that is very unhappy. So if there are unhappiness, and they can 
address the issue and it cost them not very much, they will go ahead and address it. So 
that’s the most pragmatic way to do it. I have seen you know all over Barcelona 
everywhere you know people organise all kinds of funny things, but when I ask them what 
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they have achieved? They have achieved very little. And they marvel at the kind of things 
we have achieved. Although in a official platform they will say that oh you know oh no 
we, we are not doing what we can you know as a trade union you know. …They say we 
listen to government, we work too closely with employer, but when you ask them in terms 
of unemployment, in terms of benefits, in terms of assistance, they have very little what 
compared to us.’  
 
(Interview 10: 63-64) 
 
Annex 4.2  
 
According to Mannheim, ideology may be separated into, the particular and the total 
(Mannheim 1991: 49). The particular conception of ideology expresses scepticism over 
ideas and representations presented by people, viewing them as a guise for the ‘real 
nature of a situation’, because the true portrayal would not be ‘in accord with his 
interests’ (Mannheim 1991: 49). This conception takes the individual’s psychology its 
level of analysis, and designates only a part of the ‘opponent’s’ claim as ideologies; the 
view being that it was a deliberate act carried out through lies, distortion and the 
concealment of factual circumstances to further the individual’s self-interests (Mannheim 
1991: 49-52). But such falsities and distortions can be identified because both parties 
share ‘common criteria of validity’ (Mannheim 1991: 50-51). 
 
The total conception of ideology on the other hand, which is more inclusive, refers to the 
ideology of a group within a particular socio-historical milieu (Mannheim 1991: 49-50). 
What is questioned here is ‘the opponent’s total Weltanschauung’ and ‘conceptual 
apparatus’, which needs to be understood as an outcome of his ‘collective life’ in which 
he engages in (Mannheim 1991: 50; Mannheim 1993: 140-141)250. Unlike the particular 
conception of ideology, differences in thought-content here occur at the noological level, 
and arise because of ‘fundamentally [different] thought-systems and widely differing 
modes of experience and interpretation’, which results in different perspectives 
(Mannheim 1991: 51).  
 
However, entire though-systems are not as easily discerned as group ideology, wherein 
individuals react similarly in similar circumstances. The integration of individual 
experiences would not reveal a thought-system – which is the ‘systematic theoretical 
basis underlying [individual judgements]’ – because individuals do not experience all the 
elements of an outlook, only particular aspects of it (Mannheim 1991: 52). Hence at the 
level of the individual, we can only hope to uncover ideological conceptions that deal 
                                                 
250
 Mannheim 1991: Weltanschauung may be interpreted here as ‘world view’; Mannheim 1993: The 
concept of Weltanschauung is an extremely complex one, with the ‘entity that it denotes [lying] outside the 
province of theory’. ‘The global outlook of an age is or of a creative individual is wholly contained in their 
philosophical and theoretical utterances; you need only to collect these utterances and arrange them in a 
pattern, and you have taken hold of a Weltanschauung’.  
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with specific content – that would allow us to point out lies and falsehoods – rather then 
whole thought-system (Mannheim 1991: 52-53, 57)251. 
 
Annex 4.3  
 
Summary: Interviewee is describing how the union tries to convey information to 
members. Figures and the description of organisations have been replaced by ‘x’ to 
preserve anonymity.  
 
Interview excerpts:  
 
‘It is a big organisation you cannot have just x committee, x reps, for x especially you 
know, … the x professional is one big group and then the non-x professional, … so all 
these uh we need different people to take care … either base on occupational groupings 
to take care of them or on department grouping, you know, you take of the laboratory, 
you take care of store, you take care of the kitchen … So you need a big committee … 
these are more challenging than say a small office, a small trading office, everyone is on 
one building, on one level, … I need just three person you know, and even if three out of 
two, two out of three are not active, one person could still run the show, because most 
likely you can just see everyone, and … probably all with desktop and email you know, 
one message you just broadcast to everyone.  
 
Whereas [in some] organisation, sometimes people don’t work at their desk, no, no email 
account you know, today not all company provide staff with the email account, so you 
still need people, to reach out to the people, … people to people contact is very 
important.  
 
Big and diverse group and sometimes companies whereby there are different … so they 
will need people from each store, even the store you have different levels right? And they 
work shifts right? Morning afternoon shift, … so you will need more … committee 
members and it is a challenge also to get this committee to come together, to meet 
regularly. So as the industrial relations person in charge, we have to make a conscious 
effort to nurture the leadership … getting them in is one thing, sometimes you can get 
them in they are interested they are willing to serve but they don’t know how, they don’t 
know how to organise themselves together. So we have to consciously help them to have 
regular say committee meetings at a common place, help them to maintain 
communication.’ 
 
Interview (9c: 4) 
 
Annex 4.4  
 
                                                 
251
 The close interrelation between psychological perceptions and noological level of worldviews means 
that the distinction between the particular and the total conception of ideology is more easily done at the 
conceptual level than in reality where they are often intertwined. (p.53, 57) 
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Summary: Interviewee is describing the attitude of union members; union members who 
have more interest will make the effort to seek out more information and participate 
within the unions and its activities. Our expectation is that union leaders who are ‘more 
involved’ are likely to identify more closely with the objectives of the union and of the 
labour movement compared with those who are more ‘apathetic’.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘… unless I have a need, if I am the type of uh active person and I [am] really interested I 
join this union, I want to find out what is really happening, what are the activities, then I 
will make the effort to check out with my branch officials and if they don’t know, 
sometimes they don’t know, then I will ask them to give me the contact number and I will 
call up you know and make enquiries. We have members like that, they will call up, “and 
what kind of courses can I attend?”, “what kind of benefits?”. So it’s more a personal 
thing that people depend on their own needs and their own motivation, generally most 
people just go about life, if I don’t need I don’t go and call and I don’t even want to 
attend if you call a meeting, it doesn’t matter who is the chairman. It’s that kind of, you 
call it apathy … we don’t have that kind of strong activism you know at the individual 
level la.  
 
… those who are really interested, they will take an effort, they will go and attend the 
rally, go and listen, they will go and visit the website, the blogs and participate. Other 
than that the rest, apathetic. Whatever will be will be.’ 
 




Summary: The following two excerpts illustrate the relationship between the NTUC and 
individual labour unions. In the first, the interviewee discusses the role played by the 
NTUC in establishing broad national agendas, while the second highlights one such 
example.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘We will take the cue form the national body, basically why? Because they are the 
planners, they are the people who look ahead and see what is going to happen five years 
down the road and they think that you know they should start taking action now. For 
example, extending retirement age’ 
 
(Interview 9h: 19) 
 
‘Flexible wage system is another … big topic that is being promoted by the government 
and that is in the National Wages Council recommendation every year, for employers to 
move towards a more flexible wage system.’ 
 
 217 




Summary: The interviewee is describing the circumstances under which union members 
decide to take up union membership and the circumstances that would draw them to act 
together as a concerted group.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘[They] just join for the benefits. Unless they, usually they are galvanised by some issue, 
work issue, if there has been some sacking recently and they feel that it is not right then 
they all will [join], … it will bring people together, it may be me, it may be you the next 
time round, let’s do something. And they will, … they themselves will activate. Other than 
that it’s like, hey it’s ok you know, no need for union, you know.’ 
 




Summary: In the excerpt, the interviewee describes the how heated negotiations between 
union leaders and management can get. But yet, both parties try to separate personal 
feelings from official duties.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
[The union delegates and the management talk like friends, yes they may raise their 
voices and shout at each other even when negotiating but outside of the room they can all 
go and ‘lim kopi’ [have coffee] together. This he explains is keeping work and personal 
feelings separately. He believes that at the end, the aim is to reach a decision that can 
benefit everyone. The industrial relations committee which comprises of members of the 
union EXCO meets once a month and is the body that decides on any agreement made 
between the union and the management. In addition, the union’s EXCO will meet with the 
management once a month as well, whether or not there is anything to discuss. The 
reasons for this he explains is to show to the management and vice versa that ‘yes, we are 
with you] 
 




Summary: In this full excerpt, the interviewee shares how investors make feedback 
through government bodies when they are unhappy with the unions. This seems to 
substantiate the concerns of the union.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
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‘… you publish and tell people that you have 4,000 over cases settle at the union level, 
then the investors will say, actually sound problem you know dealing with unions. So 
there’s always a flip side. We are too small a country, we always worry, worry that the 
investors don’t come.  
 
It is true, we have investors who actually you know through EDB have got to us, 
sometimes you know to tell us their concerns. And EDB sometimes also will call us and 
say that “this company complain to us you know, they are very unhappy you know this 
issue cannot resolve with you all”.’ 
 
(Interview 10: 40-41) 
 
Annex 5.5  
 
Summary: Here, the interviewee is responding to the question of the basis of judging who 
gets elected into the branch committee, and the role played by the IRO in the selection 
process.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
Question: ‘… in terms of having say influencing the who gets in and who doesn’t, into the 
branch committee …, what is the basis of uh judging who gets in and who shouldn’t? The 
IRO to, you know, exercise some kind of influence over the process?’  
 
Reply: ‘They are expected to … They are expected to. … We should be on, basically it’s 
uh more a case of eliminating we think have ulterior motives, not so much as to be so 
selective or elitist or whatever, what more we don’t want people who come in with bad 
motives, or own self interest or now, nowadays of course the other question is whether 
they have political motives or not … political two things, you can talk about political in 
terms of the wider politics, whether they are people who are members of opposition party 
… yah that can be dicey situation. The other political thing I think we can put it generally 
as bad motives, you know that they have some hidden agenda. Yah, they have some 
hidden agenda, they probably have some issue with the management, and they hope to 
advance their cause for their own interest through the committee.’ 
 
(Interview 9c: 29) 
 
Annex 5.6  
 
Summary: The rationale for the close relationship between the union and government can 
be traced to the 1970s.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
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‘In the 1980s, the NTUC will have a more difficult role in an economy grown more 
complex and sophisticated, and with organising a workforce which is better educated, 
better trained, and with higher expectations. To do this, more talent must be inducted into 
the leadership, men with ability and dedication, men who can work closely and patiently 
with grass-root union leaders to bring the Singaporean worker up to world standards of 
skills and professionalism. 
 
The progress of the past 20 years was made possible because of the close, almost 
inseparable, ties between the leaders of the PAP and the NTUC. In fact they are one 
leadership’  
 
(Lee 1980: 5) 
 
Annex 5.7  
 
Summary: The emplacement of MPs in unions is also driven by internal pressures faced 
by the unions, especially since there is no leadership renewal as workers themselves 
aspire for upward social mobility.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘But the reality of it is that where, as the economy as we develop and our life improve, 
unionised workers also want a better life for their children, so they want their children to 
go for tertiary to have a profession, a better life. So the better ones don’t stay in the 
working class to that extent there becomes a dearth of leadership, in that sense, that kind 
of calibre. So there has to be something done to fill this vacuum, which is why 
government has step forward injected labour MPs from outside to represent workers. We 
still do have workers rep as labour MP but a number of them are now like seconded to 
the labour movement.’ 
 




Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘In the nature of union organisations, as compared to that of political parties, a curious 
contradiction has arisen between the PAP and the NTUC; it is one which has the seeds of 
potential conflict if the present PAP-NTUC relationship is not institutionalised and made 
durable before a younger generation of leaders has taken over charge of both 
organisations. 
  
… In Singapore, only the overriding authority of the political leadership saves the 
country from unnecessary conflict; for if challenged, the union leadership knows it must 
fact the collision of wills; few union leaders can doubt the outcome of such a clash, … if 
the union leadership challenges the political leadership, political leaders must triumph, 
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… by changing the ground rules to thwart the challenge, using legislative and 
administrative powers, and, when necessary, backed by the mandate of the electorate.’ 
 




Summary: Interviewee is making a comparison between the union leaders of the past and 
those of the present. While the government is complicit in its development, it also faces 
its own constraints.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘I think we are living in a state, very difficult to state you know, … we have really don’t 
have these what you call union leaders anymore in the older days … I can say only when 
I work, during the first 10 to 15 years that … have the leader from the ground, then after 
those union leader disappear. That is first generation leaders, and then after that we 
don’t, we don’t seem to be there anymore. Very difficult to have leaders.’  
 
… the government definitely want to build the image that … the labour movement in 
Singapore is under control, and they don’t want to give the impression … that they are 
going hard on those management … I think also very difficult for the government to help, 
to build, when the workers have no leader, how the government can provide a leader? … 
I’m quite sure you know … very few people are still aware of the practices, a lot of 
practices which have gone’ 
 
(Interview 5a: 13) 
 
Annex 5.10  
 
Summary: In the excerpt below an interviewee discusses the rationale for the acceptance 
of how the labour movement is organised in Singapore and the industrial relations model, 
premised on the symbiotic relationship between government and the labour movement 
under, which they operate.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘… the proof if it is what you see, is the working population worse off than it would have 
been if we had modelled ourselves on the west rather than you know, fashion our own 
unique model of IR in Singapore working in synergy with government and employers, 
because our destiny as a small nation is very vulnerable.  
 
… how long is their [the West’s] history? How long is our history? So when we first gain 
independence in 1959 and without the reform, without the cooperation, tripartism, we 
could have easily gone the way of a lot of other newly independent countries, they are not 
thriving as well today as Singapore right? 
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Yah they could have government leader who become corrupt and self-serving. …, they 
have free democratic union, how free? After a time, working class is the one who suffer, 
when the economy goes down, the country gets impoverished because of corrupt leaders. 
So good and bad, but overall I would say it is the good over the bad, that we have a close 
working relationship and we a government that also works towards elevating the status 
of labour. And you’d be surprised that the fact that we have a cabinet minister in NTUC 
and all it helps with certain employers’  
 




Summary: The interviewee discusses what it means to be a popular leader, comparing 
NTUC leaders of the present with those of the past. By so doing, the interviewee is also 
capturing the change in the type of leaders that appear nowadays in the union.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘Popular is different, like from the old days, like Devan Nair is popular as a leader, just 
thrown up, these are the real true blue labour leaders … he was from the Teachers’ 
Union and … they are themselves from the grassroot, and that sense of comradeship, 
understanding workers’ woes and their needs and concern. Today the top leadership are 
more inducted that they are at different level, they are scholars’.  
 




Summary: The strategic importance of the larger unions does not seem to be lost on 
political nominees who wish to enter the labour movement. The excerpt sees an 
interviewee describing why it is difficult for a Secretary-General designate to the labour 
movement to lose or fail to be elected, while also discusses the powers of the Secretary-
General in particular to appoint individuals. There is the suggestion that entering large 
unions is helpful for this purpose.   
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘… hard for him not to win. You see the thing is, he get all the exposure, he has been 
slotted to vote and to sit now as a deputy, the constitution allow Sec Gen to appoint, that 
again constitution allow to appoint deputy Sec Gen without going through voting. You 
say “not fair you know, the constitution is approved by the delegate last time”. Unless we 
challenge, change the constitution, then all the delegates vote for it, change the 
constitution. We need to mobilise so many people to support your motion. Say you have 
to do a lot of work to change the system. Say that Sec Gen don’t have the power to 
appoint Deputy Sec Gen. … 
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Secondly they also want the right people, if not, the image of the union is gone. So they 
do a lot of education. And big big unions I go and serve, I help them, they remember you 
you know.’ 
 
(Interview 4c: 37) 
 
Annex 5.13  
 
Summary: Interviewee discusses the importance of finances for the union.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘… financial viability, leadership, it is important. So if you have shrinking membership 
size, shrinking numbers of members of course the union finances, the revenue is also 
affected, then their ability to continue to provide the level of service to members. We are 
big in the sense in terms of membership size and we are one of the unions that able to 
employ full time officers, full time staff in fact to provide the whole range of service 
including collective bargaining, other social, recreational even training for our union 
leaders and members. So if your membership size is small, your revenue is small, your 
capacity to hire full time staff, then the demand is on the membership themselves to have 
their own leaders, engage in collective bargaining.’ 
 




Summary: Interviewee discusses the typical breakdown of union expenditures and what 
unions do to raise funds.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
Question: So how would you describe the breakdown of the finances? What would be the 
most amount of thing that you all spend on? 
Interviewee: In any service oriented organisation, it’s staff salary.  
Question: So how much will that take up? 
Interviewee: 30 over percent.  
Question: 30 over percent. Then the rental?  
Interviewee: This is rental free what, we bought the place.  
Question: Oh. Then the rest will go to operating costs?  
Interviewee: Benefits, welfare, operating costs.  
Question: Benefits in what kind of benefits?  
Interviewee: Organise activities, book grants, … study grant, hardship grant. 
… 
Question: So at the end of the year you collect revenues? 
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Interviewee: We net, fortunately our union every year we have net surplus because we 
are, we are very prudent in the way we spend money. 
Question: Then how does, what does this money go into? Savings fund?  
Interviewee:  We do other things… 
Question: Invest… 
Interviewee: We do investments and uh we also introduce uh other new schemes la. If you 
net surplus then you can do more the following year.  
Question: Is there uh, restrictions on how you spend the money? So you can go and invest 
in shares and things like that?  
Interviewee: No, no, no, there’s a trustee fund, there’s a trustee act, there are certain 
funds that you cannot invest in. You cannot invest in shares, you can only buy blue chips 
and then bonds. The trustee’s act, will tell you what are the thing you can or cannot.  
Question: Ok so is this tied to any government approved things?  
Interviewee: Ya, trustee’s act. RTU will come after you, every year you need to declare, 
the registrar of trade union will come after you. 
 




Summary: Interviewee discusses how unions use their money to generate more money.   
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘On top of that I will give to NTUC this much, my commitment over. But you want you 
can actually become shareholder of all these cooperative, so what we do our money we 
have is put into Fairprice, put into Comfort, we put into Childcare, we put into Thrift and 
Loan, and they give 3 to 5% return. … Every year.  
 
… you see, you put in a bank, bank only give you 1% or 2, NTUC gives more, and they 
have to give more because they don’t pay tax, their 22% they save. And they must make 
sure they make profit, if they make loss then nothing to talk, if they make profit they save 
22% of profit right? They don’t have to pay tax, maybe 15%, 1-2% I give to union then 
here I give dividend and all that, so … They make more than the, the 22% isn’t it? They 
make in millions, they don’t pay tax, the running cost is all taken care.  
 
Question: But how does the money get back to the union then? 
Interviewee: By investing.  
Question: Ok, so every year there will be dividends paid out…  
Interviewee: Paid out, that’s how we survive…  
Question: And that helps to fund the union… 
Interviewee: When we have excess cash we put into these cooperatives …, we put out 





Summary: Interviewee discusses how the unions obtain information from the ground, and 
how this information passed on which contributes to their feedback role. ‘x’ is used in 
place of the specific industry in order preserve respondent anonymity.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘So you know the trends, you know what are their so called their practices and things like 
that. … And they are the experts, they will be able to tell me like if I say I talk about x 
industry, so my officer handling the x industry will going to tell me what is happening in 
the x industry. And if I want to do something in this industry, I will get her to sit in to 
coordinate. Ya, then she will get all the employers in this industry together with the 
workers and then you know we will usually partner with the NTUC or WDA you know to 
work out schemes la for specific industries la.’ 
 




Summary: Interviewee discusses how positive discrimination is carried out and explains 
why the union is reluctant to discriminate against non-members.   
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘get the company to positively discriminate, discriminate the union members in the form 
of contribution to the, to the union fund, to the special branch, special branch fund. 
Because every branch, they have some kind of fund and for certain branches some 
management actually put some money into this fund for the branch committee to play 
around with, organise activities whatever, but it cannot be for the own pocket one, it’s for 
organising activities and who governs this fund is the union headquarters, so they also 
cannot anyhow take out the money to use or what, so it’s for them to [organise] activities 
for the workers. We will always say workers because we, the union also don’t want to 
discriminate non-members and members and uh …  
 
In the sense that the union actually is for, works for the workers, and who supports us are 
the members, but we work for the welfare of the workers so … it’s not in our good stead 
[to] say that we, we want to exclude non members. We include them but we subsidise 
members. That is how the, the EXCO of the union, that’s how the management of the 
union wants to positively discriminate [the] members. So when it comes to like let’s say 
the branch organise some kind of like dinner, so the members go they need to only pay 
$5, then the non members they need to pay for the whole meal that kind of thing so this 
has been held among our branches la, for a very long time already, the, the branch 
officials usually take this money to organise some kind of activity where they invite all the 
workers and then, but the non members will have to pay a higher, … the actual price, 
instead of the subsidised price. So even in our, even in our headquarters level where we 
organise like Bangkok trips for all members we also don’t say that non members cannot 
join, they can join, but they pay a higher price.’ 
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(Interview 11: 22) 
 
Annex 5.18  
 
Summary: The following excerpt discusses the reality of globalisation and its effect on 
outsourcing and relocation in particular industries.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘Oh it’s quite real what, we see it in the last 5 years what. Companies relocating … to 
cheaper cost centres. Manufacturing is a good example, in the last 5 years we’ve see a lot 
of electronics firm, Seagate and all that, latest being Maxtor they relocate, for all this low 
end low skill production jobs. And then even in the services sector we see outsourcing, 
some global companies they might out, they might decide to do part of their pack end 
operations in China or in India, call centres’. 
 
(Interview 9g: 3) 
 
Annex 5.19  
 
Summary: Interviewee discusses how the union prioritise and negotiate with employers.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘At the end of the day it is still a list of demands that we serve to the company and we just 
bargain and see the employer what they are able to give, and if they still insist on it, but 
you come a point where ok this you narrow down, what are the things that you give 
priority to you know, what you can, what are the trade offs that you can accept what you 
can’t, what you are prepared to let go. It’s all part of the negotiating process, and then 
part of the strategy ok. You may send on a request for 10 items but you know you only 5 
items are priority, it’s a bargaining process. If the employer give this I will let go of that, 
a trade off.’ 
 




Summary: The interviewee here is describing what happens during a negotiation process, 
and that despite how heated negotiation can sometimes get, at the end of the day both 
unions and employers would take an objective approach to the problem so as to maintain 
good relations.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
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‘I mean it there can be major disagreement you know. Say for example over pay issue, 
over bonus payout, yah? There can be disagreement say over the treatment of trade 
union official for that matter. So it can be fiery, it can be explosive but at the end of the 
day I think the idea is that rational thinking will prevail la. Yah, so in other words you 
don’t, you just don’t hammer the guy or whack the guy for the sake of wanting to win you 
know. At the end of the day I think it’s the sensitivity and then the sensibility of the issue 
which is more important. I think most of us who are practitioners actually goes into the 
issue not only for the present but the preservation of the future. So we are always very 
conscious over the fact that whatever we do, we should not, should not damage the future 
relationship. Because it’s a long term thing. That’s why [I] mention in certain instances 
we could have win all the way. Alright? But sometimes we don’t want to win all the way, 
for reason that we wanted, we value that long term relationship.’ 
 




Summary: Interviewee describes the considerations of the union whether deciding 
whether or not to implement the flexible wage scheme. Even if the scheme is nationally 
directed, unions appear to take into consideration member’s views and possess some 
degree of discretion in deciding whether or not to accept the conditions.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘It depends, it depends on the company, and it depends on our employees, in our 
members’ sentiments la. If a company wants to take out one month and put into a 
variable bonus formula, they must tell us what is the carrot, you’re taking one month of 
my fix to put into a gamble. You must be prepared to top up with another two months or 
another one month, so that my variable is not my fourteenth month from there, for you to 
take away. Ok? So company will come up with bonus formula, a minimum of one month 
to maximum of three months. So you take out your fourteenth month fixed to gamble you 
can get fifteen month or fourteen point five or whatever.  
 
But we will also look at the criteria, what kind of profit level before we can reach that 
fifteen month. If they dangle the carrot so high, even I can’t reach, can’t take my 
fourteenth month huh, with that kind of profit, then we are not going to reject it and say 
my members are quite happy with the fourteenth month, they are not greedy for fifteenth 
month, so we don’t change. Yah.  
 
… Yah, so as long as there is a union, there is a collective agreement, it’s guaranteed. So 
we have uh, I have one company where we have a unusual situation where company say, 
actually we are moving towards what the government is recommending, flexible wage 
system, and we will cut down to thirteenth month and the other one month we will put in 
a, to a bonus plan. But for your union members because you reject it, they will stay on the 
fourteenth month, they will not take part and participate. But for our management, 
executive we are going to implement this.  
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… Yah that’s why, one way, but there are some companies will try to bulldoze their way 
and … the government is already recommend, NWC recommending flexible wage you 
know, why is your union uh not abiding but this? Actually … At the tripartite level again 
there was all these announcement that we should move to a flexible wage system and if 
possible reduce our AWS to a thirteenth month and put the excess into a flexible bonus 
scheme ok, and we should, if you are the employer you would support this won’t you?  
 
… Yah, so there were a lot of employers who wanted to jump on the bandwagon and go 
this direction and uh it came to a point where the union had to bring up to the minister, 
the new minister Mr Ng Eng Heng, to a point where he had to make a public speech; if 
you have an agreement with your union uh for a fixed AWS more than one month and 
you’re happy with the way it is, don’t have to change252. So to us that is because of the 
union representation, it’s a message to the employer, you don’t push it, government, 
tripartite may have said that you try to you know, move towards the thirteenth month, but 
you still have a contract there, you still have to honour it and unless your union is 
prepared to change, happy to change because as I say it depends on individual company, 
you come out with the proper bonus sharing scheme ok, how you want to pay half month, 
how you want to pay 1 month, the KPI, nowadays we talking of it.  
 
When the tripartite body recommended a flexible wage system, pay according to 
company performance, there is also a qualifier, that company come up with Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI), measurable standards of the company performance, you 
know. Not some blur blur idea you know; in my CEO reckoning I think this year we can 
afford to pay one month so we pay one month. You, so employers conveniently ignore this 
part, part of the recommendation, so if you are not ready how you want to measure your 
company’s performance, what do you, what indicators to use, sales figure, sales revenue, 
turnover or profitability? You don’t know what you are measuring your performance 
against, how do you expect us to agree with you to uh to implement a flexible bonus 
scheme when everything becomes discretionary in the employer’s hand, we have no 
control. So that is the, the other part of it. 
 
(Interview 9b: 14-16) 
 
Annex 5.22  
 
Summary: The interviewee cites a case of dealing with an employer who was found to be 
‘jumping on the bandwagon’ and taking advantage of national initiatives to benefit at the 
expense of workers. ‘X’ was used to maintain the industrial field of the company.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘… 1998 crisis, every company is suffering generally, and already government, the 
National Wages Council also make a unprecedented recommendation that employers can 
                                                 
252
 This arrangement is in fact permitted under an exception clause under the Employment Act Cap. 91 
Section 48 (1) and (2). 
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cut wages, on top of CPF cut. We call it a wage reduction. Alright? And so this particular 
employer decide that that was the opportune time. Since NWC recommend wage 
reduction, why don’t we just cut the AWS, we are not going to pay increment, that’s not 
good enough for us, let’s cut their AWS. And they cut, they didn’t pay, and they didn’t tell 
us, they didn’t disclose any information, they just cut, so I have no choice, I have to take 
them to the Ministry of Manpower to explain why they cut you see. And so they have to go 
there and show their P and L and so on, and ended up, you know X practise they are not 
affected by Asian Financial Crisis, maybe during SARS, that is years later, it’s still 
profitable, they just jumping on the bandwagon, so they finally agreed, first they offered 
pay oh we pay half a month, we said no and they finally agreed to pay the full AWS. But 
because they disclosed their accounts and so on, I then went after them for bonus for 
1998.’ 
 




Summary: Here, the interviewee describes the sort of qualities that are deemed to be 
necessary in a union delegate.  
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
[It is extremely important that union delegates were trusted by their members. Otherwise, 
the delegates would not be able to perform. Thus in that sense delegates have to know the 
workers very well and communication and networks are important. For workers it is 
important that the union delegate is able to help them in their working lives. They would 
raise questions to the delegates for the delegates to raise to the EXCO and from there the 
EXCO to raise to the management if it is necessary. Rapport in this sense is very 
important. Members will usually know when a delegate is not working, they can tell from 
the way in which their issue is handled by the person. Whether or not they try and make 
effort to help solve their problems. A lot of the time, what is crucial is not that the 
problem gets resolved, rather, it is in the way that help is given to the members. The 
outcome may be negative in the end, but the delegate must try. If the delegate is not good 
and not sincere, word will get around and people will come to know about it, because 
people know other people and they will tell. I was told of a an example whereby people 
because of their job have access to walkie talkies or PA systems, used them to broadcast 
their dissatisfaction to everyone. A singular complain made in such a fashion can reach a 
lot of people all at once and very publicly. And such a method can be very effective. After 
people come to know, the delegate may have to step down.] 
 





Summary: Interviewee explains and describes the behaviour of union delegates who 
participate in the union for the sake of their own interests, and indirectly explains the sort 
of role expected of a union delegate.   
 
Interview Excerpts:  
 
‘Just basically, they just want to know for their own personal benefit, and then when I 
come in for negotiations on salary or position, I look at my position what is my salary 
range will I be affected you know, that kind of thing la. It will become quite evident, how 
does it benefit me.  
 
… Sometimes, you notice they seem to be concentrating on what affects them, not 
generally speaking for the you know general membership, for the rest of the thing they 
you know quite laissez faire, you know, nothing, they don’t really go out and say survey 
members how do you, what are your problems, what are your issues you know, so the 
more committed and active ones they will come back with a, they will feedback, can we 
look at you know Lee or this group of workers, you know does the union have any 
financial assistance scheme for this uh person you know, whose husband is out of work, 
that kind of thing, so you get feedback from people who are more, more people oriented. 
And actually it is a lot of expectation and demand, we also expect them to be problem 
solvers for the members. You know, members come with problems to them, if they can 
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